EXHIBIT B

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          IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
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          FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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                              )
     In re:
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                              ) Chapter 11
     LEHMAN BROTHERS ) Case No. 08-13555(JMP)
6
    HOLDINGS, INC., et al, ) (Jointly Administered)
7
                  Debtors.
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         DEPOSITION OF PROF. PAUL PFLEIDERER
14
                  New York, New York
15
               Tuesday, February 23, 2010
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    Reported by:
24
    MAYLEEN CINTRON, RMR, CRR
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     JOB NO. 28399
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	Page 2		Page 3
1		1	APPEARANCES:
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3	February 20, 2010	3	JONES DAY LLP
4	9:13 a.m.	4	Attorneys for Debtors - Lehman Brothers, Inc.
5		5	222 East 41st Street
6		6	New York, New York 10017-6702
7	DEPOSITION OF PROF. PAUL	7	BY: JAYANT W. TAMBE, ESQ.
8	PFLEIDERER, an expert witness, held at the	8	KELLY CARRERO, ESQ.
9	offices of Jones Day LLP, 222 East 41st	9	XOCHITL STROHBEHN, ESQ.
10	Street, New York, New York, pursuant to	10	ROBERT W. GAFFEY, ESQ. [as noted]
11	Notice, before MayLeen Cintron, a Registered	11	
12	Merit Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter,	12	
13	and Notary Public of the State of New York.	13	BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
14		14	Attorneys for Barclays
15		15	5301 Wisconsin Ave., N.W.
16		16	Washington D.C. 20015
17		17	BY: JONATHAN M. SHAW, ESQ.
18		18	
19		19	
20		20	QUINN, EMANUEL, URQUHART,
21		21	OLIVER & HEDGES LLP
22		22	Attorneys for the Creditors Committee
23		23	51 Madison Avenue - 22nd Floor
24		24	New York, New York 10010
25		25	BY: ROBERT K. DAKIS, ESQ.
	TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580		TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580
	Page 4		Page 5
1	APPEARANCES: (Cont'd)	1	- P. Pfleiderer-
2	111 1 2 11 11 11 0 2 21 (0 0 m 0)	2	PAUL PFLEIDER,
3	HUGHES, HUBBARD & REED LLP	3	called as a witness, having been duly
4	Attorneys for the SIPA Trustee	4	sworn by a Notary Public, was examined
5	One Battery Park Plaza	5	and testified as follows:
6	New York, New York 10004-1482	6	THE REPORTER: Please state your
7	BY: WILLIAM R. MAGUIRE, ESQ.	7	full name for the record.
8	FARA TABATABAI, ESQ. [as noted]	8	THE WITNESS: Paul Pfleiderer.
9		9	EXAMINATION BY
10		10	MR. TAMBE:
11	ALSO PRESENT:	11	Q. Good morning, Professor Pfleiderer.
12	DR. MARC VELLRATH, Finance Scholars Group	12	My name is Jayant Tambe. I'm one of the
13	RAJESH ANKALKOT, Alvarez & Marsal, Inc.	13	lawyers for Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.,
14		14	the Debtor in this matter.
15 16		15	I'm going to allow also the other
16 17		16 17	counsel to introduce themselves. But with me
18		18	from Jones Day are Kelly Carrero and Xochitl Strohbehn.
19		19	MR. DAKIS: Robert Dakis from Quinn
20		20	Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Hedges, for
21		21	the Official Committee of Unsecured
22		22	Creditors.
23		23	MR. ANKALKOTI: Rajesh Ankalkoti
24		24	with Alvarez & Marsal for Lehman
25		25	Brothers.
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Page 6 Page 7 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 MR. TAMBE: We have received word 2 2 not correct and were replaced. 3 3 from Trustee's counsel that he will be (Exhibit 634-A, Expert report of 4 4 Professor Paul Pfleiderer - Vol II, here shortly but we are to start 5 without him. 5 marked for identification, as of this 6 6 (Exhibit 633-A, Expert report of Professor Paul Pfleiderer - Volume I, 7 7 Q. I'm also handing you what has been marked as deposition Exhibit 634-A. Can you 8 marked for identification, as of this 8 confirm that that's Volume II of your expert 9 9 0 10 report? (Whereupon, a recess was taken 11 from 9:24 a.m. to 9:27 a.m.) 11 A. I believe it is, yes. 12 Q. We will keep those handy because we L 2 BY MR. TAMBE: 13 will be referring to those frequently 13 Q. Good morning, Professor Pfleiderer. 14 I'm handing you what has been marked as 14 throughout the day. 15 deposition Exhibit 633-A. Can you confirm 15 (Exhibit 635-A, 2/22/10 letter to that that is Volume I of the expert report you Jones Day from Boies Schiller with 16 16 attachment, marked for identification, have submitted in this matter on or about 17 17 18 January 8, 2010? 18 as of this date.) 19 19 A. With the qualification that some of (Exhibit 636-A, 2/22/10 e-mail to 20 the pages have been replaced here. 20 K. Carrero from Davenport with Q. And you're referring to some of the attachments, marked for identification, 21 21 schedules, the spreadsheets to which the back 22 22 as of this date.) 23 of Volume I off Exhibit 633-A; is that right? 23 (Exhibit 637-A, 2/10/10 e-mail to A. Yes. For example, page 129, the 24 K. Carrero, marked for identification, 24 25 date headings on the columns in that page are 25 as of this date.) TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 9 Page 8 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 through the report and found some parts that 2 Q. The next document I'm handing you 2 3 has been marked as Exhibit 636-A. Is that a 3 had to be corrected. 4 document you've seen before today? 4 Q. When is it that you went through A. I did not see the cover page, but 5 5 the report with your staff to make these the contents that contain the list of errata. 6 6 changes? 7 I did see. 7 A. That would have been an ongoing process that probably commenced as soon as the 8 MR. SHAW: I would like to 8 report was filed. I was reading the report at 9 9 interject a point of clarification. 10 Although the document is entitled "as various times, and so were staff working at my 10 of February 18th" and seems it's 11 11 direction. And on occasion an error was 12 carried through, these are actually 12 discovered, and I believe a list was assembled 13 materials provided as of yesterday. 13 over time as those errors were discovered. MR. TAMBE: As of February 22nd. 14 14 And what you see is the sum total of that list 15 MR. SHAW: Correct. 15 as it exists now. 16 Q. Turning to the attachments to the 16 Q. When is the last error that's noted cover e-mail, Professor Pfleiderer. The first 17 17 in this errata sheet recorded, sir? attachment is titled "Expert Report Professor 18 (Witness reviewing document.) 18 19 Paul Pfleiderer, January 2010 errata." Do you 19 A. I'm not sure I understand the 20 20 21 21 A. I do, yes. Q. Well, were you finding errors in Q. Is that an errata sheet that you 22 22 your original report as of yesterday? Did you 23 prepared, sir? 23 find any vesterday? 24 24 A. No, I did not. A. It was prepared by staff working 25 under my direction who had gone along with me 25 Q. When was the last day that you or TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580

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Page 10 - P. Pfleidereryour staff found an error in your report

that's been listed here in your errata sheet? (Witness reviewing document.)

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A. I'm having trouble answering the question because there were a few errors that I had found but staff had already found and corrected. The last error that I found was one that I think staff had found before, and that was probably about a week ago. But they had found it, I think, perhaps several weeks ago. So I'm not sure that I can answer your

question in terms of definitively saying when

was the last day in which an error was

- discovered. Q. Were you involved in the decision as to when those errors would be reported to counsel in this matter?
- A. I was involved to the extent that I knew that there was an errata sheet that was being prepared, and that would be submitted, but I wasn't involved in the precise timing of that.
- O. Who made that decision as to when the errata sheet would be turned over?

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- P. Pfleiderercontained.

- Q. And you satisfied yourself that there are no errors in your errata sheet?
- A. As I sit here now, I'm not aware of any errors in the errata sheet.
- Q. In the review you conducted, you said, yesterday or in the last few days when you went over the errata sheet, was to confirm that weren't any errors in your errata sheet, correct?
- A. As I said, the review was to determine that things that had been discovered in my report that was viewed as errors, were corrected. I can't categorically state that there are no errors in the errata sheet, but I'm certainly not aware of any.
- Q. The next attachment, again, within Exhibit 636-A is titled, the case name, "List of documents sent to Paul Pfleiderer after filing of expert report," and it states there, "As of February 18, 2010." But I believe counsel said that should read as of February 22, 2010. Do you see that?

A. I do.

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MR. SHAW: Objection. Foundation. If you know, you can answer.

A. I don't know.

- Q. Once the errata sheet was prepared, sir, did you sit down with the errata sheet and the report and make sure that the corrections that were listed in the errata sheet are consistent with your understanding of the errors that need to be corrected in vour report?
- A. As I suggested before, this was an evolving document and as the errors were assembled, I understood where the errors were and what they were correcting. So I think the answer is yes, in the course of the preparation of this, I was looking at the various errors understanding why there were errors and understanding the nature of the correction.

But I don't think there was a moment in time when I went through it all at once. Although I did look at it, I believe it was yesterday or the day before to confirm the nature of the errors and what was -- what was TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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Q. And have you reviewed this list of documents before this morning? (Witness reviewing document.)

(Mr. McGuire entering the room.)

A. I received the things appearing on this list in various tranches, shall we say, and...

MR. SHAW: I think he's just asking if you reviewed the actual list.

Q. That was my question. We can get to the next question.

You have reviewed the list before today?

A. This list here?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

- Q. And you were explaining that the materials listed in this list, which is the second attachment to the cover e-mail in 636-A are materials that you received in various tranches on or after the date of your report,
 - A. I believe that is correct, yes.
 - Q. It is numbered pages 1 through 15. TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

Page 14 Page 15 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 Do you see that? 2 Q. And you recognize that as a Bates 3 3 A. I do. labeling that's used by Barclays for documents 4 Q. Starting at the bottom of page 1 4 produced by Barclays, correct? 5 over to the top of page 15, do you recognize 5 A. I do. 6 those materials submitted by Barclays as part 6 O. And is it fair to say that none of of its opposition brief that was filed towards 7 7 these documents that are listed as "Additional 8 the end of January? 8 Materials" were available to you when you A. Yes, I do. 9 9 prepared your report? 1 0 Q. You would have received a set of 10 A. I believe that's correct. 11 those materials when Barclays filed them; is 11 Q. When did you receive these 12 12 that correct? documents? 13 A. Within days after it was filed, I MR. SHAW: When did he personally 13 14 believe. I'm not quite sure what the precise 14 receive them or when did staff, working 15 15 at his direction, receive them? timing was. 16 Q. I want to draw your attention to 16 MR. TAMBE: When did he personally 17 the last page of the exhibit. It is page 15 17 receive these documents. 18 of the attachment. The category titled 18 A. I would have to go back and check, 19 "Additional Materials." Do you see that? 19 to the extent I could, with my records. Some 20 20 A. Yes, I do. of these. I believe were e-mailed to me but 21 quite a few of them, I believe, were put on my 21 Q. What you have in a list under 2.2 **Additional Materials are a series of Bates** 22 computer with a flash memory device that I 23 numbers which all begin with "BCI-EX," do you 23 received from staff who had received them. 24 see that? 24 So I'm not sure exactly how to 25 A. I do. 25 answer the question because I'm not sure when TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580 Page 17 Page 16 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 the -- when the various things were received 2 them. But it didn't cause me to change issue 3 and transferred to my computer. 3 -- change my opinions in any substantive way. 4 Q. Now, have you, in fact, reviewed 4 Q. Handing you a document that's been 5 every one of these items that were provided to 5 marked Exhibit 635-A. Have you seen that 6 you after your report was filed? 6 document before today? 7 A. Staff working at my direction has 7 (Witness reviewing document.) reviewed these, and I've reviewed several of 8 8 A. I'm not sure how to answer your 9 9 question. I can go through it page-by-page these. My problem is some of these are 10 spreadsheet names that I may not recognize by 0 and say that I don't believe I've seen the 11 the name, but if we were to open the 11 cover page, and I don't believe I've seen the spreadsheet, I would see -- I've seen that 12 next page. I have seen the third page or 12 13 spreadsheet before. 13 something very similar to it. 14 So my difficulty in answering your 14 One of the difficulties I'm going 15 question is the spreadsheet names were not 15 to have in answering questions of this sort is 16 what I kept in mind when I was looking at 16 that I've looked through a large number of 17 things. I was more aware of the content and 17 spreadsheets that often times contain 18 the way the spreadsheet was structured. 18 information that's in other spreadsheets that 19 Q. Were any of the opinions that you 19 is either the exact same information or 20 20 expressed in your expert report affected in similar information. any way by the materials that you reviewed, 21 21 So when I look at any one of these these materials, the additional materials? 22 22 pages, I've either seen this page exactly as 23 A. No, not at all. Although, I should 23 it's presented on the paper, or I've seen 24 something very similar. So the third page I 24 say what I saw here has actually strengthened 25 my opinions. So in that sense it's affected believe I've seen. When we get to the next 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleiderer-

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page, this looks to be either something that I have seen or something very, very similar to things that I've looked at over the course of evaluating the various materials that have been presented to me.

The problem here is that this is a printout, I believe, from a spreadsheet. And I never look at printouts from spreadsheets. I actually look at the printouts -- or I should say the spreadsheet in native form, in the electronic form.

So seeing it as a printout, I'm unable to verify that that's exactly the same as the electronic form. So if I page through it, this would appear to be a printout from one spreadsheet. Unfortunately these pages aren't numbered, so I'm not sure when one spreadsheet ends and another one begins.

Q. Just so you know, we prepared this exhibit based on a document we received late yesterday from counsel from Barclays and I printed out the spreadsheet that was attached, provided with a disc and included with that letter. So the document is what it is.

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Do you understand the information that's contained on any of these pages, sir?

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MR. SHAW: Well, I think his point is the document is not what it is. Because as he said, he looked at these in electronic format where there is different formatting, different information. He certainly can try to answer questions, but he's testified he has not looked at printouts.

Q. Looking at the fourth page of this exhibit, Exhibit 635-A, can you tell by looking at that page what type of information is being conveyed on that page?

(Witness reviewing document.)

A. Again, I am going to say that there's a lot of information that I can read from this, but I'm going to be very careful because the way one goes through an electronic spreadsheet often is to not only look at the numbers, but to look at the cell references and see what they refer to and the calculations behind them.

So what you don't see in the TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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printouts here are the formulas behind them. But I can go through this and, to the best of my ability, give you answers as to what a lot of these numbers and symbols refer to, but

with the caveat that I'm not able to do that completely because it is not in electronic form.

So looking at the first column, the inventory there was received, was divided to various categories and there were two grouping, PMTG, Principal Mortgage Trading Group, and Principal Mortgage Trading Group II. The Principal Mortgage Trading Group taken alone, not with the "II," contained a fairly large inventory of security. And the one with the II contained a somewhat smaller

The next columns you see are the CUSIPs. And those, as I'm sure you well know, are numerical codes that identify individual securities.

Then we have "loss coverage ratio" which, for various fixed income securities, is going to relate to aspects of the security. TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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There's a model price here, and to know exactly how that's being used and feeds into other calculations, I would have to have the electronic spreadsheet to determine what that is used for and how it might affect other -- other numbers.

There is a common heading, BoNY, that's Bank of New York, and this was a price that was given to this particular security called a mark that was given by Bank of New York on the 19th of September 2008 as the inventory was received.

The next column, and I want to be very careful here because, again, it is very important to look yet how these numbers are used. It is headed "final PCG," price control group price. What I discovered is that often times, this is repeated, so the actual number that's used for calculations that come subsequently in this spreadsheet, to know where it comes from, you have to actually look at the underlying formula.

But oftentimes, a column with that heading was given the price control group TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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6 (Pages 18 to 21)

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price that would be used to -- to basically get the midpoint mark for -- for the assessment for the value of the acquisition balance sheet.

Then there would be a "comment" column that would show where that price came from and whether it was based upon a model or, in some of these cases, it appears -again I have to look at this carefully, that it's relating back to the Bank of New York

Then we have a column which is called "factor," and this refers to fixed income securities generically where some of the principal has been paid down. And so since the pricing is based upon a par amount, when the principal has been paid down, you have to reduce it accordingly for that paydown.

The top one, you see that the factor is one, meaning that the par value is going to be multiplied by one to reflect that there's really been no paydown on that security. But if you go down to row four, TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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you'll see that the factor is 0.94 and that would mean that the par value has to be multiplied by 0.94 to reflect the fact that about six percent of the value has been paid down.

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The next column is labeled "price difference." I couldn't tell you what that is without having this in electronic form to be able to see exactly what was calculated there. But on this particular printout, it would appear that that column wasn't used.

The next column, as you can see, doesn't have a heading. Oh, I'm sorry. This may be the -- it is a wider column. This is why, again, you need it in electronic form. I thought there were two columns there. If you have it in electronic form, you can easily see that there is just one column there.

So to clarify, it would appear from this spreadsheet printout that that space there is all labeled by the column headed "price difference," and I couldn't tell you what that price difference is referring to without having the electronic version to see TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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what the formula was.

Then we have a column that's labeled "adjusted nominal", and what that would be in all likelihood -- and again, I'd want to see if that corresponds -- actually, it is going to be perhaps difficult here. Because I'm not sure the whole thing is printed out. This is another potential difficulty in looking at it as a printout.

So I wouldn't be able to tell exactly what that -- or even speculate what that refers to until I see the actual electronic version and see the formula that's used there.

Now, it appears that the next pages are just additional rows under those column headings, and that seems to go on for some -some pages.

And so I think if you go, I'm going to guess, probably to page 15 or so, where you'll be moving across the spreadsheet to new columns, then you have a heading that says "difference", again, I couldn't tell you what that difference is without having it in TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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electronic form. It seems to repeat the "desk," and then again "Principal Mortgage Trading Group" for the first row.

And then we have a type of security. And this type is used -- and I have to make sure in this particular case that this was the actual column that was being used. This type is used to determine what liquidity or haircut is given to convert the mid-point price to an exit price. This may be the column that is used to classify. But again, you can't tell unless you have the version of the spreadsheet in its electronic form to see what the actual formula that's being used.

Then --

Q. I'm sorry. Can I just stop you on that one for a second?

A. Yes.

Q. I'm trying to understand when you say the liquidity or haircut discount is used, used by whom and how?

A. We may get to it if we go further into the document here. Let me just --MR. SHAW: Switch documents. TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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A. This spreadsheet may not have it then.

Q. What is your general understanding of how the type was used or connected to a liquidity discount or haircut?

- A. First of all, I want to be very careful here. I pointed to a column and pointed to a listing of types. I don't know whether this particular column refers to the types that were used in any spreadsheet to determine the haircut.
- Q. But on other spreadsheets you've seen, you've seen the type of security, the label is one of the drivers of what liquidity discount or haircut was used by Barclays; is that correct?
 - A. That is correct.

O. Am I to understand then that that same liquidity discount or haircut is used for all securities of this type?

A. Well, we have to be very careful here because in some of the types, the corporates, for example, the -- let me explain the process that was done with the corporate 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide

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securities. Because to answer your question -- first of all, the answer to your question is no.

It was not the case that the haircut was uniformly applied to securities based upon type. And one example where that's not true are the corporate securities, ones that are labeled "corporate".

What Barclays did as a general practice was they got quotations from various vendors and other sources on corporate securities, basically bids that were given across a number of vendors. And generally, I think there may have been some exceptions to this and I'd have to go back and look at the spreadsheets to, perhaps, find some of those, but generally speaking, what they did is they took the minimum of those and applied that as the exit price.

So what you would do -- if we had the electronic spreadsheet here, I could show you. What in that case happens is it refers to the corporate type liquidity discount, but you'll see that that's a one. And what that TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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reflects is that no liquidity discount is being taken off of that on the spreadsheets that are related to liquidity discounts. Rather what is done is keying off of the minimum of the various quotations that were obtained.

So what that means, of course, is that within the class of corporate securities, it is not the case that a uniform treatment is being applied in terms of a percentage reduction because it's based upon actual quotations that are coming from the market.

Q. And for other asset type classes, putting aside the corporate securities, were there any asset classes for which a uniform discount was used across all CUSIPs within that asset class?

A. I have to be very careful in answering that question because there were other asset classes where there was a discount that was applied perhaps generally, but I'm not going to say -- actually, could you read his question back for me, please, just to make sure I'm answering it appropriately?

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(Record read as follows: "Question: And for other asset type classes, putting aside the corporate

securities, were there any asset classes for which a uniform discount was used across all CUSIPs within that asset class?")

A. In answering your question, I'm mindful that you said "all CUSIPs" within that class. And there were asset classes where it was generally the case that a haircut, liquidity haircut is what I believed they called it at time, was applied generally across CUSIPs.

But there were exceptions to that. So I would have to go back and look to see if there were any asset classes for which all of the CUSIPs within that class -- and that would include the initial inventory and the J.P. Morgan inventory. It was uniform across all of those because there were some exceptions.

Q. We had stopped on "type." Carrying on to the next label.

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A. So the next column heading is, again, Bank of New York, "BoNY," nominal as of the 19th of September 2008. And my difficulty here, again, is not having it in electronic version so that I can refer to some previous columns here.

So I believe that this would be the par value that may have occurred in another column, but I would need to check that. But I believe it is the par value that Bank of New York was assessing at the time these securities were being marked by the Bank of New York on the 19th of September.

But I would have to have the electronic version in front of me to verify that. If you give me the time, I may be able to go back and look at the previous columns to see if it corresponds. Do you want me to do that?

Q. I don't think you need to do that. Let's just finish off these two, these remaining columns on this page.

A. So then we have a column that's headed "the market value of the Bank of New TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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York mark," which if I had the electronic version here, I would be able to verify this. In many columns it would be arrived at by multiplying the nominal value times the Bank of New York price, usually divided by a hundred because the price is expressed as price per \$100.

But I don't want to say at this point that that's what the numbers in this particular column on this printout of the spreadsheet reflect. Because without the formula, I can't verify that that's the case.

And then in the next column, I'm going to give the same caveat, I can't say definitively what this is because I don't have the electronic version and I can't see the formula.

But the next column is headed "Pricing Control Group Market Value," and what that would refer to is the mark that Barclays is putting on it, assuming that this column is headed appropriately. And I'm going off the column heading without being able to look at the formulas here from the electronic version.

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And that, if it is calculated as the market value for the pricing control group, it's calculated in the electronic versions of the spreadsheet that I've seen calculated would be based, again, on the nominal value which would be the par value times the factor times the pricing control group price, divided by 100.

But again, I have to be careful here. Insert, again, the caveat, since I don't have the electronic versions. I can't say these particular numbers refer to that without knowing the formula and without being able to verify it from what's going on in some previous columns.

Q. The last column is a column entitled "Comments"; do you see that?

A. I do.

Q. At least on the page we are looking at, the word "Intex" appears a few times in that column. Do you see that?

A. I do.

Q. And you recognize that as a pricing service that was used by Barclays to price

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certain security, sir?

A. That would be my understanding of what that would be referring to in this particular case, yes.

Q. Have you ever used Intex to price securities?

A. I personally haven't used it directly. It may very well be that some people at my firm have used it. I know that they used various pricing services in some of the consulting work that is done at my firm, Quantum International. I have not been directly involved in that, but I believe that we have on occasion used outside vendors such as Intex.

Q. And you believe Barclays's use of Intex, where it did use Intex for pricing, was appropriate?

A. What I have seen is that throughout the spreadsheet that I've looked at, that they've gone and gotten pricing from various sources and have used those in appropriate way, yes.

Q. And you, generally, philosophically TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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Pg 11 of 122 Page 34 Page 35 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 don't have a view about any problems of using 2 having not personally worked with it, but I 3 3 Intex as a source for pricing, do you, sir? believe that my firm has used it on occasion, 4 A. I'm not sure what you mean by 4 I haven't encountered any personal problems 5 5 "philosophically." with it. So if that's your question. 6 Q. Is there a problem of using Intex 6 Q. That was part of my question, yes. 7 for pricing as opposed to using some other A. The answer is no, I have not and no 7 8 service for pricing? 8 one in my firm has indicated that there is a MR. SHAW: Objection to form. 9 9 particular problem that they've encountered. 0 A. Without knowing a particular 10 Q. Is it fair to say that if it was 11 context and understanding exactly what the 11 not a reliable source of information, your 12 situation is, I can't answer a philosophical 12 firm wouldn't use it? 13 question like that. 13 A. I would say that given the types of Q. Generally, do you have any concerns 14 projects that I know we have been involved 15 about the approach taken by Intex in pricing 15 with, we would want to use reliable 16 securities? 16 information, yes. 17 17 A. Again, I'm not -- I'm not sure I Q. Other than Intex, are there any other sort of third-party pricing sources that 18 know how to answer the question. In the -- in 18 19 this particular context or --19 vou or vour firm deem to be reliable sources 20 20 of pricing information for securities? Q. Generally. You said your firm may have used Intex on certain assignments. What MR. SHAW: Objection to form. 21 21 22 do you mean about Intex? 22 A. I'm not sure. There are lots of A. Well, I know that they provide data 23 23 services out there. My firm, for instance, 24 that gives a lot of information about various 24 gets market quotes on equities from a number 25 fixed income securities and structures, so 25 of sources and we have a process that we TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 37 Page 36 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 developed over the years of combining that 2 is definitely yes. 3 data to -- to make even more accurate price 3 Q. The question was a little 4 estimates. And I certainly saw that that was 4 different. Do you consider yourself an expert 5 being done throughout this exercise. They 5 in the reliability of particular pricing would get price information from -- from --6 6 sources? 7 oftentimes from multiple vendors or multiple 7 A. Well, I have not done a full study sources when that was available, and use --8 8 of reliability. First of all, you have to 9 9 define how you measure reliability, what used that information in a combined way to get 0 a fix on the price. 10 circumstances, so on and so forth. 11 Q. The "they" you're referring to here 11 In the process of using things at 2 12 my firm and in looking at equity feeds and is Barclays? 13 13 things of that sort, I know that there is a A. I'm referring to Barclays from what 14 14 is evident from the spreadsheets that I've high degree of reliability of much of the data 15 15 that's made available. looked at. 16 16 I know that PricewaterhouseCoopers Q. Do you consider yourself to be an 17 17 expert on the reliability of particular has looked at the work that has been done and 18 pricing services? 18 the sources that have been used, and my 19 19 A. I certainly know that Bloomberg and understanding is that they had no objection to 20 20

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others are quite reliable because we've used those in our firm. And are they 100 percent accurate in all cases? I guess nothing measures up to that standard. But are they reliable to use for exercises such as this, such as we do at our firm? I think the answer TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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its use. And I was basing certainly my

assessment in part upon that, upon my knowledge of the types of vendors that are out there and what they provide, so...

Q. If you can go back to my question. Do you consider yourself to be an expert on

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the reliability of pricing sources? A. I certainly think I have expertise in it. Am I the world's expert on that? No, but I certainly have expertise to the point where I was able to satisfy myself that the use of the type of pricing sources that were being used here in this context was appropriate and reasonable.

Q. Are you offering an expert opinion in this case about the reliability of any particular pricing services?

A. I wasn't asked to offer an expert opinion on the particular reliability of any one source. So in my -- in my report, I don't address the reliability of any particular source, I wasn't asked to do that.

Q. You told us that you haven't personally used Intex for any pricing that you have done, correct?

A. Not to my recollection. I may have at one point, but I don't recall.

Q. And certainly in connection with this assignment, you personally didn't use Intex to verify the calculations or values

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derived by Barclays; is that right?

A. No, I did not.

Q. And no one on your staff did that, correct?

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- A. I would have to check with my staff who looked at lots of pricing sources and lots of information, did a number of checks. And I -- I'm not going to say that that was not done because it may very well have been done. So I don't know.
- Q. So as you sit here, you don't know whether any Intex searches, other valuations were done by your staff with respect to this assignment?

A. They may very well have been done, but I don't know.

Q. Handing you what's previously been marked as 637-A. Marked this morning as 637-A.

Sir, have you seen Exhibit 637-A before today?

(Witness reviewing document.)

A. I don't believe I have. I may have seen parts of this, but I don't believe so, TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleiderercolumn and to some extent line-by-line, and it is probably the case that in scrolling down and looking at things, I've seen each of the CUSIPs. But if you're asking did I spend ten minutes looking at each row times 10,000 or 12,000, I obviously didn't do that.

What I did is I spent a lot of time looking at what was done column by column in scrolling down the rows, looking at the procedures, looking at the various marks. And not only did I do that, but staff working at my direction did that as well in a very intense way.

So if the question is did I spend ten minutes or more looking at each CUSIP and verifying that? The answer is no. If the question is did I do a very intensive review of what was done, looking at those spreadsheets, looking at how they were constructed, looking at various rows and what was done and did the staff working at my direction do that, the answer is decidedly

Q. Again, just so I'm clear, as far as TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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Q. As part of your assignment, sir, one of the things you did is you went back and you looked at the valuations that had been prepared by Barclays' PCG Group for each of the CUSIPs in this transaction, correct?

A. Could you read the question back, please?

(Record read as follows:

"Question: As part of your assignment, sir, one of the things you did is you went back and you looked at the valuations that had been prepared by Barclays' PCG Group for each of the CUSIPs in this transaction, correct?")

A. So the only problem or the major problem I had in answering your question is your use of the term "each of the CUSIPs." I looked at my spreadsheets that contained all the CUSIPs, I believe, that were delivered in either the initial inventory or the JPM, J.P. Morgan inventory that was delivered on the 22nd.

And I've looked at those column by TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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you know, your staff didn't go CUSIP by CUSIP and validate the prices on every single CUSIP; is that right?

A. First of all, I ask what would you mean by "validate the price" on every CUSIP? So take one CUSIP first, what would you mean by "validate"?

Q. Let's use one definition of "validate." Did you go back and independently verify the price used by PCG whether or not that was, in fact, the correct price as of the correct valuation date for that CUSIP?

A. So now we need to dig even deeper. The price that was used by PCG, for example, for a corporate was obtained by getting quotations from various vendors, from various sources. And the procedure generally -- and there were potentially exceptions to this so I want to use the word "generally". We have to go through each spreadsheet if you want to individually look at each CUSIP.

The procedure was to take the minimum of those prices. So if you're talking about validation in the way that I just

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thought you were talking about it, that would entail looking at those price feeds and verifying that if it says 37.2, it was indeed 37.2 that was the price that was put out by that vendor on that particular -- for that particular day.

I don't believe that staff working at my direction did that. They may have. I can tell you that I did not do that. I took those prices as being a correct representation of what the vendor would have been reporting on that particular day.

So I did not validate those prices in that way. Staff working at my direction may -- may have done that. I do not believe that they routinely did that across all 10,000 CUSIPs. I'm actually quite sure that they did not

But if that's the type of validation exercise that you're talking about, it may have been done in some cases for some CUSIPs by my staff. I don't know. I know that I did not personally do it.

Q. That was exactly the type of

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- P. Pfleiderervalidation exercise I had in mind, so thank you for answering.

Are there any particular CUSIPs that you're aware of as you sit here today where that type of validation exercise was done by you or your staff?

A. The answer is yes in the following sense. There were some CUSIPs for which I looked at some screen shots that were produced relating to various inputs in -- in the CUSIP. And the one that comes to mind, as I sit here right now, and I could probably refresh my memory with some others if I had a spreadsheet in front of me in electronic version, but the one that comes to mind, for example, is the Pine CLO where there was a question as to what the appropriate factor was.

And I looked at a screen shot that was produced. It may have been Bloomberg, but it may have been some other vendor. And saw the actual number that came from that screen shot and that was then placed -- and I went back and verified that that number was the number that was being used in the spreadsheet.

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So the answer is yes, in a limited way, I did do that.

Q. Other than Pine, as you sit here today, is there any other particular CUSIP or security that comes to mind where you did that?

MR. SHAW: "You" personally? MR. TAMBE: Personally. Let's start with that.

A. I believe there are. I've seen some other screen shots and I have a recollection of it at some point looking -- looking for it in the spreadsheet. And that entails -- that entails you take the CUSIP and you search in the column for that CUSIP and verifying it. But I don't remember -- I don't remember the name of the security and I certainly don't remember the name of the CUSIP.

The one that stands out in my mind as I sit here now is Pine. However, I believe that my staff working at direct -- at my direction have -- have looked at no else as well and may well have looked at things that I TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleidererdidn't look at and I'm sure that's quite likely.

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- Q. Do you have a recollection of directing your staff to go look up particular prices for particular CUSIPs by name and identifying any of those?
- A. My direction to the staff working at my direction was to do a thorough evaluation of what I was doing in a more limited way of looking at the information that was presented and checking to see how it was used. So that type of global direction was given, but it wasn't given on a CUSIP by CUSIP basis.
- Q. In your previous couple of answers, you said that you would go to the spreadsheet and look up other examples. What's "the spreadsheet" that you're referring to? There are a lot of spreadsheets in this case?
- A. So there were two that one -- and I can give you. I have to go back and look because these spreadsheets had very long names. But one was called "Valuation Detail," and then there was some qualifying

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information, and that was a huge spreadsheet that had at least probably 10 -- I'm trying to recall the exact number. 10 or so. It was a workbook that had 10 or so spreadsheets, perhaps more.

And that contained the summary page as well as the backup detail for the initial inventory that was received. And then there was a separate spreadsheet -- and, again, I couldn't give you the full name because, as I recall, it's at least 30 or 40 characters long -- that contained the inventory that was received in the J.P. Morgan settlement that had a very similar structure, not identical.

But the formatting was a little bit different and some of the structure was a little different, but a similar structure overall to the initial spreadsheet or the spreadsheet workbook that related to the initial inventory.

Q. Just for ease of our conversation today, let's refer to the first spreadsheet that you're alluding to as the initial

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inventory spreadsheet. Okay? And the second spreadsheet is the J.P. Morgan inventory spreadsheet.

A. Right.

Q. Is that fine?

A. Yes. And let me just insert something here. There were other workbooks and back-up materials that were also on file. So those are not the only two.

Q. I'm aware there is certainly more than two spreadsheets out there.

But when you think about the definitive spreadsheets that you turned to in determining what price ultimately was used by PCG for a particular CUSIP, the two spreadsheets you described are the ones you would first turn to?

A. Well. I want to be a little bit careful. You said the "definitive spreadsheets," and there were -- there were others that were important in establishing inputs into those. So in some sense, those have equal standing because they were all involved in the production of the final TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 - P. Pfleiderer-

numbers.

So it's not the case that you can look at those two spreadsheets in complete isolation and get all the information that you

- Q. I don't mean to suggest otherwise, but there are two spreadsheets that you've identified as ones that are particularly important to you in at least answering the question as to what value was assigned to a particular CUSIP either in the initial inventory or the J.P. Morgan inventory by Barclays, right?
- A. Again, I wouldn't say that they answered the question. There are two spreadsheets that gave the summary for the valuations of the initial inventory and the J.P. Morgan inventory respectively. And those spreadsheets had summaries, and the summaries pointed to other worksheets --

Q. Within that same spreadsheet?

A. -- within that spreadsheet, but those, for example, were based on other spreadsheets. One of the spreadsheets that TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleidererappeared, for example, in those was a spreadsheet called "Liquidity", and that had backup in another spreadsheet. So I think for convenience, you don't put all of this into one super workbook.

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But I want to be careful that in saying -- in identifying two, that we're not segregating them in inappropriate ways from other spreadsheets that were certainly important for what ultimately ended up in the summary section of those spreadsheets and was used for the acquisition valuation.

Q. As a practical matter, sir, neither you nor I nor the judge can ever sit down and open and go through every single spreadsheet that Barclays may have used in valuing the securities, correct? There's just too many of them?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

- Q. There's a lot of data here, right?
- A. There is a lot of data. I --
- Q. So let's not get jammed up in how much data there is.

When I ask you what price did

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Barclays assign to a particular CUSIP, where would you go to find that price? Where in your work papers, where in the spreadsheets you've been provided would you go? Where would you first go?

A. So let me just say something. I can't say what the judge would look at clearly. But when you say "as a practical matter," there were spreadsheets that were used in this, and one could take the time to -- to go through those if one had the time.

So when you say "practical," obviously if you have to do something in limited time, it may not be possible to go through -- through all those in extraordinary detail. But I certainly had a lot of time to go through them in great detail and reach the conclusions that I did.

But to answer the question that you posed last, the two spreadsheets that you would go to to see what price Barclays had assigned to a particular CUSIP and ultimately the price that was used, the par value, the factor, the market value, the liquidity

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adjustment and the ultimate exit price, all of those are contained first in those two spreadsheets that we were talking about just a moment ago.

Q. And anywhere in the materials that are before you, your expert reports, the addendum, etcetera, do you see the file names for those two spreadsheets that you are talking about?

(Witness reviewing document.)

MR. SHAW: I would object to the question on the grounds that he does not have in front of him the revised version of the materials relied on in preparing the report. If you want to --

MR. TAMBE: We can go ahead and mark that. We can save a lot of time, Counsel. If you know what he's referring to by file name, list the file names and we will go to those.

MR. SHAW: I think he is referring to the two spreadsheets discussed in Exhibit 637-A as (1) and (2), which as TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 - P. Pfleiderer-

that letter says, were produced on January 18th and previously identified in the revised production of index with all the documents that were sent to you by, I guess, Chris Green on January 23rd.

BY MR. TAMBE:

Q. So in an effort to cut through some of these, sir, do you want to take a look at what counsel just said?

(Witness reviewing document.)

- Q. Do you see items (1) and (2) in Exhibit 637-A, sir?
 - A. Yes, I so.
- Q. And having reviewed those -- and feel free to consult with counsel if you need -- are those the two file names of the two spreadsheets that you were referring to in your testimony a few minutes ago?
- A. My recollection is that those are. The problem I'm having in responding is I knew where they were on the hard drive of my computer. I would go to a folder, I would see an Excel spreadsheet. I knew that even by the TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

Page 54 Page 55 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 2 size of it, that that was the one I wanted to A. No. 3 3 look at. So I wasn't in the habit of looking O. Is it in town? 4 4 A. Yes. It's in the hotel. at the entire name. 5 But looking at these names and 5 Q. Just up the street? 6 6 A. It is not up the street. recalling vaguely the names of those spreadsheets, I believe they correspond to the 7 7 Q. Well, why don't we ask for the 8 two that we've been talking about. 8 computer to be sent over? We can open it up 9 Q. And item (1), the spreadsheet 9 and then there could be no question as to what 0 that's identified in item (1) of 10 you are alluding to, right? Do you think you 11 Exhibit 637-A, that's the initial inventory 11 can do that? L 2 spreadsheet you were referring to? 12 MR. TAMBE: Why don't we do that? I make a request, let's have Professor 13 A. I believe it is. That would be --13 14 it is certainly implied by the "PwC Day 1" 14 Pfleiderer's computer sent over and we 15 label and the second by the "JPM" label would 15 can look it up. indicate the inventory that was received on 16 MR. SHAW: Let's go off the record 16 17 17 the 22nd of December. for a minute and let me talk with I knew them more by the placement 18 18 Mr. Vellrath. I think we can in the hard drive than by the names. But that 19 19 definitively tell you what those two 20 would certainly be the reasonable way to 20 are. 21 interpret those names. 21 MR. TAMBE: I would like to see Q. Do you have your computer here? 22 22 Professor Pfleiderer's computer, 23 23 A. Not here. because that is what he seems to rely 24 24 Q. Not in this room. Do you have it 25 on premises at Jones Day? 25 MR. SHAW: No. He relied on TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580 Page 56 Page 57 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 2 documents in the computer that have the spreadsheets up because you like to work 3 3 been produced to you. The fact that, with the native spreadsheets, right? 4 he in his mind, identifies them by 4 A. That's really the only way to do 5 where they are in his computer does not 5 it. 6 mean you get to demand the production 6 Q. So we'll do that. 7 of his computer. 7 MR. TAMBE: In the meantime, I do MR. TAMBE: I don't want any 8 8 have my outstanding request for his 9 9 computer. So if that can be brought uncertainty. 0 10 over, maybe we can take a snapshot of BY MR. TAMBE: 11 Q. Professor Pfleiderer, maybe you can 11 what his directory looks like and what 12 12 clarify this. I don't want any uncertainty. his hard drive looks like. 13 If I pull up a file on a laptop and put it on 13 MR. SHAW: No. We are not going do 14 the screen here, would you be able to tell by 14 to that. 15 looking at that file that that's the file 15 MR. TAMBE: I made my request. You 16 that's in your computer? 16 can choose to accede to it or not. 17 A. Oh, yes. I would be able to --17 MR. SHAW: I'm not acceding to it. once I look at the file and how it is 18 18 BY MR. TAMBE: 19 formatted. I would be able to tell if it is 19 Q. Going to 634-A, which is Volume II 20 20 of your expert report. It is the other bound the J.P. Morgan file. You simply tell by the 21 size or the initial inventory. I can look at 21 document you have in front of you. If you can 22 go to the first page, the Table of Contents to 22 the summary pages and quickly conclude which 23 23 Volume II, page 2? is which. 24 MR. SHAW: Volume II, page (ii)? 24 Q. So at the next break, what we will do is we will set up a projector here and put 25 MR. TAMBE: That's right. 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

Page 59 Page 58 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 Q. You have a column in Exhibit 1, 2 Q. The first Table of Contents entry 3 3 is Exhibit 1, part A, and that's a listing of part A of Exhibit 634-A, and it is a column 4 the initial inventory positions, correct? 4 titled "Custodial Marks." Do you see those 5 A. That's a subset of the initial 5 words? 6 inventory that was related to the -- what's 6 A. Yes, I do. Q. With respect to this spreadsheet 7 called here the fed replacement repo, yes. 7 Q. So the fed replacement repo 8 8 that runs from page 1 to page 163, the "custodial marks" you are indicating there are the Bank of New York marks, right? securities that were transferred over the 9 9 0 night of the 18th into the morning of the 10 11 19th; is that right? 11 A. That would be correct, yes. A. That is correct. 12 Q. Then when you go to Exhibit 1, part 2 Q. And that goes from page 1 to 13 B, which begins on page 164. Are you there? 13 page 164 of this exhibit, correct? You just 14 14 list out the CUSIPs and you have a couple of 15 15 Q. So beginning on page 164, that's 16 other columns, correct? 16 the J.P. Morgan inventory, correct? 17 A. Yes. 17 A. Actually, it goes through 163. Q. That listing of data that appears 18 18 Q. And that runs all the way through on pages 1 through 163, have you drawn that 19 19 page 185? 20 20 data from the initial inventory spreadsheet (Witness reviewing document.) you were talking about before? 21 21 A. That's correct. A. Well, that data was a subset of 22 22 Q. And the custodial marks in that that initial inventory. So yes, it was drawn 23 23 section, Exhibit 1, part B, those are the J.P. Morgan custodial marks? from that, but it is not everything that's in 24 24 25 that spreadsheet. 25 A. That is correct. TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580 Page 60 Page 61 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 Q. And you drew this data, Exhibit 1 2 Q. And if there were materials that 3 part B data, you drew that from the 3 you had access to or that were not used or 4 J.P. Morgan inventory you were talking about 4 considered in the report, you left them off 5 just a few minutes ago? 5 this list; is that right? A. That's correct. 6 6 A. I'm not sure how to answer your 7 (Exhibit 638-A, Appendix Two, list 7 question. Certainly the answer is yes in the sense that there were a lot of materials that 8 of documents and other materials 8 9 9 I and staff working at my direction had access reviewed and considered, marked for 10 identification, as of this date.) 0 11 Q. Sir, I place before you a document 11 For instance, if you look under the 12 marked as Exhibit 638-A. What is that 12 heading "Newspaper Articles Business Commentary," the set of newspaper articles and 13 document? 13 business commentary out there is 14 14 (Witness reviewing document.) extraordinarily large. We had access to at 15 A. This is a document that is 15 16 basically, I believe -- I'd have to go back 16 least a good part of it. Most of it, we 17 and check -- Appendix Two of my report. 17 obviously didn't use and didn't rely on. Q. And what is the significance of the 18 18 Articles about things that didn't involve this 19 materials that are listed in Appendix Two; why 19 case were certainly -- in any way were not those and not other materials? 20 used and were not relied upon in any way and 20 21 21 A. This is a compilation of materials are not listed here so... Q. That wasn't my question. When 22 that either I or my staff -- I should phrase 22 23 it this way. That my staff and I had access 23 something is used in Appendix Two, that's 24 to and that was used or considered in the 24 something you used and relied upon? 25 MR. SHAW: Perhaps I can cut 25 report. TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580

Page 62 Page 63 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 2 you have written a different report? Again through this. not knowing what Exhibit 180 is, but knowing 3 3 MR. TAMBE: I would like his 4 4 that there are some exhibits here that contain answer, actually. 5 MR. SHAW: That's fine. 5 information that was tangential and not 6 A. My answer to that question would be 6 relevant to anything that I wrote in my the following: This is a list of materials 7 7 8 that staff working at my direction and I had 8 Q. So if I understand what you're 9 access to it and either used, in the sense of 9 saying, there may be matters listed in this 0 had access to it. In many cases, we were 10 document, Exhibit 638-A, that you, in fact, 11 relying on it. However, there may be, for 11 may not have relied on? example, deposition -- some deposition L 2 12 A. Again, I'd be careful how to answer exhibits that are listed here that it would that because I'm not sure what you're saying 13 13 14 not make a difference to either my staff or to 14 in saying that we relied on it. We had access 15 me if we didn't have those. If we hadn't had 15 to it and I may have looked at something or 16 staff working at my direction may have looked those, we would not have come to any different 16 17 at something, and reviewed it and decided that conclusion because they were tangential and 17 18 not related. 18 it wasn't relevant. 19 19 I think there was an exhaustive And so did we rely on that, well, 20 20 list, or nearly exhaustive list of things that in some sense we did because it was an exhibit we had access to. But if you're asking if 21 21 that was produced or was the result of a exhibit -- I don't even know what Exhibit 180 22 deposition and it may have contained material 22 23 23 that would have been important. is at this point. 24 24 But if Exhibit 180 had not been And by looking at it and 25 available, would your opinion change or would 25 determining that it wasn't, we are in some TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 64 Page 65 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderersense relying on it because we are using it to 2 Scholars Group kept careful track of 3 see that it didn't contain something that was 3 everything that came in that was in some way 4 4 used, the analysis that was being done and was relevant. 5 5 reviewed to, as I pointed out in some of these Q. There is a lot of Bates labeled cases, to determine whether it was relevant or 6 6 documents that were available to you that are 7 not listed on that first page of Bates labeled 7 not. 8 documents. Do you see that? 8 So I did not compile this list but 9 (Witness reviewing document.) 9 they kept a careful log of everything that --0 that would be at all relevant either because O. That's not a listing of all the 10 11 Bates numbered documents that were made 11 it might be relevant and it was looked at and 2 available to you, is it, sir? 12 determined that it wasn't relevant, or because 13 (Witness reviewing document.) 13 it might be relevant and it was looked at and 14 Q. It is just the one page. 14 determined that it was relevant. 15 A. I -- I don't know looking at these 15 Q. And your understanding is those are 16 particular numbers what these were. You'd 16 the criteria used to put together this list; 17 17 is that right? have to show me. 18 18 A. That's my understanding but it may Q. Let me ask you the question another 19 19 be slightly mistaken. I don't know. But wav. 20 that's -- that was my understanding. 20 Do you have any idea of how this annex to Exhibit 638-A was prepared? 21 MR. TAMBE: 639-A. 21 A. This particular, the material --22 22 (Exhibit 639-A, BCI Exhibit 346, 23 23 declaration of Paul Pfleiderer, marked 24 A. It was -- my understanding is that 24 for identification, as of this date.) the staff that was working at the Finance 25 Q. I've handed you a document marked 25

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639-A. It is a cover sheet and a two-page Declaration signed by you. Do you see that?

A. Yes, I do.

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- P. Pfleiderer-

- Q. Turning to Paragraph 3 of your Declaration, you describe in there some additional analysis that was done by your staff following the submission of your report. Do you see that?
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. And specifically the analysis you have referenced is the classification of CUSIPs into several categories. Do you see that?
 - A. Yes.

Q. Why was that analysis done?

A. My understanding is that attorneys working for Boise Schiller requested that we do this analysis.

Q. To what end?

- P. Pfleiderer-

A. My understanding was that there are issues related to the types of securities that are in the inventory that was associated with the repo that are either securities that would not -- for legal reasons, and here is where my TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleiderer-

understanding is -- is not complete. For legal reasons, would not be in repo's having a certain legal standing.

Q. Would you consider yourself an expert in repo transactions?

A. In the legal aspect of repo transactions? No. In much of the economics involved? Yes.

Q. Have you ever personally been involved in placing a repo trade?

- A. No, I have not.
- Q. I've looked through your résumé. As far as I know, you have not worked in an investment bank or financial institution: is that correct?
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. Have you ever testified previously about repo transactions?
 - A. Not to my recollection, no.
- Q. Written any peer-reviewed papers about repo transactions?
 - A. No, I have not.

O. Written any papers about repo transactions?

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A. I've written a paper that has to do with financing of financial institutions. I'm trying to remember whether we specifically talk about repo transactions in that it wasn't the central focus of the paper, but it may have been. I have to go back and read the paper.

Q. And do you consider yourself an expert on the types of collateral that would or would not be eligible in a commercial repo transaction?

A. My understanding of the type of collaterals that are generally used in the haircuts that are generally used, I have an understanding of what -- what would typically be used. But I don't have -- I don't have a legal understanding of that.

Q. Do you consider yourself to be an expert in terms of industry practices and customs in the repo industry?

A. I certainly have knowledge, but I'm not the world's expert.

O. Do you consider yourself to be an expert for purposes of this case with respect

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to those issues?

A. I had not been asked, in what I was asked to do, to specifically address detailed issues related to the type of collateral that would be in a commercially available repo.

I do offer an opinion that the type of collateral that was associated with this was extremely risky, hard to value, and because of that would not be the type of collateral that would be used given the type of commercial repos that are -- overnight repos that have to be -- have to be marked quickly. And so I do offer that opinion. But I am not an expert in terms of the commercial practice of repos beyond -- beyond that knowledge, but that's a clear conclusion that can be drawn from the type of -- type of collateral that was actually in this particular repo.

Q. I know you offer the opinion. Do you consider yourself an expert in the matters on which you are opining?

A. I do.

Q. What's the basis of your expertise 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide

Pg 20 of 122 Page 70 Page 71 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 2 Q. Did you look at any other with respect to the commercial aspects of repo 3 3 transactions? commercial repo transactions to see what kind 4 A. The typical haircuts that are given 4 of collateral was included in those repos? 5 and the risks that would be involved and the 5 A. I'm not sure. But I believe that 6 nature of the repo process means that 6 staff working at my direction was -- was 7 securities that are extremely hard to value tasked with that. But I personally did not. 7 Q. And the staff that was tasked with 8 and have had extremely limited liquidity would 8 that, did they give you a report as to what 9 not be used in commercial repos having --9 10 having fairly small haircuts and used for 10 they found? 11 short-term transactions. 11 A. I believe, as I recall, we had a 12 12 O. And the basis of that expertise is conversation about that but I don't believe it 13 what, you've read stuff? 13 took the form of an actual report. A. I've read stuff and just my 14 14 Q. Who did you have a conversation 15 knowledge of the risk that would be involved 15 with? 16 in making a repo transaction when the 16 A. That would have been with Marc 17 17 inventory or the collateral had those Vellrath 18 characteristics. 18 Q. And do you know what Mr. Vellrath's 19 19 basis of information was about those issues? O. Do you know one way or the other 20 20 Is he a repo trader formerly? whether collateral with those characteristics A. You'd have to ask him. 21 was included in commercial repo transactions 21 22 at any time in September 2008 among any 22 O. You don't know? 23 commercial parties? 23 A. I don't believe he was. But he's A. I did not do an analysis, strict 24 24 done quite a bit. In his background, he may analysis of that. 25 25 very well have some experience. You'd have to TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580 Page 72 Page 73 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 directly ask him. 2 dimension, but rather on an understanding of 3 Q. But you're not aware of any 3 the type of securities that ended up being 4 specific? 4 delivered and the difficulty in marking them, 5 5 determining the risk, determining liquidity, A. I'm not aware of it, no. 6 Q. Okay. So you've gone ahead and that drew -- that was what I base my 6 prepared this declaration, Exhibit 639-A. 7 7 conclusion on more than a particular Is it the case, sir, that the 8 8 categorization of this sort. Although this is 9 securities that you've identified in Paragraph 9 certainly related. 0 3 in Romanette (i) through (vii), those are 0 MR. TAMBE: We can take a break 11 securities that you believe are commonly used 11 now, if you like. in commercial repo transactions? 2 12 (Whereupon, a recess was taken 13 (Witness reviewing document.) 13 from 10:56 a.m. to 11:07 a.m.) 14 A. No, I'm not -- I'm not saying that 14 (Exhibit 640-A, 2/6/2010 letter to 15 15 Jones Day from Boise Schiller, marked here. 16 16 for identification, as of this date.) Q. I know you're not saying that 17 there. But you classified these securities 17 BY MR. TAMBE: 18 and you classified them for some reason, the 18 Q. Sir, I place before you a document 19 lawyers asked you to classify them. Is that 19 marked Exhibit 640-A. Have you seen that the end to which you were classifying these 20 20 document before today? 21 securities? 21 A. I'm not sure that I've seen this A. No, it was not. And it was not --22 22 precise document. I think I've seen some of 23 the opinion that I offer in my report was 23 this at some point in the last few months, but

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based not on this particular exercise of

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looking at these securities on this particular

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I don't -- I don't believe I've seen this

particular document, no.

Page 75 Page 74 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 Q. The paragraph numbered one of this 2 documents. The issues, I have a vague 3 document, states in the first sentence, 3 recollection of it. This was all part of my 4 "Professor Pfleiderer participated in the 4 process to get comfortable with the type of 5 interviews of Richard Landreman, Gary Romain, procedures that had been done in asking --5 6 Sean Teague, Steven King and Jasen Yang. Do 6 asking questions and getting answers and -- so 7 7 I don't recall any particular issues in vou see that? 8 8 A. Yes, I do. detail. 9 O. Okay. I'm going to ask you a few 9 Q. As a general matter with respect to 10 questions about those interviews. 10 all five of these individuals, who identified 11 11 the people to speak with? Who identified when A. Yes. 12 12 they would be interviewed and what topics? Q. Describe generally with respect to 13 those individuals, how many interviews there 13 A. I don't remember the precise were, how long they lasted, who else was 14 14 process. I had read -- I know that I read 15 present. So let's start with Richard 15 Gary Romain's first deposition at that point, 16 16 and I know I read Jasen Yang. So in Landreman. 17 17 conversations with Marc Vellrath, I think we A. My recollection is that was 18 probably the last one, and I'm going to guess 18 discussed the usefulness of talking to them 19 that it may have been an hour. But there is a 19 further. And I had read -- I read Stephen potentially fairly wide airbound around that, 20 20 King, so I know that I mentioned that. I I can't recall specifically. don't recall specifically how Sean Teague and 21 21 2.2 Q. Do you recall if there were any 22 Richard Landreman were identified. specific documents or issues that you 23 23 I know that on a number of these 24 discussed with Mr. Landreman? 24 issues, a number of these interviews. 25 A. I certainly don't recall any 25 Professor Saunders was also on the line. I TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580 Page 77 Page 76 1 1 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-2 can't remember specifically which ones. And 2 Q. So you may or may not have identified any one of these people as subjects 3 some of them may have been ones that he had 3 4 wanted or it may have been that in discussions 4 for interview? 5 with some of the staff working at my 5 A. Well, the ones in particular that stand out in my mind are Gary Romain, Steven 6 direction, these were identified. But I do 6 King and Jasen Yang because I read their 7 recall having read Gary Romain, Steven King 7 and Jason Yang's depositions. And whether I depositions. The others may have been 8 8 9 identified generically in the sense of asking 9 had identified those or whether they had been 0 10 who else might be able to give back up. So identified in some other way, I can't recall. 11 Q. Do you know, looking at these five 11 they may not have been identified by name, but 2 names, which of these were identified by 12 rather generically. But I sitting here today 13 **Professor Saunders?** 13 cannot recall the exact process by which they 14 14 A. I wouldn't know that, no. were identified. 15 Q. Of these five, are there any in 15 O. You told us that the interview with 16 particular that you remember identifying 16 Mr. Landreman lasted an hour. How about the yourself, not just asked? 17 17 interview or interviews with Mr. Romain? 18 A. Again, I'm recalling that I had 18 A. Actually, I said it may have lasted 19 19 specifically read before these interviews the an hour. It may have been a fair amount depositions of Gary Romain, Steven King and 20 longer than that, it may have been a fair 20 Jasen Yang. So it may very well have been 21 amount shorter. Going on the recollection of 21 that on the basis of that, I said it may have 22 what I booked in my calendar when the 22 23 been interesting to talk to them. But it may 23 interview was set up, I think it was -- I'm have come about through some other way as 24 picturing it booked for an hour, but it may 24 have gone longer than that. 25 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide

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Page 78 Page 79 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 2 Q. Are all of these interviews booked said it so emphatically was -- I'm not sure that I asked the question. But the question 3 3 in vour calendar? 4 4 was asked. There were, again, several people A. I'm not sure. Because I'm an 5 absentminded professor, and I sometimes put 5 on the line. 6 things in my calendar and oftentimes I rely on 6 The question was asked if he had any financial stake, if you will, in terms of 7 my very feeble memory. 7 Q. How many interviews did you have 8 8 whether assets were marked high or low or with Gary Romain? 9 9 anything in terms of his personal incentives. 0 A. I'm recalling one but there may 10 And he was very, very emphatic that his job 11 have been a follow-up interview that I don't 11 was to get it right and that there was no --L 2 12 there was no bias. recall now. 13 Q. And how long was the one that you 13 I mean, I wasn't surprised that 14 recall? 14 that was the answer, but he -- he was very 15 15 clear in stating that the role that he had was A. That was -- that was some time. I one to just achieve accuracy in the accounting 16 think it was certainly in -- certainly an hour 16 if not more. 17 17 and the whole procedure. 18 Q. Was that in person or over the 18 Q. Do you recall discussing any 19 19 valuation issues with him? phone? 20 20 A. There were certainly -- the bulk of A. No. All of these were 21 telephonically. 21 the phone call was on issues related to 22 valuation and procedures and would I -- what I 22 Q. Do you remember what issues you 23 discussed with Mr. Romain? 23 recall is that after that phone call, at some 24 point fairly soon after that phone call, I had 24 A. The one thing that -- the one thing 25 that stands out in my mind, just because he 25 a conversation with Marc Vellrath and we TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 80 Page 81 - P. Pfleiderer-1 1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 talked about that and what would be the issue 2 Q. Did you provide any of these 3 -- what the conclusions would be that would go 3 witnesses with questions in advance of the 4 into the report or help define the conclusions 4 call so they would be ready for the that would go into the report in terms of what 5 5 interviews? 6 was drawn from that call. 6 A. I personally did not, no. 7 But I don't recall, other than that 7 Q. Did your staff? 8 very emphatic statement that he made, I can't 8 A. Not to my direct knowledge, but I 9 recall the specific issues. 9 don't know. 10 Q. So you don't actually recall any of 10 Q. Did you identify particular the specific valuation issues that you 11 11 spreadsheets or files that you wanted 12 discussed with Mr. Romain? 12 discussed with these individuals on the call? 13 13 A. I know that there were a number A. I don't recall that spreadsheets, 14 that were discussed and I know that -- I think 14 per se, were identified other than what may 15 there were even more -- well. I shouldn't sav 15 have been -- the discussion was more on where 16 more but ones that were discussed with Sean 16 certain numbers came from, what procedures 17 Teague at great length, but I can't recall the 17 were used. But I don't recall, as I recall 18 exact content of that. 18 that it was done on a basis of what do cell 19 Q. Did you keep notes of what 19 three in column 4 -- or in column D represent. questions you were asking him and what answers 20 20 I don't think that was the nature of the he was giving? 21 21 discussion, I'm pretty sure it was didn't. 22 22 Q. In any of these interviews, do you A. No, I did not. O. Did anyone in your staff? 23 23 recall having spreadsheets open on your 24 A. I don't -- I don't know 24 computer screen and you sort of walking

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specifically now.

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through the spreadsheets over the phone with

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- P. Pfleiderer-

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- A. I don't believe so, no.
- O. Now, you said there were a number of valuation issues discussed with Sean Teague. How many interviews were held with Mr. Teague?
- A. I'm trying to recall. He was -- he was on one of the phone calls. As I recall, there were some timing differences and he was on a phone call -- and I don't recall specifically which phone call he was on. I believe he may have piggybacked on the phone call with Gary Romain, perhaps. But I don't recall.

Q. Do you recall any of the specific valuation issues discussed with Mr. Teague?

A. Again, I think it was on some very specific issues on procedures that were followed. I know some of the questions, I know, had been identified by staff in looking through the spreadsheets that they were -they were looking through. And there were -there were questions about -- about procedures that were being asked and I was hearing the TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleiderer-

answers.

And I recall that the basic contour of the discussion was that Marc Vellrath who was working, working quite closely with the spreadsheets, as was I, but he was deep down in the weeds, if you will, was asking questions, and then I was asking follow-up questions to get clarification in my mind. And that was the basic contour of a fair amount of the discussion, although I certainly asked questions that were unprompted by anything that was being asked by staff working at my direction.

Q. My question is narrower and more focused.

Do you recall any of the specific issues that you spoke with Mr. Teague about?

A. Well, I believe that there was discussion about -- I may be confusing this with -- with one of the other calls. But there was certainly discussion about price and marks, about midpoint valuations, questions about, as I would recall, determining -determining where things went, how they were TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleiderer-

valued, how they were categorized, what went to the PMTG group and -- so there was a lot -there was a lot that was discussed, but I don't recall anything that gets beyond that level of specificity.

Q. Do you recall with respect to any of these individuals, specific securities being discussed?

A. I know, or I'm almost completely certain that in one or more of these phone calls, the Pine CLOs were discussed, at least that's my recollection. I think that there was a discussion in general about some of the auction rate securities perhaps not by individual name but rather more generically. So there were some -- there definitely were some specifics, and then there were other things that were discussed more generically by security type.

Q. But in terms of specific securities, you recall discussions about the Pine CLO and certain auction-rate securities; is that right?

A. That's my recollection sitting here TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 85

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today.

Q. And the auction-rate securities you're alluding to, those are Giant Stadium cap securities, sir?

A. Here it may have been the Giant Stadium securities or it may have been auction-rate securities as a generic class of securities. That I don't recall.

O. Completing the list with Mr. King and Mr. Yang. Other than the description you've provided of the kinds of issues discussed, do you recall any specific issues being discussed with either Mr. King or Mr. Yang?

A. My recollection is that issues were discussed about pricing in the PMTG classification and some of that, obviously, would have been with Stephen King, although I think some of those things were also discussed with Gary Romain but probably more focused discussions with Stephen King.

So, what I can't do, unfortunately, is parcel out who discussed what specifically and in what context or in what phone call TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleidererspecific things came up, but I do remember the Pine CLOs definitely being discussed perhaps in more than one phone call, probably in more than one phone call.

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- Q. And the information you collectively received from the series of interviews helped form your opinion in this case?
- A. The information was -- was part of the mix of the information that I had, deposition testimony, these interviews, carefully working with the spreadsheets that I had done and that my staff had done. So yes, it formed -- it formed part of what went into the overall conclusions that I'm drawing.
- Q. And in part, you were able to pose questions or get answers to questions that you had about the spreadsheet and other data, correct?
- A. Oh, yes. That's -- any question that had come up, they -- they seemed to have a quick answer to or they seemed to be able to address the level of detail of questions that I was posing and other people were posing on TSG Reporting Worldwide 877-702-9580

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the phone call.

So that in itself gave me additional comfort beyond what I could see in the spreadsheets and everything else that a lot of effort and thoughtful appraisal had gone into the -- into the process.

Q. And with respect to any of these interviews, did you keep any notes of any of the questions asked or any of the answers given?

MR. SHAW: Asked and answered.

- A. No, I did not.
- Q. Did any of your staff members?
- A. Again, I don't have direct knowledge of that.
- Q. And how about any counsel working with you; did they keep notes of those conversations?
 - A. You have to ask them.
 - Q. You haven't seen any such notes?
 - A. No, I have not.
- Q. How were you recording the information you were getting in the course of these interviews?

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A. The staff, Marc Vellrath, and I were listening to these phone calls, and then we talked about basically how to proceed, answer questions about how to look at certain things in the spreadsheet. What you see, for instance, in my report about the Pine CLO was, I believe, in part based upon the outcome of those conversations as well as other information that was -- that was in the filing.

Q. I'm just trying to understand how you recorded the information.

Did you record any of the information you received in any of these interviews in any form?

- A. I personally did not, no.
- Q. Did your staff?

A. Again, my understanding is that they were in the phone call and that this was informing what they were doing in terms of processing information on the spreadsheets. And then in terms of sitting down and looking at those spreadsheets, we were informed by that.

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Q. Turning to your report, Exhibit 633-A. If you can turn to page No. 2 of the report.

In footnote 3 you say you are not a CPA and you did not examine and do not opine as to whether Barclays' accounting for its acquisition of LBI's North American broker-dealer businesses complied with applicable accounting principles.

Do you see that?

A. I do.

Q. Are you offering any opinion in this matter on the propriety of any of the accounting policies and practices followed by Barclays?

A. So if I'm asked to answer the question, does all of their accounting or even part of their accounting meet certain regulatory standard or IS standards, I am not a regulator and I am not a CPA, so I would not presume to be able to answer that question.

On the other hand, I'm able to look at the process that they followed in terms of valuing the securities that they received and

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looking at how they accounted for it, and understand from that enough, or more than enough to form the opinions that I'm drawing in the report so I would make the distinction between being able to do what a CPA or someone who is certified to basically make a judgment on whether accounting standards have been met, since I'm not a CPA and do not have that level of certification, I certainly can't do that.

But in terms of understanding what was done and whether it represents, how it represents the transaction and what occurred, then I certainly am able to do that and to judge -- judge from what they did in the acquisition accounting, for instance, how that relates to various issues in this case.

Q. Do you believe yourself to be an expert on any accounting standards?

A. If the line to determine whether one is an expert is having a CPA, then I fall below that line. If the line is: Do you understand accounting principles and can you look at this and determine whether some basic accounting principles have been followed?

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precise regulatory requirements in any particular setting, whether it's U.S. or U.K., I don't have that expertise.

Q. And in terms of what the standards may be for the adequacy of disclosures made to a bankruptcy court, that's not something that you are an expert?

MR. SHAW: Are you asking him what the legal standards are?

MR. TAMBE: My question --

Q. Do you understand my question, sir?

A. No. Because when you use words like "adequacy," I think I can only answer that question when I understand what the --what the line is being drawn. If it is a legal decision or legal assessment has to be made, I do not have a legal background.

If it's a question about information that's required to make various decisions, then my training as a financial economist is certainly relevant to questions that would arise when it's posed in that regard.

Q. So when it's posed in that regard, TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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Then I have some -- more than some ability to do that. But I'm not a certified public accountant.

Q. Have you ever testified on the adequacy or application of accounting standards in any matter?

A. I've never been asked to because, again, I'm not a certified public accountant.

Q. Do you consider yourself to be an expert on standards of disclosure or adequacy of disclosure in bankruptcy proceedings?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

A. I'm not sure how to answer this question because the question you asked before about accounting, there's a clear bright line. You're either a certified public accountant or you're not. I'm not sure if there's a bright line to be drawn here.

Certainly much of my academic work has been concerned with information and how information gets disclosed into markets. And so I certainly have expertise along those lines.

But in terms of understanding
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are you offering any opinion as to the adequacy of the disclosure that was made to this Bankruptcy Court with respect to this transaction?

A. The opinions I offer are those that are in my report. And to the extent that they touch upon that, then I am.

Q. Do you believe any of your opinions touch upon the adequacy of the disclosure made to the Bankruptcy Court in this case?

A. I think at the end I'm referring to decisions that were made ultimately by the Court. I don't know whether there's a direct implication there that there was adequate disclosure, but it's certainly implied by what I'm saying that I believe that the decisions that were reached were based upon the information that was available and was presented to the Court, and it was reasonable to conclude as the Court concluded.

So that certainly touches upon the issue of adequate disclosure, perhaps not in a legal sense, but in other senses.

Q. Let me make sure I understand.
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Putting aside what you believe may be implied by your report, are you directly offering the opinion that adequate disclosure of the facts of this transaction was made to this Bankruptcy Court?

A. Well, I have to go back and look in my report. I don't believe I make that particular statement. But it may be that if we went through each of the opinions, especially those at the end, that they are related to issues that would relate to adequate disclosure.

Q. Is any part of any opinion that you are offering in this matter based on your views of the credibility of witnesses?

A. I think the answer to that almost has to be yes. I've read -- I've read many depositions. For instance, thinking back on it now, it occurs to me you're asking about the repos and whether they were commercially -- whether the inventory that was received in the repo was adequate or -- or not adequate, but would be associated with what would be considered normal for a commercial TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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repo.

And I remember reading, I believe it was Stephen King and perhaps in some other deposition testimony, fairly strong statement that it was not. So that was certainly part of the reason that I reached the conclusion or made the statement that it was not commercially normal -- commercially normal repo was based upon testimony that I read in the record.

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And to the extent that I'm relying on that, I'm assuming that Steven King was telling the truth.

Q. And there's other testimony in the record that you reviewed that you did not rely on, correct? And we'll go through examples.

But generally, you are aware that there are deposition and passages in depositions which you have given little or no weight to, right?

A. If you want to point out specific things, then I can say whether I -- how I weighed it and how I interpreted it. I'm not going to make a blanket statement. But if we TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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were going to talk about specific things, I can tell you to what extent that factored into the conclusions that I'm drawing in my report.

Q. Okay. But as a general matter, it did factor into the conclusions you are drawing into your report, the credibility, your assessment of the credibility of particular witnesses?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form. Compound. Vague.

A. I think the only way that I can answer that is as an expert, I reviewed the record of people who were under oath. And I don't think it is my role as an expert to make judgments about credibility. My understanding would be that ultimately that's what the Court does.

So I certainly was not -- I can answer the question the following way. It was never the case that I read something and said to myself that person is varicating, exaggerating, lying under oath. So I took the record exactly as it was. That people were testifying under oath, lots of information was TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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given.

It is obviously a somewhat confused record because people are saying different things and have different recollections, and that's why I felt for some of the conclusions I read, it was useful to look at the actual information that was there that wasn't going to be based on people's recollections. For example, looking at the actual balance sheet that Lehman Brothers had on Friday, September the 12th was actually a good way to actually get to the issue of what was the valuation based upon Lehman marks at the time -- at least on the 12th, at the time before the transaction was even being contemplated.

So it is a confused record in that way for the very simple reason that an extraordinary amount of volatility in both the markets and in this process was occurring over this week. But I did not in any way draw a conclusion that I can rely on X and not rely on Y because X is telling the truth and Y is lying. I did not go through that at all.

Q. With respect to the example you TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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just mentioned, the balance sheet valuation, there you looked at what you believed to be the balance sheet of Lehman Brothers on the 12th of September in drawing your conclusions, as opposed to the testimony of witnesses about what may or may not have happened in terms of negotiating a discount at

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A. Just to be clear, I looked at two things. I looked at a spreadsheet that was produced based on the balance sheet of the 12th, which is a summary balance sheet. And then staff working under my direction went to the GFS system and verified the numbers in that spreadsheet were very close to what was appearing in the GF system.

the inception of the trade; is that right?

Q. With respect to that example, you relied on that data as opposed to the testimony of individuals who testified about the existence of a potential \$5 billion discount at the inception of the transaction, correct?

MR. SHAW: Objection. Mischaracterizes the prior testimony. TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 - P. Pfleiderer-

A. What I did is look at a situation where there was a confusing record, if you will, about what valuations were and what they were relative to Lehman marks. And I went back and did the obvious thing, what I think is the obvious thing, of looking at what the Lehman marks were.

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And by looking on Friday the 12th before there would be any chance that they would be influenced by any process, secret or not, we can get to a way to make an assessment that doesn't rely on people's recollections.

And in a case where people's recollection are, shall we say, a bit of exaggeration but all over the map when you have documentary record there based upon Lehman's own systems on the 12th, you can cut through that confusion to a great extent and look at what these assets were being valued at on the 12th.

Q. And the system you are referring to, Lehman's own system, is the GFS system that you're referring to with respect to this example?

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A. Well, there were two, two bases for this. One was the GFS system and one was a spreadsheet that was produced that that was referenced at the top "Lehman's balance sheet" on the 12th.

Q. If we can just move in your report, in Volume I of your report, to your qualifications which I believe appear on page 80.

At the bottom of page 80, moving on to page 81, you have under "Experience" a series of professorships that you have held going back to 1977. Do you see that?

- A. I wouldn't call the professorships that I had before 1981 professorships. I had research assistant positions and teacher assistant positions, but those would not be referred to as professorships.
- Q. Are there other work experiences where you were employed by other institutions in this time period between 1977 and the present, that you have excluded from this list of experience?
 - A. Well, I did mention that I did have TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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a firm that is called Quantal International. I don't list it on here because this I interpret to be my academic résumé, it is the only résumé that I have.

In terms of positions, academic positions? No. These are the only positions I have. I joined Stanford Graduate School of Business immediately upon my completion of my Ph.D. And to be quite technical, I joined it before '81 before I completed my Ph.D. I completed my Ph.D. in 1982 but I was and have been in Stanford since 1981. So I've had no other academic appointments.

- Q. Your company is it Quantal?
- A. Quantal, Q-U-A-N-T-A-L.
- Q. Are you the sole owner of that company?
 - A. No.
 - Q. Who are the other owners?

A. Another owner is Terry Marsh, who is a professor at the University of California at Berkeley and is now an emeritus member of their faculty and he's the other major owner. But you have a stock option plan and there are TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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Page 102 - P. Pfleidererother owners as well.

Q. When did you form Quantal?

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A. I believe in 1992, if memory serves me correctly.

Q. What kind of a business is Quantal?

A. Originally it was set up as a business to provide risk estimates and large equity portfolios. So we developed a risk model which is basically a factor, implicit factor model, statistical factor model to explain correlations and risks across the worldwide equity portfolio.

And one of the roles I had was to develop the algorithms that did that assessment, and I also wrote an optimizer that would be used for portfolio optimization.

Q. Of equity securities?

A. Of equity securities. We also developed some fixed income risk models that would be integrated into the equity model, and that's still under some development. So the original concentration was in equities.

Q. In the course of this assignment, did you use any of the algorithms and models

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that have been developed at Quantal?

A. No. I did not. I don't believe I used anything that would be -- any intellectual property that I developed there.

O. Now, for purposes of this assignment, you have worked with staff at the **Finance Scholars Group?**

A. That is correct.

O. And what is the Finance Scholars Group?

A. The Finance Scholars Group, as I understand it, and I don't have a complete understanding necessarily of all that they do, but my understanding is that among the things that they do is litigation support assisting, for example, experts such as myself in handling cases where there is more than three CUSIPs.

Q. And is it the case here that you are one of the experts that works with Finance Scholars Group; is that right?

A. I know that Professor Saunders also worked with them. There may be other experts that worked with them, but only Professor 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide

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Saunders the one that I have knowledge of as having a relationship with the Finance Scholars Group.

Q. Have you worked with the Finance Scholars Group prior to this engagement?

A. No. This is the first time I had the opportunity to work with them.

Q. Does the Finance Scholars Group have a permanent staff?

A. Yes. My understanding is that they do.

Q. Have you worked with any of the members of their staff prior to this engagement?

A. Prior to this engagement? No. Actually, I have to be careful in answering that. Because I have worked with other litigation support groups and there is always a staff that is assisting and sometimes you meet some of that staff and some of the others you don't meet. And there is the possibility that someone that was working on a prior case and assisting me, unbeknownst to me, is now working at the Finance Scholars Group.

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So I can only say that I don't know anyone that's working at the Finance Scholars Group that worked on the case previously with me.

Q. Just describe for me generally the role played by Finance Scholars Group with respect to the preparation of your report.

MR. SHAW: I'll give you some latitude on this, Jay, but I would note that there are limits on discovery in the experts stipulation of the parties that's been entered here.

A. So one thing I could say is that they had access to all of the -- all of the spreadsheet data that was used in the preparation of my report as did I. And they spent a lot of time doing the -- some of the analysis on that.

For example, just to give you an example, in one part of my report, I have a reporting of what portion of the Lehman portfolio was marked Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3. And they went through the GFS report. And there's a column -- I've looked TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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at this. There's a column in that, as I recall it, it is column BQ in one of the GFS reports, that has a 1, a 2 or a 3 that reflects whether it is a Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3 security. And what they did is they went through and sorted it and determined what percentage was in each one of those categories, and that appears in my report.

So that would be an example of one of the things that they did.

Q. And in terms of the drafting and the preparation of your report, what role did they play in that?

A. The process was one of -- I met with Marc Vellrath and we sat down and I came up with an outline on the topics and sub outline of what I wanted to have covered, and the sub outline of individual points in that. And some of the drafting, I believe -- it gets a little bit confused. But some of the drafting of that was done by me. But most of the initial draft was done by him.

And then I received an initial draft, rewrote parts of it, changed things, TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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and there was this type of back and forth. Lots of conversations over the phone, several meetings in Palo Alto, and proceeded in that fashion.

Q. In terms of your valuation opinion as to value of the fed repo replacement collateral, is there a single CUSIP in the list of securities that were transferred where you disagreed with Barclays' valuation, you thought they got it wrong?

A. I certainly don't recall looking at any particular CUSIP and saying that has to be wrong. I mean, that certainly never occurred.

What I did look at are exercises of the following sort, for example. And I don't recall whether this -- I have to go back and check whether this was in the initial inventory, I believe it may have been, but perhaps it was in the inventory that was received with the J.P. Morgan settlement.

But there were -- for instance, there was commercial paper. A good example is commercial paper that was issued by LBHI which my recollection is were being carried on BoNY TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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marks on 98 cents on the dollar. I may be wrong about that, it may have been 95, but it was above 90 is what I recall. And Lehman -- excuse me, I misspoke. Barclays marked that on ten cents on the dollar or something close to that.

And I don't know whether it was correct at ten cents or nine cents or 11 cents, so it wasn't the case that I would look at that and say, oh, it should have been eight cents or it should have been 13 cents. That would have certainly been beyond what I need to do to reach the conclusions that I did.

But the question is: Is this valued more appropriately at 90 cents or 98 cents on the dollar, commercial paper of a company that's filed for bankruptcy, or ten cents. And there, it is very clear that its reliable estimate of value that could be realized, the ten cents is much closer than the 98 cents.

So the answer to your question is, no, I did not see any CUSIP where I decided that the decision that was made by Barclays TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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was patently wrong.

Q. And was there any asset class or subclass of securities with respect to which you concluded that the process followed by Barclays was wrong?

A. No.

Q. Not a single one?

A. By "asset class," you mean the corporates, the --

Q. The corporates, the agency, the PMTGs. You know, the various ways in which securities were sliced and diced and dealt with as classes of securities.

With respect to any such class of security, did you reach the conclusion that Barclays had gotten it wrong?

A. No, I did not reach that conclusion. Because again, there is no way to say it should have been 11 cents or ten cents or nine cents. The issue is whether the marks are appropriate for this particular asset class at this time given the market situation.

And you look at -- for example, you look at the quotes that they were getting and TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleidereryou ask: Is it reasonable for them to use the Bloomberg prices or the prices that they're getting from external vendors in the way that they did? And the answer is yes, in my opinion.

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Much of what was actually valued was the result of sales that occurred very shortly after the transaction. And so it would be rather presumptuous for me to say that Barclays who is marking this at the actual sale that they realized is wrong and that there's a better indication of what value they could have realized than what they actually realized immediately after the transaction.

Q. When you say "much of what's being valued" was the result of sales, give me a ballpark percentage? 50 percent? 60 percent?

A. Well, I can't give you a percentage. What I can tell you is that if you look at, for example, the PMTG spreadsheet and you go down, you'll see that there are quite a few CUSIPs that were valued at the sale price. And I refer to some of those in TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleiderermy -- my report.

And whenever Barclays in those cases had an initial mark as they oftentimes did, and then a sale transaction that occurred very shortly thereafter, they took the sale transaction rather than the initial mark with the liquidity adjustment as the -- as the value to be assigned for that particular CUSIP.

And if we open up that spreadsheet, I can show you numerous examples.

Q. And we will do that. But a couple of questions I have about the sales process.

For any of the sales that you just referred to that are identified in those spreadsheets, do you know the dates on which those sales actually occurred.

A. I'd have go back and look at the spreadsheet to see.

Q. Would that be important to assessing the validity of the price or the value that Barclays assigned to a particular CUSIP, when the sale was done?

A. My understanding from, I believe TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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conversations with -- I believe it was Gary Romain, was that those sales occurred very shortly after the closing of the transaction. And I'd have to go back and look at the spreadsheet to see if there is some -- some commentary on the side that indicates -indicates the date of the sale.

I know that in some cases, I believe, having looked at the spreadsheet, I believe there are cases where that isn't available. I know that in all cases, I believe it had to be before the 30th, but I believe that many of them were within a few days of the transaction.

Q. Are you aware of any sales that occurred after the 30th of September 2008 and which are being valued at a sales price obtained after September 30, 2008?

MR. SHAW: Are you talking just about the original inventory or the J.P. Morgan --

MR. TAMBE: The original inventory.

A. I'm not aware of it, having looked through the spreadsheets. But my TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 - P. Pfleiderer-

recollection -- I certainly did not encounter any. So the answer to your question is I'm not aware of any that were after the 30th.

Q. With respect to any of the sales, did you ever ask to see any trade tickets reflecting the sale of any of the securities?

A. I did not. Staff working at my direction may have, but not to my knowledge.

O. Do you know the nature of the sales that are being referred to in those spreadsheets?

A. I'm not sure I understand what you mean by "nature of the sales."

Q. Are these sales internally within Barclays or sales to third parties? Do you know?

A. My understanding is that the bulk of them were sales to third parties because the initial auction to the desk, I believe, I'd have to go back and review the record, was done -- I'd have to check the record to see exactly what that was.

MR. SHAW: Whenever you reach a good stopping point.

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Q. You said you have to go back and check. What would you check to determine the answer to that question?

A. I'd go back and check the -- the spreadsheets and also what I'm -- what I can't quite remember is the testimony of Gary Romain. I believe there was some testimony on this. Although it may have been -- it may have been -- it may have been information that was in the phone call that I realized was covered and I just can't remember right now.

Q. Other than what may have been stated to you in a telephone call or what you may have read in a deposition, have you at any point seen any documentary evidence of sales to third parties of this collateral prior to September 30, 2008?

MR. SHAW: Objection. Asked and answered.

A. I think you did ask that question. Because you asked for trade ticket.

Q. Trade tickets, yes. But there may be other documents you've seen that showed that there were sales to third parties?

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A. I don't believe that I've seen any. Although, I'd have to go back. I do recall some e-mails that may have talked about sales to third parties. I'd have to go back and check. It may be the staff at my -- working at my direction had seen some of this, but I don't have direct knowledge of that.

Q. Putting aside sort of to whom the sales were made, do you have any information as to lot sizes in which the trades were done?

A. I'd have to go back and look at the spreadsheets. Because I believe that in most of the cases, the whole position was sold, but I don't believe that it speaks to exactly how it was disposed of. But I have to check the spreadsheet again.

Q. Would you agree with me that the lot size in which the position was disposed of could affect the value obtained on the sale of that position?

A. Well, that is exactly the point here. That the need to mark these assets, these securities to an exit price should affect the price that it does depend -- the TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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exit price does depend upon the lot size.

So to the extent that you're needing to get an accurate estimate of what is the realizable price through an orderly exit that you will achieve on a particular security, yes, indeed, it will be affected by that. And by looking at the actual market price, you no longer really have to make an estimate, you actually see what actually happened.

- Q. How do you define "orderly exit"?
- A. Orderly exit is --

Q. Is it dumping all of the securities in one go?

A. No. That certainly was not what happened here. That would be a fire sale, where everything is -- is dumped pretty much precipitously, and that was not what happened here because a lot of the positions were held and a lot of the positions were not dumped on the first or second day.

So orderly exit is something that was not a fire sale but it was well-known that Barclays was going to sell off many of these TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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securities because it was bearing risk and holding them. A lot of them couldn't be hedged and it was -- really some of them, some of them couldn't be well hedged. Some of them could be hedged. But with ones that couldn't be hedged, there would be a greater incentive, to the extent that you could, to unwind those positions in a fairly orderly fashion but not hold them for six months or a year.

Q. Would an orderly sale include taking, for example, \$100 million position and selling it out in lot sizes of \$10 million? Is that an example of an orderly sale?

A. It could be.

Q. And it would be an appropriate way of avoiding dumping or a fire sale price?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

A. The question has to be asked in the context of what the market conditions are.

Q. The depth of that particular market?

A. The depth of that particular market would be an issue. And also the risk involved in holding it. Barclays and anyone that

TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleidererreceives a risky inventory like this is going
to be making a trade-off, is going to be
conscious of a trade-off between holding -holding something over longer period of time
and having to bear the risk of that when it is
not a position that you wanted to hold in the
first place, versus selling it off relatively
quickly but not in fire sale condition and
relieving yourself of that risk and getting a
reasonable price for it. But necessarily an
exit price, because you are exiting the

position.

Q. With respect to any of the exit prices because the exit prices were based on sale as indicated on the spreadsheet, did you or your staff do any work to determine how the prices Barclays obtained compared to prices that prevailed in the markets for those securities on those days on which the sales were made?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

Q. Do you understand my question?

A. Could you read it back, please? (Record read as follows:

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"Question: With respect to any of the exit prices, because the exit prices were based on sale as indicated on the spreadsheet, did you or your staff do any work to determine how the prices Barclays obtained compared to prices that prevailed in the markets for those securities on those days on which the sales were made?")

A. Let me give you a general answer to, first of all, the context to which you're asking that question. There are securities that were received in the inventory that were relatively easy to mark because there was an active market and prices were available through pricing sources, and in those cases where the prices were readily available through the pricing source, in many of those cases, if not most, those were the marks that were applied at midpoint marks by Barclays.

The problem with this portfolio was that there were a number of securities for which there weren't active markets. There were very thin markets or nonexistent markets, TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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or almost nonexistent markets.

So the question you're asking about some of these exits is, would you have been able to compare the price that Barclays received to a quote/unquote ongoing price in the market, and the answer to that is that there wouldn't have been an ongoing price in the market.

I did not personally check to see whether it corresponded to some ongoing price in the market because I fully well knew that in many of these cases there wouldn't be an ongoing price in the market.

Now, I don't know, it may be the case that my staff working on this did check some of that, but I personally did not.

Q. Did your staff working on this report to you, with respect to any of the sales that Barclays actually did, about how Barclays sales price compared to the prices that were obtainable from other sources for those securities for the days on which the sales were made?

A. For the sales that I was referring TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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to that are particularly important in this regard are ones that were in the PMTG section of the inventory.

Q. My question is not so limited. I'm asking about all the sales that are part of the valuation. Every single security that was sold. For any of those securities, did you do a price check? Any one of those securities, did you do a price check?

A. I'm going to be very careful here. Because the question as I understood it was when a sale price was used to determine the realizable value of the asset. So it is certainly the case that Barclays acquired securities, marked them according to various external information that was available and used that as the price, the midpoint price to which it, in many cases adjusted downward to convert it into an exit price. And subsequently, quite likely sold it but used that midpoint price, adjusted by the haircut, to basically represent the exit price.

So we have to distinguish cases --

Q. I'm not talking about that type, TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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that example. The example I'm talking about is exactly the opposite of that.

MR. SHAW: Jay, please stop interrupting his answers.

MR. TAMBE: He needs to answer the questions I'm asking him. I don't want this to be an endless filibuster session. Okay? This is technical stuff. There are lots of places to go and hide in the answer. I've asked a very specific question.

Q. Let me rephrase it, if there is any confusion in your mind about what it is that I'm asking for.

I'm asking for that universe of trades for which Barclays sold the securities, as you said, very shortly after --

A. Right.

Q. -- the acquisition date, so before September 30, 2008, and used the sales price actually obtained on the sale as the price on which they would mark that security or value that security for purposes of the acquisition balance sheet. Right? That universe of

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- P. Pfleiderertrades, those CUSIPs.

With respect to any of those CUSIPs, did you or your staff go out into the market or use any tools available to you to determine whether the sales price used was consistent with, higher, lower, how it compared to prevailing prices for that security in the relevant market on the relevant sale date?

A. And just to be clear, I was not filibustering, I was trying to make sure that the distinction was made between securities that were marked and subsequently sold, but that the mark, the original mark was used and that the classes of securities that might have been originally marked and subsequently sold, and the sale price was used. And there is a distinction there.

So in answering your question, I was wanting to make sure that we were talking about that latter universe.

Now that's clarified, it is my recollection that most of that was in the PMTG group. And I have to go back and look at some TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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of the others to see when they were using the sale prices. But most of it was concentrated in the PMTG group, is my recollection. So there would not have been prices for most of those, the prevailing in the market for those.

I did not -- in answering your question as it's now posed, I did not myself check to see whether there were prevailing prices in the market and compare those. Staff working in my direction may have done that as a check. Because they were doing checks on various things, but I don't have direct knowledge of that as I sit here today.

- Q. You've taken some comfort in the report that you've prepared on the fact that Barclays' valuation of the acquisition of securities was audited by PwC, correct?
- A. That is certainly a factor in reaching my conclusion, that an outside auditor came in and looked at the process and did what an outside auditor does in valuating something of this sort.
- Q. Do you know, sir, whether PwC did the type of price check analysis we just

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talked about with respect to the securities that were sold and for which Barclays used the sales price as the price at which they value the security?

A. They may have, but I don't have direct knowledge of that.

Q. Do you have any reason to believe they did it?

A. I have no reason to believe they did; I have no reason to believe they did not.

Q. Did you speak with anyone in PwC in the preparation of your report?

A. I did not.

MR. TAMBE: Do you want to take a break?

MR. SHAW: Yes. We have been going over an hour.

MR. TAMBE: What time is it?

MR. SHAW: 12:30 almost.

MR. TAMBE: Do you want to break for lunch at this point?

MR. SHAW: That makes sense. (Luncheon recess taken at 12:22 p.m.)

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Page 126 Page 127 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 2 was done as of the morning of 9/22, the close AFTERNOON SESSION (Time noted: 1:12 p.m.) of business of 9/22 or at different points in 3 3 4 PAUL PFLEIDERER, resumed as a 4 time during 9/22? A. Typically you would, for prices 5 witness and testified as follows: 5 6 6 that were received from outside feeds be using CONTINUED EXAMINATION BY 7 7 end of day prices. For much of this MR. TAMBE: inventory, that distinction is a difficult 8 8 Q. If you can turn to Volume II of 9 your report, sir. Looking at Exhibit 1, 9 distinction to make since there wasn't a .0 Part A, which is the initial inventory 10 market. And so knowing what a punitive price 11 collateral, the Barclays exit price marks that 11 would have been at 11:00 a.m., and what it you have listed in that exhibit which runs 12 12 would have been at 11:30. It's not a question from page 1 to page 163, those are marks as of 13 13 that's well posed, or at least not answerable. 14 9/22/2008; is that correct? 14 Q. Where third-party sources were used 15 15 by Barclays to compute an as of 9/22/08 price, (Witness reviewing document.) 16 16 your understanding were those were close of A. I believe that's how they're 17 17 represented, yes. business 9/22 prices; is that right? 18 Q. And that's what you understand them 18 A. I would have to go back and look at 19 19 all the outside sources that were used. Some to be? 20 20 may have been representing something else than A. My understanding is that the marks that appear here were prepared to estimate the 21 close of business. But my understanding is 21 fair value that could be realized from this 22 that most would have been -- it would be 22 23 initial inventory and the date that was put on 23 called closing prices. 24 them was 9/22. 24 Q. Do you have an opinion, sir, as to 25 Q. Do you know whether the valuation 25 whether the correct valuation time was close TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 128 Page 129 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 of business on the 22nd or the open of 2 The question you're asking as to 3 business on the 22nd, or do you have no 3 whether the valuation should have been done 4 opinion as to that topic? 4 early in the morning, in the afternoon, MR. SHAW: Objection to form. 5 5 beginning of business, end of business, was 6 Q. With respect to the initial 6 not relevant for forming opinions about upper 7 inventory. 7 bounds on value. Because much of this 8 MR. SHAW: Objection to form. 8 inventory, first of all, didn't have prices at Vague as to what purpose. 9 9 all and the intra-day price valuation for that A. Could you repeat the question just 0 10 we did on the 22nd is sufficiently small that 11 so I understand it completely? 11 it wouldn't have affected my overall opinion. 12 2 (Record read as follows: And my understanding of how marks 13 13 are typically given -- there may be exceptions "Question: Do you have an opinion, sir, as to whether the correct 14 14 to this, but marks are typically based when 15 valuation time was close of business on 15 price are available on closing prices. 16 the 22nd or the open of business on the 16 I should add that my understanding 17 22nd, or do you have no opinion as to 17 of this is that these prices and the pricing 18 that topic? With respect to the 18 that was done by Barclays was done using their 19 initial inventory.") 19 normal processes. So it was not done as an A. The opinions that I'm offering in 20 20 exception from their normal processes but my report relate to the valuation of the repo 21 rather it was done with what they would do in 21 capital both that was received in the initial 22 22 the normal course of business. 23 inventory and that was received later and 23 O. Is there any part of the Barclays establishing an upper bound on what that value 24 pricing policy that addresses the acquisition 24 25 might have been. of 40 or \$50 billion worth of collateral? 25

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MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

A. I can only say that the documents that I've read, and it was not surprising that this was the case, don't address such an event because I assumed that when they were written, such an event was not foreseen as a likely possibility that would have to be addressed.

Now, it is possible that there are other documents relating to policy that would address that, but I would rather doubt it.

O. None that you have seen that would address it?

A. I have not seen anything.

Q. In your earlier answer you said that part of the exercise that you've undertaken is to value the Fed Repo Replacement collateral, correct?

MR. SHAW: Objection. Mischaracterizes part of his testimony.

Q. Isn't that what you said you have done?

A. What I said is I went through an analysis that resulted in what I considered an upper bound on the value that one would place TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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on it from an economic point of view.

Q. As of what date?

A. Well, that's a difficult question to answer when you consider the complexity of what this actually entailed. Some of the repo capital came in in September, and some of it came in in December. So it is my opinion that it was appropriate to judge, or value, I should say -- again as an upper bound -- the repo capital that was received as of December as of a December date and not as of a September date.

So because of the complexity of what actually occurred, there is not a single date involved here.

Q. Putting aside those two big buckets, the September collateral and the December collateral, within the September collateral, what was the appropriate date in your view to value that collateral to establish, as you say, an upper bound of a value of the September collateral?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

A. Could you read the question again? TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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(Record read as follows: "Question: Putting aside those two buckets, the September collateral and the December collateral, within the September collateral, what was the appropriate date in your view to value that collateral to establish, as you say, an upper bound of a value of the September collateral?")

A. My understanding is that Barclays represented this as a valuation that was done on the 22nd using marks that would be applied on the 22nd. Although, as I indicated, given that there were a number of securities in this inventory for which there was no pricing data available on the 22nd from vendors or from thickly traded markets, it was appropriate for Barclays to use realized exit prices soon after the acquisition to reflect the best estimate of what the realized value would be, since there is very little information available about pricing. And it was appropriate to weight an actual sale as having more value in indicating the realized value, TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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putting more weight on that, than an estimate of what the value would have been on the 22nd using the fact that there was no information available at the time.

Q. What --

A. I should say no trade information; no active market that was giving you up-todate transaction prices.

O. In one of your earlier answers you said there was, with respect to certain of these September security, very little intra-day price movement on September 22nd with respect to those securities. Do you recall speaking to that?

A. No, I don't believe I said that.

Q. Well, did you do any analysis to see how much intra-day price movement there was for any of the September securities?

A. I don't believe that I did any such analysis. I certainly am aware of intra-day price movements in equities in particular since my firm deals with that as a matter of course, but I did not do a specific analysis for the 22nd of September for particular TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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Page 134 Page 135 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 2 could Barclays reasonably be expected to exit CUSIPs. particular assets at, if it didn't have legal 3 3 Q. The transaction, the Asset Purchase 4 Agreement, closed prior to the open of the 4 title to those on Friday, it seems -- as an 5 markets on September 22nd, correct? 5 economist and also as a lawyer, but I'll 6 A. That is my understanding, yes. 6 specifically speak as an economist, that if 7 Q. And you are aware that the APA 7 you didn't have a security available because 8 provides that all legal title to the 8 you didn't own it on September 19th, then you 9 9 transaction and the assets transferred to couldn't sell it. 0 Barclays, transferred as of 12:01 a.m. on the 10 Q. Let's take that example of that 11 22nd, correct? 11 security that you got legal title to at 12:01 12 a.m. on Monday, September 22nd. You could L 2 A. Again, that was my understanding. 13 sell that the second the market is opened, 13 And it was important that it be completed 14 before markets opened. 14 correct? 15 Q. Did you have a view as to whether 15 A. Well, I think here we start to make or not it would be more appropriate to use 16 16 a distinction between a fire sale price. September 19th close of business valuations 17 17 Q. I'm not asking you about dumping 18 for the securities that were transferred to 18 all of them. 19 19 **Barclays in September 2008?** MR. SHAW: Please let him finish. 20 20 A. Well, I think the simple answer to MR. TAMBE: If he answers my that is no, absolutely not. You didn't have 21 21 question, I will be happy to let him the assets. As you said in your preface to 22 finish. If he goes off on these long 22 23 your question, assets did not transfer until 23 side excursions, then I am going to interrupt him because it is wasting his 24 24 12:01. 25 25 time and our time and it is not getting So in answering the question what TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 136 Page 137 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 to what is a very simple and very 2 the market opens, but you could trade it that 3 straightforward question. 3 day. If it was a small amount -- and again, I 4 Q. Do you have my question in mind, 4 recall -- I believe it was either Gary Romain 5 5 or Stephen King saying that some of the sir? 6 6 positions, they had referenced a position for A. I do not. 7 which the amount that they had was 400 times 7 MR. TAMBE: Please read it back. 8 8 (Record read as follows: the average daily volume so. But conditioned on it being a very 9 9 "Question: Let's take that example of that security that you got legal title 10 small position, then that may be true. But 0 to at 12:01 a.m. on Monday, September 11 11 for establishing how to value the entire repo 12 capital, that's not relevant for almost the 12 22nd. You could sell that the second 13 13 bulk of the repo capital. the markets opened, correct?") 14 14 A. I can't answer that question So that's why I asked, are you 15 because if you're saying that asset, are you 15 talking about selling an individual security 16 talking about the entire repo capital? 16 or are you actually trying to do what was 17 Q. Any one of them. Any one of the 17 being done here, establish a value for the 18 18 entire repo capital? **CUSIPs?** 19 19 A. Which one? Q. Well certainly, sir, would you not 20 20 agree with me that one of the ways to Q. Take the smallest one. Take a 21 \$15,000 position in an equity position, 21 establish the value of the entire repo capital 22 is to do it CUSIP by CUSIP? 22 corporate. 23 A. If it was traded in an equity 23 A. Which is what Barclays did. market for which there was active trading, you 24 Q. And if you did it CUSIP by CUSIP, 24 25 might be able to trade it maybe not the second there certainly would be some positions which 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580

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were not overly large or overly illiquid, that, in fact, you could do an orderly sale or an exit of that position on Monday morning as soon as the markets opened, correct?

A. It's possibly that that would be true of some of the positions. And if you point me to a particular one, if it was 5,000 shares or a hundred shares of IBM, then I certainly wouldn't argue with you at all. I certainly wouldn't disagree.

But if it was a bigger position in a stock that wasn't thickly traded, then I can't agree with you because it wouldn't be true.

- Q. Did you do any such analysis to try to distinguish which of these positions could have been traded at first thing Monday morning and which ones could not have been?
- A. I personally did no such analysis because, again, it wouldn't have been relevant to the opinions that I formed.
- Q. Did you make any effort to try and value all of the fed repo capital as of a September 19th close of business valuation

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date?

A. No. Because as I just indicated, I don't think that that would be at all appropriate because that would be predicated on the notion that you could sell something that you didn't have. The transaction hadn't closed. So it would not have been appropriate to do that.

- Q. Did you make an effort to try and see how much the markets for any, any of the September securities moved between September 19th close of business and September 22nd close of business?
- A. No. And for the reason I just articulated, it wouldn't have been relevant.
- Q. In your report, Exhibit 633-A, if you could turn to page 10, please.

(Witness complying.)

- Q. Footnote 18 in particular, I want to draw your attention to the second-to-last sentence of that footnote which begins "to fill the shortfall." Do you see that?
 - A. I do.
 - Q. And that reads, "To fill the

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- P. Pfleiderershortfall, additional LBI securities from outside the fed repo collateral are pledged to Barclays." I'm going to stop there.

Do you see that?

A. I do.

- Q. Do you know who made the decision to select particular LBI securities from outside the fed repo collateral to pledge to Barclays as you state there in Footnote 18?
- A. I read quite a bit of deposition testimony of what happened after the repo took place on the 18th, and as it developed over that weekend. And I recall that I believe Ian Lowitt and Alex Kirk and others at Lehman were involved in some way in identifying -- in identifying securities that could be transferred, but my recollection may not be completely accurate. I have to go back and review -- review the record.

I also remember that there were e-mails that were sent within Lehman relating to this, but I don't remember the particular people that were addressed on those e-mails by name. But I recall seeing some of those.

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Q. Is it your understanding, sir, with respect to any of the collateral that was transferred from J.P. Morgan to Bank of New York on the night of the 18th, that any of that was selected by Mr. Lowitt or Mr. Kirk or others which fits this category of "additional LBI securities from outside the fed repo collateral being pledged to Barclays"?

A. My recollection was that there was a process of identifying securities that could be transferred. And as I believe is reasonable and usual in such a case, there is also a requirement that the party receiving that collateral, in this case Bank of New York and ultimately Barclays, would have some discretion as to what was -- was acceptable for that -- I don't know if it's appropriate to call it "replacement." But securities that were being used, given that some of those securities that were part of the original fed repo were not deliverable.

Again, I read -- I read a fair amount of testimony about this, but I don't remember the exact particular.

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Q. The securities that you are alluding to, both in Footnote 18 and in your answers, are those securities, securities that are sometimes referred to as Schedule B securities?

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A. No. The Schedule B securities were delivered outside of the repo capital.

Q. So you are still talking about securities that were delivered within the fed repo collateral?

A. What happened here is that a set of securities came over that were part of -- were labeled the repo capital, the repo collateral, and those came over in basically two tranches, two inventories: one on the 19th, delivered as the initial inventory that eventually was identified and also on December 22nd in terms of the J.P. Morgan settlement.

My understanding is that the Schedule B assets are distinct, and that's why I took them out of the initial inventory.

Q. So when you're referring to "fill this shortfall, additional LBI securities," you're not alluding to the Schedule B

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securities there, you're alluding to Schedule A securities; is that right? (Witness reviewing document.)

A. Well, I can tell you the process that I went through -- and that's the only way that this actually affects any of my opinions -- identified what was in the original inventory that was repo'ed by taking what was there and subtracting off what was on Schedule B.

So the set of securities that were received in the initial inventory minus those securities that are identified on Schedule B is what I'm considering the initial repo capital -- the initial repo collateral.

Q. You are answering a slightly different question than the one I had. I'm still talking about securities that came over as part of the fed repo.

You state in Footnote 18 there was a shortfall of securities that were coming over from JPM to Bank of New York, correct?

A. That was my understanding based on several things that were happening.

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Q. And that shortfall was filled in, you say, by LBI securities from outside the fed repo collateral; is that right?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

A. I don't understand all of the particulars of the process and how everything was categorized. What I do understand, if I can use the phrase "when the dust settled," there were a set of securities that were delivered in the initial inventory and a portion of those were labeled Schedule B. And what remained, if you subtract that off, is Schedule A which I take to be what was in the repo capital -- excuse me, I keep misspeaking. The repo collateral.

Q. With respect to the securities that came over on the night of the 18th, is it your understanding that any portion of those were securities that were selected or identified by J.P. Morgan as opposed to Mr. Kirk or Mr. Lowitt or anyone else at Lehman?

A. My recollection is that -- my recollection may be faulty here. But my recollection was there was a message from TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 - P. Pfleiderer-

J.P. Morgan to Lehman when the first \$5 billion payment was received.

And my recollection is that J.P. Morgan asked someone at Lehman which securities to deliver, and the message was, "Deliver them in any order, or deliver any securities," meaning any in the repo. And J.P. Morgan misunderstood that and included

securities that weren't in the fed repo. But my -- that's my recollection.

I haven't reviewed that recently, but that's my recollection based upon my reading of some of the depositions.

Q. Those securities that you just described that were identified by J.P. Morgan, are any of those securities the securities you're referring to in Footnote 18 as "LBI securities as outside the fed repo collateral"?

A. The only way that I could definitively answer that is to have all the CUSIPs that are now in Schedule A and have all the CUSIPs that were in the fed repo, the original fed repo.

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My understanding based upon everything I've read is that Schedule A securities is not equal to the securities that were in the fed repo, or a proper subset of that; that it contains securities that are not in the original fed repo. That's my understanding.

- Q. Did you do any independent analysis of the fed repo securities versus the Schedule A securities to determine to what extent there was an overlap either by number of CUSIPs or value?
- A. I did not because it wasn't terribly relevant to my major opinions, which have to do with the value of what was actually received.
- Q. If you turn to Paragraph 25 of your report. If I'm correct, in Paragraph 25 of your report, you are identifying what we've looked at before, which is the exhibits that appear in Exhibit 634-A, the Volume II of your expert report; is that correct?

(Witness reviewing document.)

Q. Turn to Paragraph 27 in your

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report. About halfway down that paragraph, the sentence that begins "no doubt." Do you see it?

A. I do.

Q. You state there, "No doubt some of the positions that transferred to Barclays were relatively easy to value..." And then it goes on.

Could you tell us by number of CUSIPs or value of positions what proportion or amounts of the positions that were transferred to Barclays were, in your view, "relatively easy to value"?

(Witness reviewing document.)

A. Since I didn't define in a precise way what "relatively easy to value" is, there is a continuum here from "very easy". Again, we can go back to the small number of shares of IBM traded in a thick market to some of the securities that ended up in the PMTT inventory.

If we can agree on a way to define where along that spectrum you wanted to be, then in principle it would be possible to go TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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back in and identifying securities as falling in one side of the line as the other, and give a number of CUSIP or a value based upon marks placed by BoNY or marks placed by the Price Control Group and ultimately on the acquisition balance sheet.

- Q. I'm not asking you to do any additional work. I'm just asking you: Did vou, in fact, do that work?
- A. No, because I didn't define that line. I guess the answer to my question is given that there was no defined line between "relatively easy to value" and "relatively not easy to value" I didn't do that exercise.
- Q. What kind of factors would go into your definition, if you were to define "relatively easy to value"? Availability of actual transaction data from public sources, is that something that makes it relatively easy to value?

A. There are a number of ways that one could go about coming up with a definition. And there is no definitive way to do that. But you could, first of all, ask whether there TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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are quotes available or whether there are not.

You could actually -- just to back up for a moment, you could take the accounting profession's distinction of Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3. And I do that somewhat indirectly here by looking at the Lehman marks -- excuse me. The Lehman classifications for what was in its inventory.

So that would be one way to just say that what we will call "relatively easy to value" is Level 1. Although I would quickly say that within Level 1, there would be a ring there as well. But that's a distinction that would be easy to implement to the extent that the securities are divided into Level 1, Level 2, Level 3.

If you didn't want to accept that, then you would go and perhaps use other criteria such as are there prices available in a liquid market. Well, you have to define what you mean by a liquid market; how frequently do trades have to occur; what's the structure of the market; how many market makers. You could come up with a whole set of TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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So it is not an exercise that's completely defined until you define it.

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Q. Did you make any effort to try to define it in any way?

A. Again, I spoke about the initial classification that's given by the GFS system that separates things into Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3. So that would give an indication, given that this was Lehman inventory that was coming over, of what the separation would be or the composition would be based upon at least the Lehman's distinction between Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3.

So indeed, I did. And we can find that part of the report and I can get the actual numbers. I don't remember them here off the top of my head.

Q. Under the definition of sort of "relatively easy to value" then that you would adopt based upon Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3, is it your position that all Level 2 assets are not relatively easy to value?

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A. Let me correct the premise of your question. I didn't say that I would adopt Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3. What I said is one way to answer the question would be to use what accountants use. But then I said that in fact, Level 1, for example, would still have a variation.

Again, there is a continuum here. So one may want to approach it in a different way by -- and then I went on to specify various things about number of market makers, the characteristics of the market and so on and so forth.

Q. You go on further in your report in paragraph 29 to talk about some work you did looking on Bloomberg. Do you see that?

A. I do.

O. Did you do any kind of analysis to see what percentage or proportion of the Level 1, Level 2, Level 3 assets, as defined in GFS, had prices recorded on Bloomberg for the date that you went looking?

A. I don't believe that analysis was done. But it may have been. It may have been TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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done. The information could be married up, I believe, because we have CUSIPs from the GFS report with the Level 1, Level 2, Level 3 classifications. And then we have the CUSIPs that were reported, for which there were trades reported by Bloomberg or at least Bloomberg recognized it in the various classifications there that are making here.

So in principle, one could do that analysis, but I didn't think it was necessary to do that analysis because it wouldn't have in any way, changed my -- changed my opinion that I'm drawing here in the report.

Q. What you did on Bloomberg is you went and looked for prices on or shortly after September 18, 2008; am I reading that correctly?

A. Yes.

Q. For which dates in particular did you go and look for the Bloomberg prices for any of the fed repo collateral?

A. I would have to go back and check exactly what was done. I believe it was on the -- on the 18th. And when something didn't TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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show up on the 18th, then we looked -- then we looked soon after that. But I don't recall exactly what time span was.

Q. So you would have looked on the 18th for at least some of them to see if they showed up on the 18th; is that right?

A. Well, the -- there was a list of CUSIPs and that list was basically put into Bloomberg to see what would come up. So it wasn't -- there wasn't a selection process where a random sample was taken.

Q. You took the entire list of the initial --

A. It came in the entire list, yes.

Q. The initial inventory?

A. I'm afraid I'm understanding your question then.

Q. Let me rephrase it.

You took the entire list of the initial inventory, and you put it in Bloomberg; is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. To look to see how many of those CUSIPs were priced on the 18th; is that right?

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A. On the 18th or shortly thereafter, I believe is what we --

Q. There's what I'm trying to get some precision on. Did you do it for the 18th?

A. That's my understanding, yes.

Q. Did you do it for the 19th?

A. I'd have to go back and check for sure as to what happened. But I believe our effort was -- I know our effort was to look to Bloomberg and see what one could get prices within a reasonable period of time of maybe a day or two. And I don't know. I'd have to go back and look exactly how many days were looked at.

Q. You state in your report, "On or shortly after September 18th," so there is one date that's mentioned, September 18th.

In the next sentence, you say you found that Bloomberg reported an observed transaction price on September 22nd for only 5,719 off the CUSIPs; do you see that?

A. That's right.

Q. So that suggests to me you did run that list of CUSIPs on the 22nd, correct?

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(Witness reviewing document.)

A. I'm have to going back and check as to exactly what was done here. What's written here which is most likely accurate because as I recall now, the exercise was to access Bloomberg. I think that given that the inventory was going to be valued at the 22nd, this sentence states what is actually stated here, that the 5,719 is for the number that

Q. Okay.

at Bloomberg pricing looked at more days, but the number that's being quoted here is for the 22nd.

Q. Okay. I think what we're getting to is: There may be a CUSIP for which Bloomberg reported a price on the 19th but not on the 22nd, correct?

A. That certainly is --

Q. It's possible?

A. That certainly is a possibility. And of course, that addresses sort of the question that we went back to before when TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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talking about intra-day prices when prices are only sporadically available is not relevant for a lot of these securities.

Q. I'm not even right now talking about what the Bloomberg prices showed.

A. Right.

Q. Right now we're just talking about for each of the CUSIPs, how many CUSIPs were there prices available.

A. Right.

Q. And you say on September 22nd, there was 5,719. Are there additional CUSIPs for which a price was available on Bloomberg on the 18th, the 19th, the 23rd? Did you look?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

A. What I did do is look to see what could be gotten from Standard & Poors's Capital IQ which, as I show, certainly expand the number and did so. So instead of doing the exercise that you're suggesting, and I did another exercise which is to look at another vendor.

Q. My question simply is: Did you do TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 - P. Pfleiderer-

the exercise that I'm suggesting or did you not do the exercise that I'm suggesting?

A. If that exercise was done, it may have been done by staff. They were asked to analyze this. But given that the issue was what was available on the 22nd, I was comfortable with instead of looking at what you're saying, looking instead at another vendor entirely which was Standard & Poors Capital IO.

Q. So you don't know if the exercise was done on the 19th?

A. The exercise may have been done and I may even have seen results of that. I'm not sure. I don't remember them as I sit here today. But what I focused on in this report is how it could be expanded by looking at Standard & Poors's Capital IQ.

Q. A lot of things may have happened and may not have happened. Do you know if it happened?

A. I don't know that it happened, no, and I don't know that it didn't happen either.

Q. Right. You just don't know? TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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A. But as I recall, the effort to look

Page 158 Page 159 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 2 A. That's correct. A. That's correct. 3 3 Q. Now what you did do, you talked Q. You've seen that on the 4 about it before and you say it in 4 spreadsheet, there is names listed of other 5 Paragraph 30, you went to Capital IQ and you 5 pricing services, right? did the same exercise on Capital IQ for 6 6 A. Correct. 7 the 22nd: is that correct? 7 Q. And Markit, that's one of the 8 8 services that Barclays referenced? A. That's correct. 9 9 Q. Do you know whether you did that A. That's correct. 0 pricing exercise on Capital IQ for any dates 10 Q. Did you try to use any of the 11 other than September 22nd? 11 third-party pricing services that Barclays used to price its collateral, to see what they 12 A. No. I do not know. I don't know 12 13 whether it was done or whether it was not 13 showed? done. But I'm not aware of it sitting here 14 A. If that was done, I didn't report 15 15 it here. My only point in recording it here today one way or another. 16 on both Bloomberg and the Standard & Poors Q. Did you consider using any other 16 17 services other than Bloomberg and Capital IQ? Capital IQ is to show that with these two 17 18 A. I think we may have talked about 18 vendors that covered quite a bit of the 19 potentially other services, but these are two 19 universe, there are a lot of securities that 20 20 of the main ones. Again, it may be that other weren't covered by those two. So what it says services were used, but I don't know whether 21 21 is what it says. I certainly wasn't saying 22 that these were the only two services that was 22 they were or not. 23 23 Q. You know that Barclays, for certain available and I'm well aware that other 24 of the CUSIPs, used other third-party 24 services were used such as Markit. 25 services, correct? 25 Q. In paragraph 29 and 30, you are TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580 Page 160 Page 161 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 counting up numbers of CUSIPs that are covered 2 of what prices you saw for those CUSIPs for which Bloomberg and Capital IQ reported prices 3 by those two services, Bloomberg and Capital 3 4 IQ, right? 4 on the 22nd? 5 5 A. That's correct. A. That I don't know. I'm not sure --6 6 I'm not sure how the information was brought Q. Did you do an analysis to see what portion of the value was being covered by 7 7 in, whether the information was brought in 8 with a price or whether the information was those reported prices on the 22nd? 8 just brought in that there was a price 9 A. Indeed, I did. 9 10 10 available, a dummy variable, if you will, zero O. Okav. 11 A. And it's in the bottom of 11 to one, and whether the price was preserved. 12 Paragraph 30, for example, where it says 12 We can go back and check and see what data 13 that -- "just using Barclays exit price mark 13 exists on that. as I did above," and this was done for 14 14 Q. Did you give your staff any 15 Bloomberg, it is also being done for Standard 15 instructions as to whether to preserve or not & Poors Capital IQ, "I find that the CUSIP 16 16 preserve the prices they observed on Bloomberg positions for which Capital IQ reports no 17 and Capital IQ? 17 price account for almost 40 percent of the 18 18 A. As I understood what we were doing 19 19 aggregate value of the securities that is we were getting a record of whether the transferred to Barclays in the Fed Replacement 20 CUSIP showed up, whether it was recognized; 20 21 whether there was pricing available and 21 Repo." 22 So it was done for both number of 22 whether there was not. 23 CUSIPs and also by value as put on it by 23 I didn't understand, or I don't 24 24 Barclays. know whether that query turned up actual 25 prices or whether it turned up something that 25 Q. And did you keep a report or record

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Page 162 Page 163 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 2 indicates that prices were available. So I Q. Why not? 3 3 A. I'm sorry? would have to check to see if that -- check to 4 see how the data came in. 4 O. Why not? A. Because I assumed and saw that 5 O. And these calculations of 53 5 6 percent in paragraph 29 and 40 percent in 6 where prices were available, that's what 7 paragraph 29 and other percentages that appear 7 Barclays was using. They were the going 8 on Paragraph 30, is that the result of some 8 prices from outside vendors. Q. Did you check to see whether the 9 type of a spreadsheet that calculated numbers? 9 .0 A. Yes. It was done basically by 10 prices they claim to be getting from outside 11 identifying a CUSIP as either having a price 11 vendors were, in fact, the prices you were available or not. And then taking those 12 12 seeing when you ran these CUSIPs through Bloomberg and Capital IQ? Did you do that 13 CUSIPs that did not have prices available from 13 14 one of these vendors or the other. So if 14 check? 15 we're looking at Standard & Poors's Capital 15 A. That may have been done, but I'm IQ, identifying CUSIPs that didn't have the 16 16 not aware that it was done systemically. But 17 price available from that service and then 17 it may have been done. But I'm not aware of 18 adding up the values that were assigned by 18 19 Barclays in the acquisition balance sheet. 19 O. So things may have been done: 20 Q. Did you make any effort, either 20 you're not aware of it being done? yourself or through your staff, to compare the 21 21 A. I'm not aware of it, yes. 22 Bloomberg and Capital IQ prices to either the 22 Q. I'm trying to understand the math you set forth in paragraph 31. 23 **BoNY** prices or the Barclays valuation prices? 23 In Paragraph 29 and 30 you used 24 A. I'm not aware that that exercise 24 25 was done. 25 a 40 percent number to talk about the value, TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 164 Page 165 1 1 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-2 the aggregate value of the securities for 2 Paragraph 32. At the end of Paragraph 32, 3 which no price is available. But in 31 you 3 you've got this calculation of Level 1, Level 4 combine the Bloomberg pricing and the Capital 4 2, Level 3 that you talked about before off of 5 IQ pricing; is that right? 5 GFS, correct? A. That's right. We take the super 6 6 A. That's correct. 7 set of those. 7 Q. Just following your numbers here, 8 Q. And once you combine the super set 8 you got 4,000 categorized as Level 1. Do you 9 of those, now there is something a little more 9 see that? 10 10 than 23 percent of the total fair value of the 11 repo collateral using Barclays' valuation for 11 Q. And you've got 19,800 categorized which you don't have Bloomberg or Capital IQ 12 .2 as Level 2? 13 prices; is that right? 13 A. That's correct. 14 14 Q. And another 2,100 categorized as A. That's correct. 15 Q. So for more than three-quarters, 15 Level 3, correct? 16 16 you do? A. Yes. 17 17 A. For 72 percent. Q. This is not the population of 18 Q. 72 percent? I'm sorry about my 18 CUSIPs that was actually acquired by Barclays, 19 math. We're trying to add it to 100 percent, 19 right? 20 20 A. No, it is not. 21 A. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I was 21 Q. This is some other larger 22 looking at the wrong number. 77 percent. 22 population that was on Lehman's books on 23 Q. So more than three-quarters? 23 September 12th, right? 24 24 A. Yes. A. That's correct. 25 25 Q. All right. Let's go to Q. And as part of the sales process, TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580

Page 166 Page 167 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 Barclays picked and chose what securities it 2 MR. TAMBE: Let him finish. 3 3 A. It's been a while since I've read wanted to purchase and there were some that it 4 told Lehman it did not want to purchase, 4 that portion of the transcript. I have to go 5 correct? 5 back and look at exactly what is said. I 6 6 don't remember exactly how it was said or what A. Again, I'd have to go back and read 7 the deposition testimony exactly how things 7 the context was. 8 were sorted out in that process. But what I 8 Q. Are you aware generally that know is what was on Schedule A. 9 9 efforts were made by Barclays to try to 0 Q. Did you read the analyst conference 10 de-risk the portfolio they were acquiring? 11 call transcript for the announcement of the 11 MR. SHAW: Objection to form. 12 transaction? 12 Vague as to time. 13 13 A. I'm not even sure what "de-risk" A. Yes. 14 Q. This is the Barclays announcement? 14 actually means. I know that hedging was going 15 A. Right. Right. 15 to be done. I know that -- I know that Q. Do you recall reading in there the initially there was, in the APA a specific 16 16 17 senior management of Barclays talking about 17 contractual term, a specific part of that 18 how they de-risked the portfolio they were 18 contract that said that only 50 percent of the 19 19 acquiring? RESIs would be acquired. So I have -- I'm not 20 20 MR. SHAW: You mean the portfolio quite sure. I have to go back and look at the context to understand exactly what was being 21 they intended to acquire? 21 22 MR. TAMBE: Do you want me to swear 22 referred to in that conference recall. 23 you in and you can start testifying? 23 Q. Did you do any analysis to try and quantify the relative riskiness of the MR. SHAW: You're asking misleading 24 24 25 questions. 25 portfolio eventually, actually acquired by TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580 Page 168 Page 169 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-Barclays versus the portfolio they intended to 2 2 THE WITNESS: And the J.P. Morgan 3 acquire? 3 4 4 Q. Turn to Paragraph 42 of your MR. SHAW: Again, objection. Vague 5 5 as to time. report. 6 6 The leading sentence of A. I certainly did no full scale 7 Paragraph 42 you state, "Having analyzed 7 analysis that would have involved one set of JPMorgan Chase's marks and the Bank of New 8 CUSIPs and the CUSIPs that they actually got 8 9 and looking at the differences between those. 9 York's marks for many of the esoteric and 0 So if there's -- and I don't believe this 10 illiquid securities transferred in the Fed 11 11 Replacement Repo, I conclude that many of them exists. 12 were in fact inaccurate, often significantly 12 But if there's a set of CUSIPs that 13 13 so.'' relate to what they intended to acquire and 14 then what they did acquire, which, of course, 14 With respect to JPMorgan Chase's 15 is Schedule A and Schedule B in the 15 mark, can you tell me can you tell me single 16 16 CUSIP or security for which you believe the J.P. Morgan settlement [sic], one could 17 17 potentially do some evaluation of the risk JPMorgan Chase mark was inaccurate? 18 (Witness reviewing document.) 18 profile of one or the other. 19 19 But I'm not sure the first set of A. I certainly don't remember a 20 specific number. I have to go back and think 20 CUSIPs is even well defined. I'm not sure. 21 about deposition testimony and relate it to 21 MR. SHAW: I just note that there 22 claims about the J.P. Morgan marks and the 22 is a transcription error. Did you mean 23 to say Schedule A and Schedule B on the 23 BoNY marks, and it had CUSIP numbers there. J.P. Morgan settlement or and the 24 So I don't have a CUSIP number to offer at 24 25 this point. J.P. Morgan settlement? 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580

Page 170 Page 171 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 Q. Even if you don't have CUSIP 2 Do you have an understanding as to what their numbers, even generally, is there a particular 3 3 contractual duties were to value securities as 4 security you have in mind or class of 4 a custodial agent? 5 securities that you believe JPMorgan Chase 5 A. Not on the basis of a thorough 6 marked inaccurately? Not BoNY, JPMorgan 6 reading of the contract, no. 7 7 Q. Did you ask for a copy of Chase. J.P. Morgan's securities pricing policies? 8 8 A. I have to --A. I personally did not, and I don't 9 9 MR. SHAW: Objection to form. 10 A. -- go back. I have to go back and 10 know whether staff working in my direction did 11 11 or did not. look. 12 12 Q. Did you look at the custodial Q. How about Bank of New York, did you 13 agreements that were signed by JPMorgan Chase 13 ask to see their pricing policies? 14 and by Bank of New York? 14 A. Same answer as before. 15 A. I didn't look at them in great 15 O. You did not? 16 detail. I do recall seeing -- seeing 16 A. I did not. And it may or may not be the case that staff working in my direction 17 something, but I didn't look at it in great 17 18 detail. 18 had looked at that. 19 19 Q. Do you have any understanding with Q. In the course of your work, you respect to JPMorgan Chase what the scope was 20 20 don't recall ever seeing such policies from of their contractual duties to value 21 J.P. Morgan or Bank of New York for this 21 22 22 securities as custodial agent? assignment? 23 A. Not in the basis of a thorough 23 A. I'm pretty sure I did not see any 24 24 policies. I've looked at Barclays policies, reading of a contract, no. 25 Q. Same question for Bank of New York. 25 but I don't believe I've seen either TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 172 Page 173 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 J.P. Morgan or Bank of New York policies. 2 we can give you one. 3 Q. By the way, did you ever ask to see 3 (Whereupon, a recess was taken 4 Lehman's policies? 4 from 2:09 p.m. to 2:17 p.m.) 5 A. I'm not sure I've seen any 5 BY MR. TAMBE: 6 documents relating to their policies either. 6 Q. One of the conclusions in your I may have, but I don't believe so. report, sir, is that the GFS data is not a 7 7 reliable source of pricing information because 8 Q. We talked a couple of times about 8 GFS data. Do you recall making specific it was sticky, correct? 9 9 10 requests for Barclays to provide you with GFS 10 A. That was one of the reasons, yes. 11 data? 11 Q. And you set out in your report a couple of tables where you seek to demonstrate 12 12 A. Staff working at my direction did, 13 13 the stickiness of the GFS data, correct? yes. 14 14 Q. Is it your understanding that you A. Yes, there are two tables in the 15 made request for runs to be created pulling 15 back of the report. 16 certain specific data from the GFS system? 16 Q. Let's go to those tables. Let's go 17 A. That was my understanding, yes. 17 first to Exhibit 4, which is page 125 of Exhibit 633-A. If you just want to put a 18 Q. And it is your understanding that 18 19 the GFS system that used to belong to Lehman 19 sticky there so we can hold that page. now resides physically at Barclays, correct? 20 MR. SHAW: What page is the 20 A. That's my understanding, yes. 21 21 schedule? 22 MR. SHAW: Jay, whenever, we can 2 MR. TAMBE: 125. I'll give you 23 use a short break. 23 some stickies, too. 24 24 THE WITNESS: I could use one. MR. SHAW: Thank you. 25 Q. The reason I'm asking you to put a 25 MR. TAMBE: Since you asked for it, TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580

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sticky there, if you can go back to the body of your report, Paragraph 39, you describe in Paragraph 39 what you're doing in Exhibit 4 and 5, so I may want you to toggle back and forth there.

A. Sure.

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Q. It is page 24.

(Witness reviewing document.)

- Q. So in Paragraph 39, you set forth the methodology you followed to generate the table that is Exhibit 4, correct, as well as Exhibit 5?
 - A. That's correct.
- O. And if I understand what was done to generate Exhibit 4 is you took from the September 12, GFS data all securities marked as Level 3 securities and which had an indicated value of greater than \$20 million, and then you looked to see if those prices had changed within GFS subsequent to the 12th; is that right?
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. What GFS population did you run that search on? Let me be more precise.

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Did you run that GFS search on all securities on GFS on the 12th or did you run that search only with respect to those securities that Barclays eventually acquired?

- A. My recollection is on all securities in GFS that met those two criterias. But looking here at the list, I recognize a number of these as ones that ended up being in the collateral or the initial inventory, or perhaps the JPM inventory that came over the Barclays; that came over to Barclays in one fashion or another.
- Q. And you can't rule out that Exhibit 4 contains securities that did not end up with Barclays?
- A. That's entirely possible given my understanding that the search criteria was as described, just Level 2 or Level 3 and over \$20 million in value as of the 12th.
- Q. Why pick \$20 million as the cutoff for this analysis, sir?
- A. I would say two reasons. One which was to save paper, although as I look around the room I realize that it probably didn't 877-702-9580

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have much of an effect. But the main reason was that I wanted to look at securities that had substantial value that would be material for the conclusions that I was drawing.

Q. If you add up, if you sum up the "Gross Long Inventory" column on Exhibit 4 of your report, do you know how that compares in percentage terms with the total population of Level 3 securities in GFS as of September 12th? How big a portion of the Level 3 securities have you analyzed here?

> MR. SHAW: Objection to form. (Witness reviewing document.)

- A. I'm afraid I can't answer your question. I was attempting to mentally add these up and then take my recollection of what might have been recorded as to the Level 3 -total population of Level 3 securities, which I don't remember so I can't answer the question.
- Q. But short of sort of doing the analysis now, do you recall having done the analysis at some point to see what portion of the Level 3 securities were captured by this

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analysis?

A. I didn't do that and it wasn't material to my -- my opinions here.

- Q. Now, I note that what you have reported in Exhibit 4 are clean market prices for September 12th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th and 22, right?
 - A. That's correct.
- O. Did you for any of these Level 3 securities go back in the GFS data to see how frequently these securities were marked prior to Lehman's bankruptcy?
- A. No. Because again, that was not material to my conclusions.
- Q. What is your understanding of how often Level 3 securities are re-priced or remarked?
- A. I don't know what particular policies may have been in place. Because as I say, I don't believe I've seen the Lehman policy on that. But the conclusion that I'm drawing here is not how this compares with prior policy but rather, are these reliable indicators of value given that they are not TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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changing in a turbulent week when a lot is happening in the market.

- Q. Right. The conclusion you're drawing from the fact that the price has changed from the 12th to the 15th for some of these and then don't change through the 22nd is that people were so caught up in the turbulence and their own personal crisis that they weren't remarking these Level 3 securities, right?
- A. Certainly, these Level 3 securities were not remarked to reflect what undoubtedly were changes in value over the course of the week.
- O. And to know what's driving the re-pricing or the lack of re-pricing of a security, wouldn't you need to know what the policies are as to when Level 3s are remarked by Lehman in the ordinary course?
- A. I think the best way to answer this question is I'm not necessarily drawing a conclusion here about whether policy followed this week was different than the other weeks, although I certainly read a lot of deposition TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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testimony that indicated that this week was different than other weeks. I remember, I believe it was Mr. Marsal who said that he found extreme chaos when he was coming in on his own and so forth.

So it would be reasonable to conclude that whatever policies might have been in place were not necessarily being followed. However, my major conclusion is that because these weren't being updated, they could not serve as a reliable indicator of value in a week where there was a lot of turbulent activity in the market and market valuations were potentially changing.

So whether it was as a result of following policies that resulted in stale prices all the time, or whether it was a result of people not being able to follow the policy is really immaterial for the ultimate question, which is can these Lehman marks be used as a reliable indicator of value as the week is progressing when they're not being updated in a week when values are changing.

Q. If, for example, Lehman's policy TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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was that Level 3 assets are re-priced on the 15th and 30th of each month, so middle of the month and end of the month, the pattern of price changes that you see here would be perfectly consistent with such a policy, correct?

- A. As would my conclusion that they would not be reliable sources of value.
- Q. But for a different reason; it's not because people are distracted and caught up in their personal life, it's because they're following the Lehman pricing policy, right?
- A. Again, that doesn't affect the conclusion that I would draw that they're not reliable.
- Q. It is not the conclusion that you would draw. It is the conclusion that you have drawn. You have suggested to the Court that the reason these prices aren't being remarked is because people are so caught up in their personal lives that they don't have the time to remark their books. You have no way of knowing if that's the reason these prices

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didn't change or simply because policy was being followed?

MR. SHAW: Objection.

Mischaracterizes the report and his prior testimony.

(Witness reviewing document.)

A. I think the answer to your question, I will simply read into the record what I said in Paragraph 39 which is, "My analysis of the prices recorded in GFS reveal significant stickiness in the marks," and then it goes on to talk about Exhibit 4.

So I'm not using this to conclude anything about what Lehman employees were doing. Although, given my reading of deposition testimony, I know that this was an unusual week. But Paragraph 39 does not begin by saying Lehman employees were not updating the GFS system, and as evidence thereof, and then go on. It simply says that my analysis "revealed significant stickiness."

O. Just to answer my question, you have no way of knowing whether the reporting of these prices in the GFS system was or was

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- P. Pfleiderernot consistent with Lehman policy, correct?

 A. Then it would be immaterial for my conclusions --

Q. That wasn't my question at all.

- A. -- because I wasn't basing my conclusions on what Lehman policy was or was not. I'm simply looking at the prices as they're reported in the GFS system and noting that they were sticky.
- Q. Do you have a problem with my question? Do you understand the question I'm asking you? You have no way of knowing whether this was consistent with policy or not? Do you understand that question?
- A. I have not read the policy, so I don't know what the policy is.
- Q. And the same is true with the data you have in Exhibit 5? You have no way of knowing whether that is consistent with Lehman's policy that existed then for the re-pricing of Level 2 securities, correct?
- A. No. What I do know is that it shows that they were sticky, which is the only conclusion that I was drawing.

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Q. What is Barclays' policy for re-pricing Level 3 securities?

A. I don't recall. I'd have to go back and look at their policies.

- Q. Do you have any understanding generally in the financial industry, what is the test for when you have to go in and remark a Level 3 security; when it's appropriate to do so, when you're required to do so? What are the standards?
- A. I don't know the exact accounting standards, no.
- Q. Not the accounting standards. Are there any valuation standards that apply that require financial institutions to go in and revalue Level 3 securities?
 - A. Valuation standards set by whom?

Q. By regulators.

A. I don't know the exact regulatory policy. But what I do know is a financial economist is a stale mark. And if prices are changing and if values are changing and a mark is not being updated, it is stale. And that's all I was observing here.

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- Q. What percentage of Level 3 securities were remarked more frequently than the ones you selected in Exhibit 4? Did you do that analysis?
- A. I'm not sure I understand the question.
- Q. If you don't apply the \$20 million criteria, if you look at all of the Level 3s that are available in GFS, did you look to see how many of the other Level 3 securities other than the ones you have in Exhibit 4 were being remarked throughout that week?
- A. Beyond the cutoff of 20 million; is that what you're asking?
- Q. Yes. The entire population. Not this population.
- A. I'm not sure whether that analysis was done. But I suspect that it was and we just reported the top ones above 20 million because those were the ones that had material value or certainly were going to be where a lot of material value would reside.
- Q. You don't know that, do you, because there could be a lot of Level 3 assets

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that are just under \$20 million, so there could be billions and billions of dollars of Level 3 and only a couple of billion that are being captured by your analysis, correct? You don't know?

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A. What I do know in this analysis is that some of the ones that were very important in the inventory that came to Barclays, which do show up here, such as the Ciago line at the top, were not being updated. I don't have precise number as to what the analysis would show if the screen was set less than 20 million. Let's say 10 million or 5 million. So I don't know that.

Q. And the same is true for the Level 2 securities analysis in Exhibit 5?

- A. That would be correct, yes.
- Q. By the way, where is Pine?
- A. I'm sorry?
- Q. Where is Pine?
 - A. (No response.)
 - O. Where is Pine?
 - A. I said Ciago.
 - Q. But where is Pine?

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A. Oh, I'm sorry. (Witness reviewing document.)

- Q. You can satisfy yourself that it is not there.
 - A. I'm just checking to make sure.
 - O. Absolutely. By all means do.

A. What that would indicate is something that answers the question then that we were talking about before. If the policy was only to mark on the 15th and the 30th, then Pine would show up here. What the absence of Pine means potentially, and the explanation would be, that it was updated more than once during this week. Because let's remember what the criteria was.

The criteria was anything marked Level 3, or Level 2, and above 20 million in value, if it was only updated at most once.

So if it were the case that Pine was updated twice or more, then it wouldn't appear here -- which appears to be the case. But that would say that there was a discretionary policy of some sort that would mean that some things were updated more often 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide

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than others.

Q. There's something you just said there that's really interesting to me.

So this list is limited not only by the fact that it is Level 3s, that are above 20 million, but you also limit it to make sure that you only captured those securities that were updated only once during that time period? Is that what you're telling me?

A. Let me reread what Paragraph 39

Q. That's not in Paragraph 39. So, hence, my interest.

MR. SHAW: Objection to the characterization.

- Q. That aspect of your answer is not in Paragraph 39, so, hence, my interest.
- A. Yes, it is. I respectfully disagree, so let me read:

"Exhibit 4 reports LBI net long inventory positions in Level 3 securities with an indicated value greater than 20 million as recorded in GFS as of September 12, 2008" -and ere is the important clause -- "for which TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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there was no price adjustment after September 12th or at most one adjustment after September 12th." And then this parenthesis "typically a downward, single downward from the 12th to the 15th with no subsequent adjustment."

So the selection criteria is exactly what this says, Level 3 above 20 million and for which there was at most one price adjustment. So it's certainly possible and undoubtedly true, given what we have about Pine, that there were securities that were adjusted more. And Pine, if it was adjusted more than once, would not be included in this table by the criterion that was set out.

But then that would call into question our discussion before about the policy being that you only mark on the 15th and the 30th, because that would not explain the absence of Pine.

Q. How many other securities were there that were more than 20 million in value for which prices were adjusted more than once during this time period? You're suggesting Pine may be one of them. Are there others?

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A. Oh, there could be, and undoubtedly are. My point was simply that there were stale prices in the system. I wasn't saying that everything in the system had stale prices. I was simply observing that there was a substantial number of CUSIPs for which values were above \$20 million and for which there was at most one price change during the course of this week.

Q. You said there was a substantial number of CUSIPs. But I think you added up all of the CUSIPs in Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 5. I haven't done that. But my guess is we are talking about fewer than 200 CUSIPs, probably 100 CUSIPs that you identified there. And the population that we are talking about as of September 12th is 20,000 plus, correct?

MR. SHAW: Objection.

A. I would have to go through and add up the number and then refer back to the other that establish its universe.

(Witness reviewing document.)

Q. Well, the universe is in Paragraph 32, I believe. That's where you add TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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Page 190 Page 191 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 up all of the GFS Level 1, Level 2, Level 3 2 A. What we don't know is the 3 positions. Maybe the universe is even larger 3 percentage here. We can't say anything about 4 than that because maybe there were some CUSIPs the percentage. And the reason we can't is 4 5 for which there was no indication of Level 1, 5 the 20,000 -- excuse me. The \$20 million 6 Level 2, Level 3, but it is at least 26,000 6 filter. So it is true that there are a total 7 positions. Paragraph 32. 7 universe of 2,128. And the filter here was at 8 (Witness reviewing document.) 8 20 million so a substantial part of that 9 Q. Do you agree there is at least 9 universe is probably less than 20 million. 10 26,059 positions as of the 12th in GFS? 10 And since I just did the analysis 11 A. The relevant universe is the number 11 here, I just report the analysis for those 12 that were categorized as Level 2 or Level 3. above 20 million, the really relevant question 12 13 is - if you want to calculate a percentage, is And since you're talking about Level 3, it was 13 14 2,128. 14 what percentage is this of the percentage that 15 15 are in Level 3 that are above 20 million. Q. Of the 2,128, Exhibit 4 captures 16 how many, fewer than 20, 25 at the most? 16 The 2,128 gives the total number, 17 A. I think I counted it as 26. Again, 17 which would include, no doubt, many under 18 I didn't say a substantial percentage, I said 18 20 million. So we can't really talk about 19 a substantial number of these were not marked percentages unless we're comparing 19 20 more than once during the week. 20 apples-to-apples. So either we do the O. But on the basis of this analysis, analysis for the entire universe or we figure 21 21 22 you rejected wholesale all of the GFS data as out how many in that 2,128 are above 22 23 unreliable, correct? 23 20 million and calculate a percentage one way 24 MR. SHAW: Objection. 24 or the other. 25 Mischaracterizes. 25 Q. But if what you're trying to do is TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580 Page 192 Page 193 - P. Pfleiderer-1 1 - P. Pfleidererfigure out how sticky Lehman's GFS prices are, 2 2 So if it turned out -- and I'm not why wouldn't you look at the universe of 3 3 saying that it would, but just for 4 prices? Why filter it out for only 4 hypothetical purposes. If it turned out that \$20 million-plus positions? 5 5 of the 2,128, 75 were above 20 million, for A. Because my point was to show that 6 6 example, then we would have 26 out of 75. 7 there were a substantial number of securities 7 Q. But we don't know if that's the 8 that had value, in this case above 20 million, 8 case because that's not something that was 9 that were not updated more than once during 9 tracked and reported by you? 10 the course of the week. 0 A. That's not something that's in my 11 Q. And in your view, the substantial 11 report. 12 number here is 26 over 2,128? Q. It is not that you tracked it and 12 13 13 left it out of your report, you didn't track A. No, that's not what I said. 26 14 over whatever number of that 2,128 is above that; is that right? 14 15 20 million. 15 A. I believe that the information is 16 Q. And you don't know that number there. What I chose to report is securities 16 17 because you didn't track that number, how many 17 that had more than \$20 million in value, were above \$20 million were updated more than once 18 in GFS at either Level 2 or Level 3, and did 18 19 during the week? 19 not have price updates more than once a week. 20 20 A. That wouldn't be the relevant Q. Let's go to Appendix 4 in your number that you would need. What you would 21 2.1 report. It's in Volume I. 22 need is to take the 2,128 and figure out what 22 MR. SHAW: Page 106. in that population is above 20 million. That Q. Page 106. If you want to mark it 23 23 24 would be your base. Of those, 26 meet the with another sticky, please feel free to do 24 25 criteria of not being updated more than once.

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In Appendix 4, you have eight items, either specific CUSIPs or types of securities that you analyze in particular ways, right?

A. That is correct.

- O. Was there a particular filter or methodology you used to select these eight securities or asset classes as opposed to doing some other type of analysis? Why these eight?
- A. I chose these eight because they give a range of examples of various things that I found in the course of my analysis. So the filter was basically the filter of choosing examples that illustrated various -various things that I found in the spreadsheets that I was looking through and understanding what was associated with various securities in those spreadsheets.
- Q. Let's start on the back actually with the Pine CLO. Start with page 116 where you begin the Pine CLO discussion. One thing I want to do is look at your errata sheet because you made an edit to this.

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Exhibit 636-A that we looked at this morning. It may be that last document.

MR. SHAW: The last document.

- Q. If you turn in your errata report to the third page of that errata report, the last item there. That's a correction you're making to this discussion of Pine in Appendix 4, correct?
 - A. To the Pine CCS CLO discussion.
- Q. So I understand what you're discussing there in the second paragraph of the Pine CLO discussion, you are editing your report to say, "Bank of New York valued the transfer position in Pine at 1,020,500,000"; is that right?
 - A. That's what the correction is, yes.
- Q. What you are correcting is what you used to appear there before which was a number of 914,983,902. Do you see that?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. And both in the original report and in your correction you say that the value that Bank of New York ascribed to the transfer position in Pine was based on an erroneous

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factor, correct?

- A. That is what was the reference, for example, that I was mentioning this morning when I saw a screen shot of the vendor source showing what the factor actually was at the time.
- Q. And in correcting your previous analysis of Pine CLO, you say in your errata sheet, what BoNY should have done is have a BoNY midpoint mark of 914,983,902; is that right?
- A. If that factor of -- I forget what the factor was -- but is applied to the 1.02.
- Q. But that's what you do in your errata, right, you apply the right factor and you say this is what BoNY should have done?
- A. I have to go back and look at the actual spreadsheet because I think the correction was actually done in this spreadsheet itself. If we were to open it up, I could look at it and see how it enters into the spreadsheet in which the BoNY mark is given. And I can't remember whether it was given at 1.02 or whether it was corrected to TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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the 9.14.

- Q. Well, if BoNY had reported it at 9.14, that would have been the correct value to report it; is that what you're saying?
- A. No. I'm not saying that. I'm saying that there appeared to be an error that had been made based upon an erroneous factor. Correcting that erroneous factor does not make the BoNY midpoint mark correct, it just adjusts the par value downward to reflect that the factor is no longer one.
- O. Because you perceive two problems with BoNY's valuation; they misapplied the factor and they got the valuation itself wrong, right?
- A. Well, there are three reasons at least ultimately for a difference here between the BoNY mark, the initial mark, and the mark that Barclays ultimately gives to it.

One would be in this particular case an erroneous factor. The other would be a disagreement based upon value once that factor is corrected. And a third would be the adjustment from midpoint down to exit prices TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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Page 198 Page 199 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 that would have been done here to make that 2 original version here, yes. 3 3 correction. Q. And in your correction what you say 4 4 is, "After adjustment for this error, the And we have to open up the 5 spreadsheet to see exactly what was done. I 5 value of these positions at BoNY's midpoint 6 don't recall all the details in terms of, for 6 mark should have been 914,983,902," right? 7 instance, the exit point mark. Although I 7 A. That is what I'm saying in the 8 think it is here in the report. 8 errata sheet, yes. 9 Q. What I want to do is focus on the 9 Q. If you look at Volume II of your 0 first of those three, the factor problem. 10 expert report, Exhibit 1, Part A, page 1. Are 11 Because that's the subject of the correction 11 you there? in your errata sheet. That's the part of your 12 12 A. Yes. 13 analysis that you're correcting, is the Q. If you go down about seven or eight 13 factor, correct? 14 CUSIPs, you will see custodial mark, 15 15 914,983,902. Do you see that? A. In terms of the errata sheet? Q. In terms of the errata sheet. 16 16 (Witness reviewing document.) 17 A. Yes. A. I do. 17 18 Q. So just isolating that issue. I 18 Q. That's Pine, correct? know you have other concerns about BoNY's 19 19 A. We have to check the CUSIP. But 20 valuation, but let's just focus on the factor 20 the numbers certainly are the same. 21 21 Q. So BoNY did have it at the right 2.2. 22 In the original report you said, factor all along? 23 "Bank of New York valued the transfer position 23 A. This is where we have to go back to in Pine at 914,983,902," correct? 24 the spreadsheet and see what was done there. 24 25 A. That's how it appears in the 25 My recollection is that the factor was TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580 Page 200 Page 201 1 1 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-2 corrected in the spreadsheet from one to 2 BCI-EX-(s)-00213990 with attachments, 3 whatever it was. And then the way that the 3 marked for identification, as of this 4 custodial mark was calculated was to station 4 date.) the notional amount, multiply it by the 5 Q. Professor Pfleiderer, I'm handing 5 vou what has been marked as Exhibit 641-A. 6 factor, multiply it by the implied -- and we 6 have to go back and check here -- price at 7 7 What this is a collection of native format 8 which BoNY was marking it divided by a 8 documents that were produced along with the 9 9 Bates numbered pages that you see in this hundred. 10 10 document beginning with BCI-EX-(S)00213990. So without looking at the 11 spreadsheet and knowing whether the correction 11 And what this corresponds to is a document we of the factor corrected what was reported as 12 were looking at this morning, which is 12 13 the custodial mark in the spreadsheet from 13 Exhibit 637-A, and the files identified by 14 14 counsel, which files we confirmed this morning which this was derived, we can't really tell. are the two initial inventory and JPM 15 Q. Well, you didn't adjust any of the 15 16 custodial marks when you put them on 16 inventory files that you have on your hard 17 17 Exhibit 1, Part A, correct? You reported them drive in your computer. 18 as BoNY had reported them? 18 This is the first one of the files. 19 19 A. As they were registered in the Do you recognize the file? 20 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. We'll see if we can pull up the 21 Q. Because we have it now on a TV 22 spreadsheet and we can mark the spreadsheet 22 screen, in native format, in a spreadsheet. 23 itself as an exhibit. 23 That's something you've seen and are familiar 24 24 (Exhibit 641-A, e-mail re: with it? 25 25 Acquisition balance sheet, A. Very familiar with this. TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580

Page 202 Page 203 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 Q. Where on that spreadsheet, which is 2 I'm going to get it with column G -- this 3 a spreadsheet that's embedded within 3 comes up a little differently. 4 Exhibit 641, is the Pine CLO? Where would you 4 Perhaps the easiest thing is to 5 search for the CUSIP. If someone would be so go? 5 6 6 kind as to read the CUSIP number. A. Do you want me to try and do it? 7 Q. Yes, you can try. 7 O. 722490AA7? (Handing monitor to witness.) A. 887? 8 8 Q. To be clear, the document that we 9 9 Q. No. Apple, apple 7. 10 are working off of is a document that ends on 10 A. AA7. I must have typed it wrong. MR. VELLRATH: Capital As. 11 3995.xls. 11 12 12 A. Capital As? Okay. And you're going to what tab, sir? 13 If you can just describe what you are doing. 722490? 13 Q. Yes. 14 A. I'm going to the "PMTG" tab. I'm 14 15 now going to select the entire spreadsheet and 15 A. AA7. 16 make sure there are no hidden columns here. 16 Q. Or you can just look for the word 17 I'm in a slight disadvantage in doing this 17 "Pine." I think you should unhighlight the 18 because this is the older version of Excel, 18 column and search, that might work. 19 and through lots of trial and pain, I've 19 A. It should be in column A, though. 20 gotten used to the new version. 20 Unless it's... Q. Well, next time we gather, maybe 21 21 The one thing I should check is 22 you can bring your computer and maybe we can 22 some of these were put into corporates. But I 23 work off the right version of Excel. But 23 think it was the PMTG file. 24 let's do the best we can. 24 Let me just look and see if it was 25 A. So I'm going to sort now, I believe 25 put in corporates. Sometimes you have to look TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 204 Page 205 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 in multiple places. 2 value and I take a full price of a hundred, 3 MR. SHAW: I think it may actually 3 saying it's selling at par, then BoNY will 4 be in the PMTG 2 file. 4 value it at this. So then the question ultimately arises: Well, why does it show up 5 5 MR. TAMBE: Okay. 6 6 in the spreadsheet at 914.983? THE WITNESS: Ah, that could be. 7 (Witness conducting computerized 7 The reason is as follows. Do you see the factor of .8966? And it is 8 search.) 8 9 9 highlighted here. And I believe the person Q. There it is. Line 35. 10 A. Yes. Okay. I highlight that now 10 that put it here highlighted it to show that 11 with your permission. 11 it was a correction. So the person that was 12 12 Q. Sure. going through it carefully, noting the 13 13 difference in factor, putting it in, had the A. Just so it is easier to see. 14 14 O. So now let's read it across and see following consequence associated with that 15 what BoNY had, what the custodial mark was. 15 action. 16 A. So here is -- here is what 6 Since the BoNY mark is based upon 17 17 multiplying the price times the factor times happened, and here is what explains the 18 18 the notional value and then dividing by a outcome here. 19 19 So the original notional value was hundred, given that the notional value had 1.02 and change as you might say here. 20 20 been adjusted by the appropriate factor, it 1 billion and 20 million. And the BoNY price appears here, just by the consequence of the 21 21 22 22 way that the BoNY price is calculated, that is 100, so that's what it came in at. 23 23 BoNY marked it correctly. But that's only BoNY marked the CLO at that value. 24 24 because of the formula that's being used here. Why? Because it put in a factor of one. So 25 if I do not decrease the original notional And the spreadsheet corrects the erroneous 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

Page 206 Page 207 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 2 factor from 1 to .896. the relevant factor is as of a particular 3 3 So what it came down to was, indeed date? 4 4 1.02 million -- excuse me, I misspoke. 1.02 A. One of the various pricing services 5 billion. It's showing up at the spreadsheet 5 that would give you -- give you the factor. Q. And you believe the .8966 is the 6 at the corrected price only because in column 6 7 J -- I'm referring to now column J, row 35, correct factor to value the Pine CLO as of 7 8 given the way this is sorted. The only reason 8 9/22; is that right? that that is showing up with the appropriate 9 9 A. Based upon the outside source that .0 value corrected by the factor is that the 10 was obtained. 11 person who constructed this spreadsheet 11 Q. Now, the Pine CLO, what tranche of the Pine CLO is the subject of this analysis? corrected the factor, and that gets reflected 12 12 13 in column J, but it does not show what it was 13 A. This lists it as a mezzanine 14 marked at when it came in from BoNY because of 14 tranche. I'd have to go back. 15 15 Q. Are you sure about that? this correction. 16 Q. How would you know whether or not A. I'm not sure -- I'm sure that it 16 17 that's the correct factor? 17 list it here as "CLO mezzanine." 18 A. That's where I looked and I don't 18 Q. And your understanding is that what 19 19 that means is that that is the mezzanine know exactly where to find it. But it was 20 20 some of the data that was produced in the file tranche of the Pine CLO that's at issue? that's related to the Pine CCS. I recall 21 21 A. I would have to go back and look at 22 looking at a screen shot which shows that 22 the information that was in some of these 23 23 files, at least in the spreadsheet looking now that's the correct factor. 24 at column D, row 35, it's listed here as "CLO 24 Q. And ordinarily for a CDO or a CLO, 25 where would you go and look to find out what 25 Mezz." TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 208 Page 209 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 Q. Can you step away from the monitor? 2 believe some of the -- I may be confusing this I want to ask you a question about Pine. 3 3 with something else that I looked at. But I 4 A. Sorry. 4 believe that there was some -- some documents 5 Q. That's all right. 5 that related to that, but I'm not sure it was 6 Did you look at the offering 6 for the Pine CLO. 7 documents for the Pine CLO? 7 O. And it would be relevant to the 8 A. I'm trying to recall whether those 8 valuation of the Pine CLO as to where in the 9 were included. I don't believe that I saw 9 capital structure of the Pine CLO the 0 those. I don't believe that they were 0 particular Pine security at issue resided; 11 included in the e-mail attachments that were 11 whether it was a senior or a mezz or a junior? 12 2 backup for this. A. It would be, yes. Q. Did you ask to see it? Did you . 3 13 Q. It would affect the cash flows that say, let me see a copy of the offering 14 14 were coming to that particular security, 15 memorandum? 15 16 A. I did not personally. Staff 16 A. Generally, the waterfall goes working at my direction may have. But I through the various tranches and it would 17 17 definitely affect the cash flows. 18 didn't personally. 18 19 Q. We're doing the "may have thing" 19 Q. Did you look at the waterfall for again. Do you know if they did? 20 20 the Pine CLO? 21 A. I don't know that they did, I don't 21 A. Again, I don't believe for that know that they did not. 22 particular CLO, but I may have. I recall 22 23 Q. Do you know what the capital 23 looking at some documentation, but I'm not structure of the Pine CLO looks like? sure that it was with Pine. 24 24 25 Q. Did you look at the avenues of 25 A. Sitting here now I don't. But I

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Page 210 Page 211 - P. Pfleiderer-1 1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 default for this particular CLO? 2 A. It would appear -- I want to look. 3 3 A. I don't believe so, no. H is the par... 4 Q. Do you know whether or not this 4 (Witness reviewing document.) particular CLO went into an EOD shortly after 5 5 A. G is the factor. I is the price. 6 6 Yes, it is. Exactly the calculation that I the transaction? 7 A. I believe I saw something 7 described when I described when I was 8 somewhere, but I may be confusing it with 8 explaining what had happened. something else. So the best answer I can give 9 9 Q. When we scrolled to the right, I 0 you is not that I recall sitting here today 10 had you stop at the column that was entitled 11 what information I had on this particular CLO 11 "market value 9/22 with liquidity." Can you 12 12 get back to that column? versus some other. 13 Q. Just going back to this particular 13 (Witness complying.) 14 line, right, line 35. 14 Q. Are you there? 15 If you scroll to the right, a 15 A. Yes. 16 little bit further, a little bit further? 16 Q. And that column, which is column 17 (Witness Complying.) 17 Z-35, that's the Barclays exit price for that Q. All right, stop right there. 18 18 security, correct? 19 Column J has the derived BoNY value 19 A. I'm going to be very careful in calculated with the adjusted factor, right, 20 answering this because what I need to do --20 Q. You should be careful. It is half the 914 million, correct? 21 21 22 22 A. Before answering your question a billion dollar difference, so... 23 definitely, I would want to look at exactly 23 A. I'm going to go and look at the what the formula is. 24 summary and look at. It points to Z, yes, 24 25 Q. You got it right there? 25 that is correct. TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580 Page 212 Page 213 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 Q. What you did is you went to the 2 amount of that factor. 3 summary page to make sure that what is being 3 Q. So this one line is responsible for 4 summed up is the values that appear on the Z 4 maybe 5- to \$600 million of the delta between column of this particular worksheet? 5 5 the Bank of New York prices and the Barclays 6 6 A. That's correct. Because there are prices, right? 7 often columns here often times repeated with 7 A. I just realized I misspoke. When I said it was less by the factor I meant to say 8 small differences or just repeated. And I 8 9 always made sure in everything that I did that 9 it was less by the change in the factor times 10 it was the column that ultimately fed into the 10 the -- times the price. 11 summary page which, again, feeds into the --11 Q. So having directed that, can you ultimately into the acquisition balance sheet. 12 now answer my question that this one single 2 13 Q. Just looking at the two values 13 item is responsible for the 5- to \$600 million 14 14 then, the BoNY value versus the Barclays final of the delta between the Bank of New York 15 exit price value, there's about a \$500 million 15 prices and the BoNY prices, correct? 16 difference between the two values, correct, 16 A. Well, that's 900, whatever it was, 17 17 for this one single CUSIP? minus 428. 18 A. Well, let's be careful here. The 18 Q. So the answer to my question is 19 BoNY value was as reported in my errata sheet, 19 yes, it is? 20 20 the 1.02 which was due in part to the error in A. Whatever that difference is, yes. Q. Did you sit down with the Barclays 21 the factor. 21 22 22 people and ask them what they had done Q. So even more than a \$500 million 23 23 specifically to get to their value of difference? 24 24 \$428 million for this particular CUSIP? A. So it is even more. Once you 25 A. Did I personally sit down with 25 correct that error, then it's less by the TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

Page 214 Page 215 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 2 them? No. this particular security, correct? 3 3 Q. Did any of your staff members do A. I don't know whether that was done. 4 4 I don't know whether it was not done. that? Q. Now --5 A. My understanding is there were 5 6 conversations between staff working for me and A. I just don't know. 6 Q. Well, did you review the Trustee 7 people at Barclays about various things and 7 report for this particular CLO? 8 they well could have encompassed this 8 particular CUSIP. A. No. I believe I answered that 9 9 0 Q. Do you know? 10 question before, I did not. 11 A. But again, I don't know for sure. 11 Q. I'm not sure if I asked you about 12 Q. You don't know. Okay. the Trustee report. But okay. 12 13 So you don't know whether Barclays, You haven't reviewed the Trustee 13 for example, was misreading the indenture when 14 report? 15 they came up with their assumption about how 15 A. Again, I'm having to recall they were going to price this particular CLO? 16 documents that I did see that were in a file 16 You don't know that? 17 17 related to the Pine CLO. I don't believe 18 A. I haven't talked to them so I don't 18 there was a Trustee report there, but there 19 may have and I may have even looked at it, I 19 know how they were reading it. So I don't 20 20 know whether they were misreading it because I just don't know. don't think how they were reading it. 21 21 Q. Would it be relevant to the 2.2 Q. And as far as you know, no one in 22 valuation of the CLO how much cash was 23 your staff did a check to make sure that the 23 available in the CLO at the time of the way that Barclays had read the indenture was, 24 24 transfer from Lehman to Barclays? 25 in fact, consistent with the actual terms of 25 A. That would be a consideration that TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 216 Page 217 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 would be taken into account in value, yes. 2 Q. Did your staff? Q. So in valuing it you would take A. Our staff -- I and the staff 3 3 4 into consideration how senior the note was 4 reviewed the commentary that was provided in 5 that you were valuing, right? 5 that file, which is excerpted in my report A. That would be correct. 6 which talked about the high level 6 Q. And you would take into 7 7 concentration and other such things and satisfied ourselves -- I satisfied myself that 8 consideration the amount of cash that was 8 it was appropriate for Barclays to adjust the 9 9 available in the structure at the time of the 0 price downward to reflect both value transaction, correct? 10 11 A. That could be a consideration that 11 considerations and considerations of what this 2 12 would affect value, yes. would be worth in an exit situation which . 3 Q. And you would also take into 13 relates to liquidity. Q. How did you satisfy yourself other 14 consideration the creditworthiness of the 14 than read what they had written? 15 credits underlying the CLO, correct? 15 A. That would be a consideration; the 16 A. Basically reading what they had 16 17 number of credits, correlation issues. A 17 written and understanding that it was a highly concentrated CLO with a number of names that 18 whole host of other things would be factored 18 19 19 Lehman had put together that could not be in. 20 20 Q. Did you study those kinds of sold. factors and consideration with respect to this 21 21 My recollection, for example, is --22 and I may be faulty on this, is that we did 22 CLO? 23 A. Did I personally study those? 23 look at the GFS report. And this may be --24 this may be for Pine. It may be for something 24 Q. Yes. 25 A. No. else. But if I recall correctly, it was for 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580

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Pine.

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And the GFS report lists Pine, I believe, and shows number of days held in inventory and also gives a column which says "max holding." And if my recollection is correct, the number of days that this had been held by Lehman in inventory was much greater than -- or it was greater. I don't know if it was much greater, than the reported max holding period which only suggests that Lehman was having some problems selling it as well.

Q. The max holding period is what drove Barclays' valuation of this security, right?

A. No. But you asked if I looked at something else. And I just told you that yes, there was other information that was available such as what was in GFS. And I would just put the caveat in there that my recollection is that that was Pine, but it may have been some other security.

But there is information that is in the GFS report that gives how long something was held in inventory, at least that's the TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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So there was a fair amount of effort that was done looking for outside information. I know

I can't recall the precise things that were done, but I recall conversations in which we talked for a reasonable length of time about how difficult it was to get information for some of these CUSIPs, and I recall that the Pine CLO was one of -- one of those

And I believe that some information was also perhaps in that search dug up, if you will, by Googling it but that there was limited information out there.

So staff working at my direction definitely did, shall we say, due diligence on this in particular partly because of its size.

Q. Excuse me. Other than Googling, what other due diligence did they do?

A. I have to, again, ask them. I know that this was looked at rather intensely.

THE WITNESS: Is it possible to take a break now? MR. TAMBE: Sure.

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column heading. And as I recall, the Pine CLO had been held in inventory for quite some

Q. So you read what Barclays had written about it, you may or may not with respect to Pine have gone back to GFS. Anything else that you did to satisfy yourself that Barclays' explanation was adequate for vou?

A. Personally I don't believe I did anything beyond that. But I may have. I've considered this quite closely. Staff working at my direction may have done other things.

Q. Again, they may have done other things. Do you know whether they did other things?

A. I would have to ask them.

Q. As you sit here today, you don't know of anything else your staff did, right?

A. Yes, I do. Actually, I do.

Q. What did they do?

A. I know that they did rather extensive search on -- on Google looking for the CUSIP, looking for information about it. 877-702-9580

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(Whereupon, a recess was taken from 3:24 p.m. to 3:44 p.m.) BY MR. TAMBE:

Q. When were you retained?

MR. SHAW: Before you start, he had some additional amplification on one of the answers he just gave.

Q. Go ahead.

A. I think before I took the break I said that I would have to ask Marc Vellrath, so I took the opportunity during the break to ask Dr. Vellrath to my right what was done.

I was having trouble remembering what specifically was done in relation to the Pine CLO versus other things. Just to clear it up, I was indeed thinking of something else that was in the GFS system that showed that it was held a long time. Because my memory was refreshed that Pine was actually, I believe, issued in May of 2008.

Q. Right.

A. So it was another security that falls into that.

Having brought up the GFS system, TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

Page 222 Page 223 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 2 think to some extent Gary Romain, but I Dr. Vellrath just refreshed my memory that believe it was mainly Stephen King about the 3 3 Pine actually appears in the GFS system, at 4 least the CUSIP does, but it has no prices at 4 pricing of Pine. And my understanding is that the staff also had discussions with him just 5 all. So in other words, his price is zero by 5 6 the Lehman system, or at least it has blanks 6 going through what was -- what was done. 7 7 So it was looked at very intensely so that's the reason that it doesn't come up by -- by the staff working for me. 8 on that spreadsheet. 8 And I myself went through those 9 9 Q. Exhibit 4? 0 A. Exhibit 4, yes. I'm sorry. I 10 files. I just couldn't recall whether they 11 misspoke. Exhibit 4. Because it wouldn't 11 were associated with Pine or perhaps something have met the 20 million criteria. It wouldn't 12 12 have even met a \$5 criteria because I believe 13 13 Q. All right. Thank you. 14 it is in zeros. 14 Other than speaking with Barclays 15 15 and reviewing the memos and other materials Q. So turning now to the work that was done, my understanding is that the files that 16 16 that they provided you with, did you or your were the backup provided by Barclays were 17 17 staff try to independently recreate the 18 turned over to you. And that does contain a 18 results of their analysis? 19 Trustee's report. I did see the Trustee's 19 A. Again, I would have to ask staff. 20 20 report in that file. So that was information. They assembled a lot of information. I don't believe that they did an independent analysis, 21 Indeed, my memory was also 21 refreshed, now I do remember it. We did have 22 but perhaps on the next break I can ask again. 22 extensive discussions, I may have mentioned 23 Q. Want to ask them right now? Go 23 this early on in my testimony this morning, 24 right ahead. We can do it off the record. 24 25 extensive discussions with Stephen King and I 25 Ask him. TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 224 Page 225 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 MR. SHAW: We're going to do it --2 Q. Now, since you have the spreadsheet 3 3 I'll think about when we're going to do open before you, where in that spreadsheet 4 4 would you find this valuation? MR. TAMBE: So you don't want him 5 (Witness reviewing document.) 5 6 6 A. I'm having trouble scrolling down to answer right now? 7 MR. SHAW: I'll be happy to step 7 here. Let me see if this works. Q. What tab are you looking to get to? 8 out and we can ask. 8 MR. TAMBE: Well, let's not step A. Since I don't have the CUSIPs, I 9 9 10 out and do anything like that. Let's 10 need to search for the title, assuming that it 11 continue with the deposition. 11 appears in this way. 12 12 (Witness conducting computerized BY MR. TAMBE: 13 13 Q. Let's go back in Appendix 4 to Item search.) 14 14 No. 1 in Appendix 4. Do you have your report A. Okay. This is the -- I believe this is one of them. 15 15 there? 16 16 A. Yes. Q. All right. So what tab are you in 17 17 Q. That's page 107. and what line? 18 Item No. 1 in Appendix 4 is an 18 A. Well, the tab I'm in is PMTG, the 19 example of a security that was valued by 19 column I'm in is G. I can tell you that in 20 20 this particular spreadsheet, I'm on line 32. Barclays at a sale price as opposed to a marked exit price, correct? 21 21 But one has to be careful because sometimes 22 22 A. That is correct. rows are -- rows are re-sorted. 23 23 Q. If you could just reduce the size Q. And the subject of Item No. 1 are positions at 125 different CMOs, correct? 24 of that one. And let's just read across that 24

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A. That is correct.
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row to see what information.

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Page 226 Page 227 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 A. Let's see. How do you reduce the 2 A. I have to check. 3 size on this particular --3 Q. Please do. 4 Q. Go up to 190 percent up there. 4 A. So we're looking at A34. So let me 5 Pull the drop down menu, go to 50 percent. 5 scroll back. Each one of these spreadsheets 6 (Witness complying.) 6 is constructed in slightly different ways. So 7 Q. All right. let me just look up and make sure the column 7 8 A. Just getting the title in here to 8 heading is right here. see what corresponds. 9 9 So this is the original notional. 10 Q. All right. So line 4 has the 0 Q. Let's be clear. On row 34 of this 11 **Structured Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan Trust** 11 particular security, the original notion was 12 Series, that's the type of security that's 12 10.9 million, right? 13 covered in Item 1? 13 A. That's what it appears to say here. 14 A. That would have been one of the 14 Q. Okay. 15 15 A. And that was the position that was 125, I believe. 16 Q. Okay. So let's just go across that 16 sold. 17 row and tell me how Barclays priced that 17 Q. Okay. So the entire position was 18 particular securities. Let's just go across. 18 sold. 19 (Witness complying.) 19 Does this row tell you when that 20 20 Q. So you're in column AI? position was sold? A. I'm looking at AI now just to see, 21 21 A. I'm not sure that it shows -- it 22 assuming that that is the one that was used. 22 shows where it was allocated. 23 So I'm now looking column AD, and 23 Q. I'm actually asking a different 24 it shows "positions sold." question. Not where it was allocated. Where 24 25 Q. That's the notional? 25 was it sold? When? TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580 Page 228 Page 229 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 2 A. I think in this particular that column AE; is that right? 3 spreadsheet, it is not registered. 3 A. Well, what I would suspect is the 4 Q. Are you aware of any spreadsheet 4 following. The number, if you look at the ruler up there, the number that appears is 5 that registers the dates of sale of these six 5 74.67450414 so on and so forth. And I believe 6 6 securities? 7 that the price here is a calculated price 7 A. I have to go back and look. I believe there may be somewhere there was 8 based upon the total sale price divided by the 8 notional, and that's based upon the fact that 9 9 comments that had some information about 0 10 it appears here in at least ten decimal sales. But I have to go check to see if that 11 .1 memory is correct. places. 12 2 In this particular case, it doesn't Whereas if it had been quoted as a 13 appear to memorialize when it was sold. It 13 sale price, it probably wouldn't have appeared to ten decimal places. So this is a 14 14 does give the sale price and it does give the calculated number in my estimation based upon 15 value that it was realized in column AF. 15 16 16 the receipts that were obtained on sale And then that is taken into column 17 17 divided by the notional, multiplied by 100. AI, which in turn, I believe, we have to check Q. Now, some of the numbers in that 18 18 to make sure is the column that's zoned to 19 give the total for the PMTG group. 19 column AE are the bolded and some are not. Do 20 20 Q. Within the PMTG group, looking at vou see that? column AE which is the column titled "Sale 21 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Do you have any understanding as to 22 Price", do you see that? 23 why some are bolded and some are not? 23 A. Yes. 24 (Witness reviewing screen.) 24 Q. If a security was sold, the price at which a security was sold would appear in 25 A. You're looking at? 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580

Page 230 Page 231 - P. Pfleiderer-1 1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 2 Q. AE. we're looking at in a spreadsheet that ends in 3 A. I'm sorry. I was looking at AA. 3 995.xls, right? 4 Q. The "Sale Price" column. 4 A. Yes, I believe so. 5 A. So my understanding based upon 5 Q. In particular, it is the "PMTG" 6 earlier perusals of this and other sheets is 6 tab? 7 that -- I have to check this. But I 7 A. Yes. 8 believe -- actually, strike that. I'm not 8 Q. Is it your understanding that what that shows is that \$19 billion worth of PMTG 9 sure. I was going to say that this indicated 9 0 that there was a sale. I'm not sure that 10 positions were sold at face value, notional 11 that's the case. I have to check here. 11 face? 12 O. If you look at column AD at the top 12 A. Notional, notional value. 13 of column AD, there is a number that appears, 13 Q. Were sold, period? 14 which appears to be at the very top of row 14 A. That would be my understanding, 15 5 1 -yes. 16 16 A. Yes. O. And does one of these columns total 17 Q. -- \$19 billion, do you see that, 17 up the market value or the realized sale value 18 and change? 18 of the position sold? If you can scroll to 19 the right if you look at AF? Row 1, AF, it is 19 A. I do. 20 20 Q. Is that simply a sum of all of the a billion dollars? entries on this particular worksheet, the PMTG 21 21 A. That's my understanding, yes. 22 worksheet and the spreadsheet that is here? Q. So it is a billion dollars of value 22 23 23 realized upon the sale of the positions that A. I believe it is. It shows that it 24 are listed in this worksheet of this is a sum from row 3 to row 1069. 24 25 Q. Just to be clear, that's a sum that 25 spreadsheet; is that right? TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 232 Page 233 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 2 inside sales could be overstated or to some A. That is the total of column AF, 3 3 extent based upon them not being appropriately yes. 4 4 marked to exit price. I don't know. I have Q. Now, it's your understanding, is it 5 not, that at least some of the sales that are to go back and review how that was done for 5 6 being reported here are internal sales within inside sales to make sure that you got an 6 7 7 **Barclays?** appropriate exit price. A. That may be the case. I don't know 8 8 Q. Do you recall doing any kind of that they're distinguished here. I'd have 9 9 analysis or having a staff do any analysis 10 where you, CUSIP by CUSIP, determine inside 0 to -- have to review what was true for this sales versus outside sales? 11 particular sheet or for other ones. 11 12 A. I don't recall specifically that 2 Q. For the population of the September 13 inventory, the original inventory, what 13 those were identified and separated, but they percentage of that inventory was sold shortly 14 14 very well could have been. But sitting here 15 after the acquisition? 15 now, I don't recall that identification being 16 16 A. I don't know the percentage. done and separation done along those lines. Q. Would it be relevant to your 17 17 Q. You are aware, are you not, sir, analysis of Barclays' valuation whether there from the materials that you looked at that the 18 18 19 was an internal sale within Barclays or 19 overwhelming majority of the sales that were 20 20 whether it was a third-party arm's length reported by Barclays were, in fact, internal 21 21 sale? sales? A. It may very well be relevant 2 22 MR. SHAW: Objection to form. 23 because an outside sale may better reflect the 23 A. My understanding was that the exit price with a liquidity adjustment and 24 inventory was put in -- much of the inventory 24 inside sales may not embody that fully. So 25 or a substantial part, if not all of it, went 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

Page 234 Page 235 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 into the PMTG group and they allocated it out 2 previously marked as Exhibit 533-A. It is a 3 3 to other areas and other desks. double-sided copy, so it's a two-page 4 Q. And when they allocated it out to 4 document. 5 other areas and other desks, did they count 5 That's a document you've seen 6 those as sales transactions to those other 6 before today, right? 7 desks? 7 A. Yes, indeed. 8 A. That would be my understanding, 8 Q. In fact, you used this document to 9 9 create your post acquisition gains and sales yes. 0 10 table in your report, correct? Q. So included in your "Sale" column 11 are transactions where the inventory that's 11 A. That's correct. 12 been allocated to be of PMTG gets transferred 12 O. You take the numbers directly from by PMTG internally within Barclays to other 13 13 here? 14 trading desks, and that's recorded as a sale 14 A. For that analysis, yes. 15 for purposes of this spreadsheet; is that 15 O. Drawing your attention to the 16 16 middle of the page, there's a bold heading right? 17 17 there, "Post-auction process for assets A. I believe --18 MR. SHAW: Objection to form. 18 received in September repo and Schedule B for A. I believe that that -- I know that 19 the period 2/31 - December 2008." Do you see 19 20 20 -- from deposition testimony that there were that? allocations at other desks. What I don't know 21 21 A. Perhaps I'm not looking where I is, from looking at this spreadsheet, whether 22 22 should be. 23 there is an indication as to exactly what the 23 Q. The bold. disposition of any one of these CUSIPs was. 24 24 A. Yes, I see that. 25 Q. Let me show you what's been 25 Q. And below that bold heading there TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 236 Page 237 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 is a discussion about a list of P&L 2 Isn't it a smaller number? 3 information of \$37.2 billion of assets that 3 A. Actually, I have to determine which 4 4 number to use here. were transferred from the central book 5 5 internally to a Barclays trading desk. Do you Q. Well, you know you can't include 6 6 the JPM inventory, right? That's not see that? 7 7 September. So whatever you do, you got to A. Yes. 8 Q. So that's referring to transfers of 8 back that out. 9 37.2 billion of assets internally within 9 (Witness reviewing document.) 0 Barclays, correct? 0 A. Well the 42.61 is the initial 11 (Witness reviewing document.) 11 inventory. 12 A. That's correct, I believe. 12 Q. So 37 over 42? 13 Q. And that's \$37.2 billion out of the 13 A. Correct. 14 initial inventory, it is the September 14 Q. 88 percent, give or take, right? 15 inventory that they're talking about there, 15 A. Yes. That was my understanding, correct? 16 16 that most of what was taken in through PMTG 17 A. That includes both Schedule A and 17 would be allocated to the -- to the desk. 18 18 Q. Well, it goes beyond that, right? Schedule B, yes, correct. 19 Q. So you agree with me based on those 19 I mean, it's allocated to the desks and those numbers that the overwhelming majority by 20 20 values are recorded as sales prices for purposes of Barclays' valuation, correct?

A. That's correct. They were priced value of the CUSIPs acquired in September that 21 21 22 22 were sold, were sold internally, correct? 23 A. Well, taking these numbers as 23 and allocated to the desk at that price, is my 24 stated, 37.2 over 44.3. 24 understanding. 25 Q. Why is 44.3 the right number? Q. And then this document, 533-A, goes 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

Page 238 Page 239 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 2 on to record the P&L impact, the profit and priced and allocated to the desk at 3 3 loss impact of those sales by various that price, is my understanding.") 4 categories, agencies, emerging markets, 4 Q. Now, did you look at any --5 equities and so on, right? 5 A. I just want to have the record show 6 (Witness reviewing document.) 6 that I didn't answer the last question A. Could you read the question back? 7 7 affirmatively that you asked. Because unless I misheard it, I think my answer would be no. 8 8 I'm sorry. MR. TAMBE: I'm not sure what that 9 9 (Record read as follows: 0 "Question: And then this document, 10 means. Maybe we can have the question 11 533-A, goes on to record the P&L 11 read back and you can answer it again L 2 impact, the profit and loss impact of 12 so that we are clear what you are those sales by various categories, 13 13 answering. 14 agencies, emerging markets, equities 14 (Record read as follows: L 5 and so on, right?") 15 "Ouestion: And then this document. MR. SHAW: Could you read the 16 16 533-A, goes on to record the P&L previous question and answer before 17 17 impact, the profit and loss impact of 18 18 those sales by various categories, that? 19 agencies, emerging markets, equities 19 (Record read as follows: 20 20 "Question: Well, it goes beyond that, and so on, right?") right? I mean, it's allocated to the 21 21 A. I just want to emphasize that my desks and those values are recorded as 22 understanding is that it is not the P&L impact 22 23 sales prices for purposes of Barclays' 23 at the time of the sale to the desk, but valuation, correct? 24 rather P&L that followed it, in other words, 24 25 "Answer: That's correct. They were 25 prices that were realized later versus the TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 240 Page 241 1 1 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-2 2 price that it was sold at. different CMOs was \$80.2 million. Do you see 3 Q. Now, those prices that were 3 that on page 108? 4 realized later when the desk that had received 4 (Witness reviewing document.) 5 the securities sold them, is there a 5 A. I'm sorry. Where are we? Q. Page 108 at the top. 6 spreadsheet that captures those prices? 6 7 7 A. I'm sorry. I was looking at the A. This spreadsheet does not capture 8 those. 8 second. 80.2, yes. 9 9 Q. And that 80.2 million number is a Q. Is there another spreadsheet? I number that would appear if you totalled up 10 understand this spreadsheet doesn't. Is there 10 11 another spreadsheet that does? 11 the relevant CUSIPs on the 995.xls A. I'm trying to remember which 12 spreadsheet, correct? 2 13 spreadsheets I've looked at and how they 13 A. Which spreadsheet again? 14 relate to this. But there was obviously work 14 Q. The PMTG spreadsheet that we are 15 that was done to produce these numbers. And 15 looking at, the one that has these 125 CUSIPs 16 16 right now I can't remember what spreadsheets and others in it. But if you selected the 17 17 that refers to or that work it's embodied in. 125 ---18 But to clarify, it is not reflected in the 18 A. That's right. If you selected the 19 19 spreadsheet that's up on the screen now. 125, assuming they are all in this particular Q. Which is the 995.xls spreadsheet? 20 sheet, which I assume is the case that they 20 21 appear in this particular PMTG sheet, that 21 A. That's correct. 22 2 would be the number that you get. Q. So going on to category one in 23 Appendix 4, when we began this discussion, you 23 Q. Do you know what gain or loss 24 conclude at the end of Item No. 1 that the 24 Barclays realized on any of these CUSIPs when 25 value that Barclays recorded for these 125 25 it sold them to some third party at some later TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

Page 242 Page 243 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 2 place holder in your expert report at this date? 3 3 A. On these specific CUSIPs? page, page 108. Let's go back into the body 4 Q. On these specific CUSIPs. 4 of your report. While we're at this topic of post 5 MR. SHAW: Objection to form. 5 6 A. Actually, I may have misunderstood 6 acquisition gains or losses. Turn to table 7 the question. Can you read back the question? 7 No. 3 on page 44. 8 (Record read as follows: 8 (Witness complying.) 9 9 Q. The numbers that appear in "Question: Do you know what gain or 0 loss Barclays realized on any of these 10 table No. 3 on page 44 are all numbers that CUSIPs when it sold them to some third 11 11 are derived from the exhibit that you were L 2 12 party at some later date?") looking at, Exhibit 533-A, correct? 13 (Witness reviewing document.) 13 A. That is correct, yes. 14 A. I'm not sure if I answered your 14 Q. Now, this table 3 includes gains 15 question too quickly when I heard it. But we 15 and losses, including gains and loss on hedges do have information based upon this ex-post that were put on by Barclays with respect to 16 16 17 some or all of these positions, correct? 17 realization document that was created with 18 desk-by-desk analysis. And although it 18 A. That's correct. doesn't break out these specific ones, they're 19 O. If you backed out the gains and 19 20 20 embedded in these trading desks. losses on the hedges, what would the effect be on the gains and losses on the transactions 21 And so while one can't look at the 21 22 involving the acquired inventory? 22 specific CUSIPs that we've been looking at, A. Are you asking for a numerical 23 23 one can look more generally at the overall 24 24 value or are you asking --25 Q. Okay. If you want to just keep a 25 Q. Yes. I'm asking for a numerical TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 244 Page 245 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 2 Q. Not one-for-one hedging, but some value. 3 A. I don't believe that the combined 3 more generic portfolio type hedge? 4 4 A. I would assume that that would be information in Table 3 in Exhibit 533-A would 5 5 the case. Although in many cases, depending allow all of that to be identified with 6 6 upon the hedging instruments you have, those precision. More to the point, that 7 calculation would turn this into a decidedly 7 will turn out to be relatively the same ex-post calculation as opposed to the purpose 8 8 exercise. 9 which I put it here for which is to take out 9 (Exhibit 642-A, Agency mortgages, market risk at least that was hedged out so 0 0 unsupported or excluded file type with 11 that one can assess the reliability of the 11 attached spreadsheets, BCI-EX-00297317, 12 12 initial valuation of this -- these securities marked for identification, as of this 13 13 based upon what were realized values some time 14 14 later with hedges put into place. Q. Sir, I'm handing you a document 15 Q. But you would agree with me that 15 that's been marked as Exhibit 642-A. Do you 16 not all of the positions were hedged and not 16 recognize this document as backup for 17 17 all of the positions were hedged fully, Exhibit 533-A? 18 18 correct? (Witness reviewing document.) 19 A. That is my understanding, indeed. 19 A. That's what it appears to be, yes. 20 20 Some of this was difficult to hedge, and my Q. If we can go back to Appendix 4 in your report. Let's go to item No. 4, U.S. 21 understanding is that it was not 100 percent 21 22 22 Agency CMOs. Page 109. hedged. 23 23 (Witness reviewing document.) Q. And some of it may have been hedged on a portfolio or a delta basis, right? Q. Are you there, sir? 24 24 25 A. That's certainly possible. A. Page 109? 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580

Page 246 Page 247 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 Q. Yes. On page 109 and 110, you 2 of securities. discuss U.S. Agency CMOs and on page 110, the 3 3 (Exhibit 643-A, 2/2/09 memo from 4 bottom line is securities that had an 4 PwC to Richard Landreman, 5 aggregate custodial value of roughly \$1.2 5 PwC-BarCapWP_00023327, marked for 6 6 identification, as of this date.) billion are valued by Barclays at roughly 7 \$700 million, correct? 7 Q. If you go to the "Liquidity" tab on 8 the spreadsheet that's up on the screen which A. 7.74. 8 is 995.xls, does that contain at least some of 9 9 Q. No. 0 A. .74. 10 the backup information for the liquidity 11 Q. Actually, they were reduced even 11 adjustments that were made? 12 A. It contains the lookup table for further? 12 13 the liquidity adjustments, but there is 13 A. That was at the midpoint marks. 14 And then once you put on the liquidity 14 another file that contains some analysis that 15 adjustment or exit -- to move them to exit 15 was done for the liquidity adjustments of prices, then it is .697 billion. 16 16 various entries here. 17 Q. Did you study Barclays' methodology 17 Q. Just so I understand the lookup 18 for reducing the value of the CMO securities 18 table. So this is the "Liquidity" tab, 19 by 10 percent, sir? 19 something you refer to as "a lookup table" in 20 20 A. There is a liquidity file that was 995.xls. probably used to establish this 10 percent. 21 21 Can you describe what's contained 22 And there's back up to that liquidity file in 22 in this lookup table? 23 terms of how various entries in that were 23 A. So if we go back to the "PMTG" tab determined. I'd have to go back and look and 24 24 and we find an entry where they applied this 25 see how it relates to these particular classes 25 as opposed to the sale. We can go to a TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 248 Page 249 1 1 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-2 2 different tab and find it perhaps quicker. what's happening here is that cell K3, which 3 Q. If you can just use an example to 3 is the midpoint market value, is being 4 explain to me what's going on here. 4 multiplied by the number we get by going to 5 A. Let's take the emerging markets 5 the lookup table, which is in the "Liquidity" spreadsheet, finding the row that has an EM 6 6 tab. 7 If I point at cell M3 here, what 7 entry in it and going basically to that second 8 this is doing is multiplying -- cell 3 is 8 column -- that's what that "2" there means -multiplying case 3 which is the midpoint mark 9 9 to get a number. 0 as of the 22nd of September. It is 10 So if we go to "Liquidity" table multiplying that by a number that it gets by 11 11 and we scroll down and find EM, which happens going to the "Liquidity" tab and looking up in 12 to be in row 47, we see that the number is 12 13 that table, the entry that corresponds to 13 0.97. So there's a three percent reduction 14 14 what's in column A3 on the EM spreadsheets. from the midpoint value to the exit price to So if I go to A3. This may be one 15 15 reflect the illiquid nature of this particular 16 that is hard to get over. It could be a 16 security and what you would get if you were 17 17 hidden cell. Or a hidden column, excuse me. selling -- selling it as opposed to buying it. 18 So I -- in this particular 18 Q. With respect to EM, this three 19 spreadsheet, column A was hidden and I had to 19 percent liquidity discount is applied to every 20 20 EM CUSIP, right? unhide it. But once I've done that, I see that column A contains the entry "EM" for 21 21 A. We would have to scroll down that emerging markets for each one of these CUSIPs 22 22 column to see if that was, in fact, true. In 23 which, of course, corresponds to the fact that 23 some cases, on some spreadsheets things are they're all put in the spreadsheet "EM." 24 overridden because of other information. But 24 25 So going back to M3, cell M3, in this particular case it look like they're 25 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide

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L 2

L 5

accessing that for each of the CUSIPs.

Q. And these emerging market securities, were these debt securities, combination, do you know?

A. I believe that a good number of them were debt securities. But I'd have to go back and look. Let's see if it's in this particular spreadsheet.

(Witness reviewing screen.)

A. We certainly know that the ones that have factors are not equities.

Q. And where is your factor column?

A. In other words, I should say the ones that have factors that are not equal to one. So the factor column is column B. So the first row we see a factor of 0.55, so that CUSIP almost certainly is a fixed income instrument and not a -- not an equity. And that would be true for column -- excuse me. For row 23 and row 39.

The others that have factors of one could be equities, but judging by many of the prices, I think one could conclude that the bulk of them are fixed income. But that's -- TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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that's a surmise based upon what's seen in this spreadsheet. And if you were to ask me about any particular CUSIP, the best thing to do would be to check online to see whether there's information about that CUSIP. That would be one way to determine what it is.

Q. And if I'm reading this spreadsheet, the "EM" tab of the 995.xls spreadsheet correctly, a flat three percent discount is applied to every one of those CUSIPs regardless of size, maturity or any other individual characteristics of that CUSIP; is that right?

A. Again, I scrolled down column M and I did it quickly so I'm not absolutely sure. But it appears that each one of the entries is adjusted by that three percent discount.

Q. Going back to your Appendix 4, item No. 4, the U.S. Agency CMOs, is it your understanding that the U.S. Agency CMOs were reduced by a fixed 10 percent applying a similar methodology; there's a liquidity discount that's applied to everything that is tagged as a U.S. Agency CMO?

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MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

A. I'm not going to use the word "all" in my answer because the way that this spreadsheet works, or any of these spreadsheets, is that a formula for a particular CUSIP can be altered to use some other pricing mechanism or some other assumption. So to answer your question, I would have to look at all the ones that fell into a particular category and then scroll over to see if the lookup table is being used or perhaps something else.

Q. But staying with the lookup table, where on this lookup table would you find the liquidity discount for U.S. Agency CMOs?

A. So at least the way it's sorted here -- and again I have to caution that if the spreadsheet is sorted in a different way, the rows will not correspond to what I'm about to say.

But given the sort that I'm looking at now, the IOs, U.S. Agency CMO, interest on the U.S. Agency CMO corresponds to row 7 and has a liquidity haircut factor of .9, which is TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

- P. Pfleiderer-

10 percent.

- Q. And in fact, there's a same liquidity haircut discount for inverse IOs, right above that, U.S. Agency CMO inverse IOs?
- A. Yes, that appears to be the case here.
- Q. Again, the same percent is used for complex floaters, right?
 - A. That appears to be the case, yes.
- Q. What did you do to satisfy yourself that the same liquidity discount was appropriate for IOs, inverse IOs, inverse floaters, complex floaters, and several other types of U.S. Agency CMOs, all of which seem to have a flat 10 percent discount? Does that make sense to you, sir?
- A. Well, the approach here, no doubt, is to take an average over CUSIPs and here you take an average over types of securities. And in any work of this sort what is important at a certain level of granularity to make sure that your average reflects the average that would be applied.

In some cases it may be that you TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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would use bigger haircuts, in some cases a smaller haircut. But if on average this is judged by the people who are putting this together -- and, of course, this is reviewed by PricewaterhouseCoopers -- as a way to reflect the average within that class, then it is appropriate to do that.

So you could have had a much more complicated analysis that would go down CUSIP by CUSIP to do an analysis, but at that level of granularity, the gain in accuracy is probably illusory because you're basically going to get some that are more and some that are less, but the average is going to reflect the population?

Q. And do you have an understanding with respect to U.S. Agency CMOs how that average that was used was calculated?

A. I'd have to go back and look at some of the support documents to refresh my memory. But sitting here now, I don't remember exactly what the analysis was done for these. I remember we were talking about the emerging market, I remember looking TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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specifically at that and can tell you how that issue -- can tell you how that was done. But in this particular one, I have to refresh my memory.

Q. Let me see if I can do that. I'm handing you what's been marked as Exhibit 643-A.

You've seen Exhibit 643-A before today, right?

A. I believe so, yes.

Q. What do you recognize it as?

A. I'm going to read it to make sure. (Witness reviewing document.)

A. So I may be confusing this with something else I've seen, but I'm pretty sure this is the one that I was thinking of. And it actually addresses the issue that I was talking about where they are using a -- if you read the last paragraph, a 10 percent bid/offer reserve at a proxy supported by both methods, and then they observed that 75 percent of the U.S. Agency CMO book was derivative structure, IOs, POs and C bonds which are basically in some ways like zero TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleiderercoupon bonds up to a point where interest is withheld and paid later.

And the fact that these generally have lower liquidity is used to support, using the 10 percent as an average. So you're doing what you do in a number of situations where you're going to apply an average and you have to make sure that that average reflects the population, knowing that in some cases you're applying it to things that might be a little bit below and others that you might be applying it to things that might be a little bit above what you want to capture. But overall on average, is going to lead to an unbiased and accurate result.

Q. And the effort to come up with this 10 percent bid/offer, that effort relied at least in part on these observations that were collected on page 2 of the exhibit of buys and sales on specific days for specific securities, correct?

A. That is my understanding of what this is, yes, it is.

Q. And BBG type is what, Bloomberg TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

type?

A. That would be my assumption here. I would assume that that's the case, yes.

Q. And so this table of page 2 of Exhibit 643-A is used to come up with an average bid/offer spread for U.S. Agency CMOs. Do you see that?

A. That's right.

- P. Pfleiderer-

Q. Of 10.55 percent. And then that 10.55 percent is used as a basis for supporting the 10 percent bid/offer average that's used for U.S. Agency CMOs by Barclays, correct?

A. The .9 factor that's in the spreadsheet that we were just looking at under "Liquidity," yes.

Q. Now, if you look at the sample that's used to drive that 10.55 percent, sir, you'll see that you have a series of entries where the bid of percentage is 15 percent or greater, and you have a series where the percentage is well below one percent. Do you see that?

A. I do.

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65 (Pages 254 to 257)

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Pg 67 of 122 Page 258 Page 259 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 last column, but it comes close to being 2 Q. So that's not a normal 3 3 distribution, right? sorted on the last column. 4 A. Do you mean Gaussian? 4 Q. Is there anything about the 5 Q. Gaussian, yes. You got two lumps. 5 distribution of those percentages, the fact You got a cluster of observations that are 6 that you have a collection of very high 6 high and vou got a cluster of observations readings relative to a collection of very low 7 7 that are low? 8 8 readings that concerns you at all about the 9 9 validity of using an average with respect to A. Indeed. 0 Q. Right. 10 the U.S. Agency CMOs? 11 A. I suspect that these have been 11 A. Well, the answer is no because of sorted on the last column. L 2 12 the last paragraph on the first page. So 75 (Mr. Gaffey entering the room.) percent of the U.S. Agency CMOs book was 13 13 14 A. Although it looks to be that it is 14 derivative structures. So 75 percent is going L 5 15 to be drawn from the top part, and 25 percent sorted on that. by the bottom. So based upon that 16 16 Q. Is there anything about the fact 17 that you have a collection of high 17 informational loan, that would indicate that 18 observations and a collection of low 18 the 10 percent, which is roughly an average of 19 19 half at the top and half at the bottom, is observations --20 20 A. Excuse me. I just want to correct actually conservative. 21 my answer, what I said. It sort of appeared 21 So I would interpret this table to be sorted. But actually as I look at it 22 with the information that is provided in the 22 23 again, it is not completely sorted. The last 23 last paragraph of the page below -- excuse me, entries are somewhat bigger than the entries a the other side of the page, as indicating that 24 24 2.5 little bit above. So it is not sorted on the 25 this was probably a conservative method that TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 260 Page 261 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 was used by Barclays. 2 was reviewed and if they did review it, you 3 And my understanding is, again, 3 don't know what they did to review it? 4 that this had to be reviewed by 4 A. Again, I did not -- as I said 5 PricewaterhouseCoopers, so they were issue -before, I did not talk to anyone at 5 they were probably trying to be -- this is 6 PricewaterhouseCoopers, so I don't know -- I 6 7 speculation on my part. But I assume they 7 don't know the specifics. were being conservative because my 8 8 Q. Other than anything 9 9 PricewaterhouseCoopers may or may not have understanding is it would -- it would be 0 10 done, did you or your staff try to replicate reviewed by PricewaterhouseCoopers. 11 Q. But you don't know whether it was 11 this exercise that was done by Barclays? 12 2 reviewed by PricewaterhouseCoopers, right? A. I did not. And again, I have to 13 A. I don't specifically know that this 13 give the same answer. The staff that was 14 was reviewed. By understanding is they did 14 working on this did an incredible amount of 15 review -- I believe they did review the 15 analysis, so there were things that were done 16 liquidity adjustments that were being made. I 16 that were basically done to get comfort 17 have a recollection that that was -- I'm 17 levels. They would call to my attention 18 trying to remember whether that was in a phone 18

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was reviewed. But I understand that PricewaterhouseCoopers did -- did a thorough review of their procedures.

call or how I heard that. I'm not sure, as I

sit here today, that this particular analysis

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Q. But you don't know whether this one TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

things that were deserving of further investigation and called to my attention things where there was quite a degree of competence in making the assessments that I was making throughout the report.

So I do not know whether staff went through the exercise of trying to replicate the analysis that was done here.

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Page 262 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 If you talk about replicating this 3 analysis what I would assume that that would 4 entail is simply going out and looking at these CUSIPs and getting this information and 5 6 I have no reason to believe that this 7 information is incorrect or that the 10.55 8 percent is an average of that column or 9 anything else. So I'm not sure what the value .0 of replication would be here. Q. Just as you sit here today, you 11 12 don't know anything specifically that your 13 staff did to validate this analysis; is that right? 15 A. I don't -- I don't recall that they 16 looked at this. They may have. I'm not sure. 17 Q. Well, they may have done a lot of

Q. Well, they may have done a lot of things. Do you know whether they did anything with respect to 6.3?

A. No. It is the same answer as before. On many of these things, they may have, they may not have.

Q. You don't know, right?

A. I'm sorry?

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Q. You don't know?

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- P. Pfleidererpurposes of the valuation, correct?

A. That's correct. As I suggested this morning, they did that generally in the case of the corporates.

Q. And you observed that when you were looking at the spreadsheets, you observed that with respect to the corporates there would be third-party quotes and Barclays would use the minimum quote for purpose of the valuation, right?

A. As I said, generally that seemed to be the policy. I think there were some exceptions to that, but that was generally the case.

Q. Just to be clear, did you compare that treatment of third-party quotes with the printed Barclays policy for pricing securities?

A. I read through documents that gave the policy. I don't recall specific discussion of that particular issue.

Q. And with respect to these securities and with respect to the corporates, when you observed that Barclays was using the

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A. I don't know on what they did or --

Q. Yes. With respect to this particular issue, you don't know what they may or may not have done?

A. For replicating this particular spreadsheet, I don't know. But I would assume that that would have been inappropriate use of their time relative to all the other things that they did. So I rather doubt that they would have engaged in such an exercise since it wouldn't have been terribly, terribly relevant to the type of issues that we were looking at.

Q. If you go to item number five --

MR. SHAW: Before we go to item five, can we take a short break?

MR. TAMBE: Sure.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken

from 4:49 p.m. to 5:13 p.m.)

BY MR. TAMBE:

Q. All right. We talked this morning about situations where Barclays obtained third-party quotes from a number of different sources and used the minimum quote for

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minimum price, did you have any conversations with Barclays to ask them why they were using the minimum price as opposed to an average or some other methodology?

A. I personally did not. But my recollection is fairly strong that my staff working at my direction did. And as I recall, the notion was within the time period that they were looking at, prices were falling. So by taking the minimum, you're more likely to capture the value at that time.

But that may have been a discussion on corporates or it may have been a discussion on some other group of assets. But I do recall that there was justification for taking a minimum based upon the fact that the markets were falling at that time.

And again, the idea was, I believe, to at the moment they captured the price, to get the most recent price as opposed to prices that -- quotes, I should say, that would have been stale.

Q. When is it that Barclays went out and sought these quotations with respect to

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- P. Pfleiderercorporates or any of the other securities for

which they sought third-party quotes?

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A. I'm not sure of the exact timing because I believe that there was a marking effort that started on the 22nd to capture, capture prices and quotes. But there was also some work that was done retrospectively to establish what the quotes would have been at the time. So I'm not sure what was done on those particular days and what was done by going and getting historical information that related to those days.

Q. And do you have an opinion or a view as to the reliability of quotes that were obtained on or about September 22nd versus quotes that were obtained retrospectively? Is one more reliable than the other?

A. No. They would have the same degree of reliability as long as they are generally referring to that time period. It is inappropriate to go get a quote today and use a quote that someone is quoting on the market today to value something on the 22nd. But to get information today about what's TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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example of a corporate security where Barclays had obtained multiple quotes --

If we go back into the 995.xls spreadsheet, what tab are you going to, sir?

A. I'm now in the Corporates tab.
That's "Corps." And I'm scrolling over to column AB and beyond. So the relevant columns are columns AB, AC, AD, AE and AF.

Q. Let's just stop right there.
So column AB is titled "Markit," correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. And that's a third-party provider of market data for certain types of securities, correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. What's the next column over, AC?

A. "EJV."

Q. What is that?

A. I believe that's a pricing service that's owned by Reuters. I can't tell you right now what EJV stands for. I did know at one time.

Q. What's the next one, AD? Just for TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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being quoted or what prices were on the 22nd, even though you're looking at historical prices, to the extent that that was accurately captured at the time, would still have the same degree of reliability.

Q. When you look in the spreadsheets, the spreadsheets that we've been looking at before and you see third-party prices reflected in those spreadsheets, is there information contained in the spreadsheets as to whether those are contemporaneously obtained prices or whether they are retrospectively obtained prices?

A. Again, with the distinction that they are not prices that are quoted at later dates for the later dates. I don't believe that there is identification in the spreadsheets that I looked at. I have to go back and look at some of the columns to see if perhaps there were. But I don't recall seeing in the spreadsheets for all CUSIPs.

Q. By the way, just to make sure that we're all on the same page, if you could go into one of these spreadsheets and look at an

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the record, the heading there is "ISMADQPP." Do you know what that is?

A. I did at one time. But sitting here right now, I can't remember what that stands for.

Q. The next column over, AE?

A. That is Bloomberg.

Q. That's "BBG," Bloomberg; is that right?

A. Yes.

O. And the next column over?

A. That's basically the Financial Times. I forget what "ID" stands for, but it is the Financial Times or service that gives quotations.

Q. We know from your earlier testimony that Bloomberg is a service that at least for certain purposes you and your staff accessed, correct, in connection with this assignment?

A. We talked this morning about the number of CUSIPs for which Bloomberg quotations were available. So that was one case where Bloomberg was used.

Q. Did you personally access any of TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

Page 270 Page 271 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 these other third-party price providers in 2 A. That was simply a count of the 3 connection with this assignment? 3 number of quotes that are in those columns. 4 A. Did I personally access them? 4 So the maximum is five, and the minimum Q. Yes. 5 5 obviously is zero. In the case of the one that is in row 12, it appears that there was 6 A. No, I did not. 6 no pricing information to be obtained from any 7 Q. Do you know whether your staff 7 accessed any of these other third-party 8 8 one of those providers. And so there was 9 providers that are reflected on this sheet 9 obviously no depth in the sense of any price 0 that you were discussing? 10 from any one of these providers. 11 A. I believe that they did. 11 So you see there a dash that appears indicating that there are no price L 2 Q. And for what purpose did they do 12 13 so? 13 quotes available. 14 A. I believe that that was for getting 14 Q. The next column over, AH, is 15 some information about some of the 15 captioned "Composite," correct? 16 difficult-to-price CUSIPs and to see if 16 A. Correct. information was available. I don't believe 17 17 Q. Is that simply an average of the 18 that I accessed them for other CUSIPs that we 18 quotes that were observed? 19 19 A. I believe it is. But what I will see here. But I think on a slightly basis, 20 20 do, to make sure, is take an average since the they did. Q. The next column over, AG, has a formula does not appear. In some cases 21 21 heading "Depth"? 22 formula was written over and so in those 22 23 23 cases, one needs to check. And actually --A. That's correct. O. What's your understanding of what 24 24 make sure I did that correctly. Actually, it 25 that column indicates? 25 appears that it is not necessarily an average TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580 Page 272 Page 273 1 1 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-2 because I just took an average and got 100.87. 2 where they highlighted the cells and copied Q. That's for row 9? 3 3 them and then pasted them as values so that 4 A. I'm looking at row 9. And the 4 they wouldn't be -- wouldn't change their base 5 that they hardwired in. And in doing that, composite is recorded as 100.85. 5 6 Q. So do you have an understanding as you lose the information as to how they were 6 to how the composite was prepared by Barclays? 7 7 calculated. But in a case like this, we can 8 A. I may have at one time, but I don't 8 spend some time and figure out potentially what -- what's being done here to come up with 9 recall what it is. I have to explore a little 9 10 10 these numbers. But it does not seem to be a bit more. 11 I spend a lot of time, in going 11 simple average. 12 through these spreadsheets, reverse 12 Q. Do you recall asking Barclays about 13 engineering what was actually done in just the 13 how the "Composite" column was calculated on way that you see me doing as you sit here now. 14 14 this spreadsheet? 15 If something was labeled as a composite and 15 A. I did not. And the reason is -- I the formula was not there, I would do exactly 16 16 will show you what the reason is by going to 17 17 what I just did a few minutes ago and that is the summary page and going to -- so I'm now on the "Summary" tab. put in a formula to see where that number came 18 18 19 from so I had a full understanding of what 19 Q. For 995.xls? procedures were being followed. 20 20 A. And if I go to row D -- I'm sorry. Because like I said, in some cases 21 I'm going to -- I want to go -- I misspoke. I 21 22 22 want to go to column E, row 4. And I see that the formula is given and in other cases, it 23 appears that the analyst that was preparing 23 that is pointing to column N1 -- sorry. To

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this spreadsheet and those that were working

on it did what you could call a value paste,

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cell N1 in the "Corporation" tab.

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And if I go to N1, I see that it --

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actually, I went to the wrong one. I'm sorry. Am I in the right one?

O. You are in the right one. You are in "Corps" in column N?

MR. SHAW: He's actually in N3.

A. Unfortunately I minimized this. I made it smaller.

MR. SHAW: Change it where it says 55 percent up at the top.

THE WITNESS: Oh, yes.

(Witness complying.)

A. So I go to N1 and what I find is that, first of all, it is looking the lookup table with liquidity, which might lead you to conclude that it was using a different way of determining the liquidity here. However, if we go to the "Liquidity" spreadsheet we find, if we scroll down for Corporate, that all this entails is multiplying by one. So there's no change that's made there.

So if we go back to the corporate spreadsheet, I just want to emphasize that this number that appears here is being multiplied by one. Then we have to go to L3. 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide

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spreadsheet is not used to calculate the values that migrate up toward to the summary sheet and ultimately to the acquisition accounting.

So it was unimportant to understand the genesis of that genesis of that number given that it wasn't used anywhere in the calculation.

O. If you don't mind going to row 9 on this spreadsheet which is the Corps tab in 995.xls.

Row 9, that's one where you have five observations from third parties, correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. And the composite price is 100.85, the minimum price is 100.63. And if you don't mind scrolling over to the left.

(Witness complying.)

- Q. And it's the minimum price that's used or is it the composite price that's used with respect to that one?
 - A. It is the minimum price.
- Q. Now, you may have already testified about this. Did you personally talk to

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For some reason this is not scrolling over.

We go to L3, which is based upon the market -- is labeled the market value for September 22nd, and we see that that -- here we have a formula so we don't have to reverse engineer.

That is obtained by multiplying J3 by K3 by 100, and then multiplying that result by I3. So we need to go look at K3 and J3 and I3. And K3 is the price. And we will need to see where that comes from. It is 100.45 for this particular row. I3 is the factor and J3 is the nominal.

So the issue is where did that price of 100.45 come from. And if we scroll over here, we see it is the minimum, not the composite.

So you asked me a question and I realized I've given the wrong answer here. But I'm giving a precise answer. You asked me a question, did I talk to Barclays about how they came up with the composite. And the answer is, that was irrelevant because that number, even though it is displayed in this TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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Barclays about why minimum price was used?

- A. This may have come up on one of the phone calls that I was involved in, or it may have been a phone call that staff had with Barclays personnel that was relayed to me. I don't remember exactly. And it may have come up both ways.
- Q. But the explanation that you received either by speaking to your staff or by speaking to Barclays directly or participating in one of these phone calls is that because the market was falling, it was appropriate to use the minimum price as opposed to a composite or some other combination?
- A. That's -- as I said before, that's my recollection about the use of a minimum in some context. I believe it was for the corporates here, but it may have been in a different context. So I want to be careful to say that I'm relying on my recollection of a conversation along those lines. I believe it probably applied to the corporates, but it may have applied to something else. I'm not sure.

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Pg 72 of 122 Page 278 Page 279 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 Q. If the composite price wasn't being 2 observed that Barclays had obtained third-3 3 used to value the position, do you know for party pricing information? 4 what purpose it was being calculated? 4 I believe rates may have been A. No, I don't know that. First of 5 5 another area where they obtained third-party 6 all, we still haven't established exactly what 6 information, if you can confirm that for 7 is being calculated here. It doesn't appear 7 vourself. 8 to be a simple average, so it is not clear 8 A. Let me make sure that columns are exactly what it represents. 9 9 being shown. . 0 But from my reverse engineering and 10 (Witness reviewing screen.) 11 careful reverse engineering of what was done 11 A. I'm not sure for rates whether this here, it was not used. 12 12 was obtained, a number of third-party pricing 13 13 Q. And we discussed this a few minutes in the same way that corporates did. I don't ago, but if you scroll over to the third-party 14 see it here. 15 prices for that particular row, row 9, that's 15 Q. Earlier when you were scrolling up I saw "Bloomberg" and "FTID." So keep going 16 no indication on the spreadsheet as to whether 16 17 17 those prices were obtained on the 22nd or right. 18 whether they were obtained at some subsequent 18 A. I missed it. 19 date looking back on the 22nd, correct? 19 Q. There we go. Column AF and AG. 20 20 A. Yes, thank you. I hadn't gone far A. I believe that's correct. It could 21 enough in the spreadsheet. 21 be that they were obtained later and applied 22 to the 22nd, or they could have been 2 Q. So with respect to rates in spreadsheet 995.xls, you at least got two 23 contemporaneously obtained. I'm not sure. 23 columns entitled Bloomberg and FTID and it is Q. Now, other than the corporates, 24 24 25 were there other securities for which you 25 your understanding those are third-party TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 280 Page 281 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 quotes obtained from those source, correct? 2 mark, unless it could calculate an average 3 A. Yes. Yes. 3 based on Bloomberg and FTID? 4 Q. And again, this doesn't tell you 4 A. That's correct. At least that's 5 when those quotes were obtained but it tells 5 what the formula would indicate that it's you quotes were obtained? 6 6 7 7 Q. You will note that one of the A. Correct. columns that you scrolled by may have 8 Q. Do you have an understanding of 8 9 what methodology or policy was used by 9 reflected sales. If you want to scroll back. **Barclays in incorporating those third-party** 10 0 (Witness complying.) quotes in its valuation with respect to the 11 11 Q. Keep scrolling to the left, please. 12 (Witness complying.) 2 rates of securities? . 3 13 Q. If you look at column S, that has a A. What I have to do is reverse sales number on it. Do you know with respect 14 14 engineer it because I'm not going to rely on 15 15 to this class of securities, what Barclays did my memory. 16 Q. So take, for example, row 54? 16 with respect to the sales prices? A. It appears, looking at the formula, 17 17 A. Again, to answer your question and if an average cannot be calculated, then it is make sure that I'm answering it completely 18 18 19 using F47 for this particular row. Otherwise 19 accurately, I would go back and look at how 20 values from this particular sheet, the rates it is taking an average of the two quotes. 20 Q. And what is F47, or F? What's 21 21 sheet, feed into the summary. 22 So if we go to "Summary" and we go 22 the F column? 23 A. So F47 was the Bank of New York 23 to...

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mark.

Q. So we'll take the Bank of New York

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(Witness reviewing screen.)

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A. ...the last which -- the last entry

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in the first block which is labeled "Treasuries/Agencies", that is the one that references the rates file.

We have to go to the rates file and go to column N. And the number that appears there is the 14 billion number that appears at the top of column N which is a sum of everything in column N. So we then look at the calculation that's being done here. And column N is based upon L3. And L3 is based upon J3 and K3.

J3 is the nominal value, and K3 is equal to AH3. So we go over to AH3 and we see that that's the average price. So that tells us that it's using the average here.

And then we go back to column N and see that based upon that calculation, which would be taking the average price from those two data providers, multiplying it times the notional value and dividing by 100 to convert it into a total midpoint price. It then takes that and multiples it by what it gets if it goes and looks up a value in liquidity table. And that value is obtained by looking at the TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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And we can go through the rest of the column and see how it looks up other liquidity values depending on the security type.

So to answer the question now that we've looked at it and reversed engineered it, the price formula for at least that row -- and we can look down that column to see how uniform it is across all the entries, is keying off of the average price and then providing a liquidity adjustment from there.

Q. So with respect to the rates, it is not the minimum price that's used, it's an average price that's used?

A. That's right. And the reason here is in part that we're taking the midpoint price and then we're using a liquidity haircut from this table. Whereas for the corporates we took those bids, took the minimum, and then had no liquidity adjustment. Because if you go down here -- since we're on it we can look at it very quickly.

You go down here to column D, cell 46 for corporate, it just multiples it by TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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classification which is in D3 for this particular security, and for all the securities in column D.

The one that I'm pointing to which is in row 3, is a treasury. So we go to the "Liquidity" tab, and we look for Treasuries.

Q. You went by it. It is further below?

A. Thank you.

Q. So row 35.

A. So Treasuries. And the number that appears next to Treasuries 0.999, which means that it is basically taking ten basis points off the price to cover for the change from midpoint to exit, which is really basically the bid/ask spread for Treasuries which is quite small because they are traded in a liquid market.

So here we see for Treasuries which are traded in a liquid market and for which the exit price is going to be very, very close relatively speaking to the midpoint price, a very small liquidity haircut is given in this case of only ten basis points.

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one. And you even see in the next column, it says "Minimum third-party price utilized in place of a bid/offer spread." And that tells you a little bit here about where this is used

It is also used for corporate credit, this approach, which is in line 45 -- row 45. And let's see if it is used anywhere else. I think those are the two places.

- Q. If you scroll all the way to the bottom of the "Liquidity" tab, please. (Witness complying.)
- Q. Turning to table 4 in your expert report which is on page 48. If you can turn there.

(Witness complying.)

Q. Are you there?

A. I am.

Q. On page 48. You have in that table a left-hand side and a right side. On the left-hand side what you have are items that appear on the 9/16 balance sheet that was an exhibit to the Asset Purchase Agreement, correct?

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Pg 74 of 122 Page 286 Page 287 1 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 MR. SHAW: Objection. 2 2 do remember the exhibit number, 19. And it is 3 3 Mischaracterizes. important also to look at the upper right-hand 4 A. I'm not sure that it was an 4 corner. And I believe that says "final" there, which in my recollection distinguishes 5 exhibit. My understanding is that it was 5 6 actually, as I read in deposition testimony 6 this from other versions which were not the rather repeatedly, not attached to the Asset 7 7 final ones and were not part of the reference 8 Purchase Agreement. 8 in the APA. 9 Q. But referenced in the Asset 9 Q. So that's the left-hand side of the 0 **Purchase Agreement?** 10 sheet. The right-hand side of your table 4, 11 A. I believe there's a reference to 11 what is your source for the numbers that 12 L 2 appear on the right-hand side of table 4? it. If my understanding is correct, it is referenced in the section on comp. I may be 13 13 A. That was a spreadsheet that I 14 mistaken about that. But I'm pretty sure, 14 understand was produced that has the title L 5 based upon my reading of the record, that it 15 2008 to 2009 -- "2009-2009, 160723, Here's The 16 16 was attached. summary for the 12.xls." 17 Q. We'll just pull that exhibit so we 17 Q. Let's just make sure we're all 18 talking about the same documents. Let's put 18 can take a look at that as well. 19 19 it before vou. MR. TAMBE: Mark that. 20 20 I'm handing you what's been (Exhibit 644-A, e-mail from Michael 21 previously marked as Exhibit 19. Is this a 21 McGarvey Re: Here's the summary from 22 document that was the source of the left-hand 22 the 12th, BCI-EX-(S)-00213948-51 with 23 23 side of your table 4? attachments, marked for identification, A. Yes. Yes, it is. It is important 24 24 as of this date.) 2.5 that -- and I do remember -- in this case, I 25 Q. I handed you what's been marked as TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 288 Page 289 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 Exhibit 644-A. Is this the source document 2 long side are 65 billion and on the net short side 48 billion. Do you see that? 3 that you used to create the right-hand column 3 4 of table 4? 4 A. I do. 5 5 (Witness reviewing document.) Q. Do you recall in the Asset Purchase 6 6 Agreement there was a reference to positions, A. I believe it is. Again, I only 7 look at these in electronic form so I'm not 7 net long positions with a value of 70 billion 8 used to looking at the printed copies. But 8 and net short positions with a value of 69 9 9 judging from the first page of what you handed billion. Do you generally remember that? 0 me -- I shouldn't say the first page, the 0 11 fifth page of what you handed me, I recognize 11 Q. Have you found any documentation that as the summary information. 12 that supports the \$70 billion and the 12 13 13 \$69 billion numbers that appear in the APA? And as you see in the upper right-hand, it does say "Balance sheet by GAAP asset type 9/12/2008." So that was, I 14 14 MR. SHAW: Objection to form. 15 15 A. My understanding is that -- based 16 believe, the document that's being referenced. 16 upon reading the record, is that there's a 17 Q. There is a reference on that 17 substantial confusion over how the number 18 page you are referring to, which is the fifth 18 70 billion was determined. 19 page of this exhibit, on the left-hand side 19 I will note that if you subtract 20 you've got the net long inventory and on the 20 off the mortgages from the left-hand side of

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right-hand side you've got the net short

Q. And the numbers that appear on the

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"grand total" line of this document on the net

inventory. Do you see that?

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A. That's correct.

Exhibit 19, you get a number that is quite

And if you look at the Asset

close to 70 billion. Not precisely

70 billion, but quite close.

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- P. Pfleiderer-positions but mortgages, as I recall, I think appear on the line below that as a separate entity, so that would imply to my reading of it, at least, that you would want to take the left-hand side of the balance sheet that is in Exhibit 19, subtract the 2.7 for mortgages, which leaves you with something very, very close to 70 billion, which if you round, will give you precisely 70 billion.

Now, I'm just noting that. I don't know that that is the source. But I'm noting that if you do that exercise that I just went through, you do come up with 70 billion.

Q. So you did the math?

A. In the way that I just described, yes.

Q. Exhibit 644-A, on the fifth page of Exhibit 644-A which, again, is the document or the page that feeds into the right-hand side column of your table 4.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. What's the source, if you know, for the valuations that appear under the "Net Long" inventory column on that table?

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A. So I would have to, first of all, look at this in spreadsheet form, in electronic form, I should say, and look at any backup formulas that are used to begin to answer your question to see where the numbers that are reported on page 5 might be drawn from. And I'm not sure they point directly to anything in this particular spreadsheet. They may be imported from something else. I have to go back and look.

Q. Well, this table 4 plays a role in one of the opinions you're expressing, correct? I mean, this is part of your opinion that based on the documents you reviewed, you detected no hidden \$5 billion discount at inception, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. That's the reason you got table 4 in here.

As you sit here today, sir, what is your understanding of the source of the numbers that you extracted from Exhibit 644-A and put on in the right-hand side of table 4?

A. I'll refer you to page 50 of my
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report, footnote 66, in which I say, "To confirm that the LBI inventory by GAAP asset type discussed in this subsection accurately reflected the net long inventory balances on the LBI" --on LBI's books as of September 10. Excuse me. I misspoke, "September 12, 2008, staff working at my direction acquired from Barclays a GFS report which as I understand it captured all LBI positions as of that date." And not to read the rest of it, but they went through and calculated values from that and found that they were in very close agreement to what appears here.

So the GFS report is in close agreement -- for the 12th, is in close agreement to what appears here.

Q. And that GFS report that you or your staff asked to be pulled, has that been produced in this case?

A. I'm not sure. I don't know.
MR. TAMBE: Counsel?
MR. SHAW: I don't know. We can look into it.

Q. Was there a particular path or a TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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particular query that you ran against the GFS data in order to prepare that report?

A. I'd have to ask the staff working at my direction exactly how they implement it. That was not something that I did.

Q. And that exercise, the pulling of the GFS data in response to a query that was done of the system, you don't know whether that's, in fact, the way 644-A was prepared, correct?

A. That someone pulled up the GFS at a later date and did it? No, obviously not. It was prepared at the time that this e-mail was sent or before. And the precise way that it was prepared is not clear from, I believe, the spreadsheet that is in front of you.

But the fact that it accords very, very closely with the GFS information leads me to conclude that it was a very accurate summary of what Lehman's position was using its own marks as of September 12th as it related to the net long inventory.

Q. And in Footnote 66, other than telling us it is very close, you don't

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quantify how close is "very close," correct?

- A. I think, as I recall, the differences were close to immaterial in percentage terms. But I'd have to go back and check it in terms of what the exact differences were.
- Q. When you did your analysis as to whether or not there was some hidden \$5 billion discount at inception, did you take into account Exhibit 200, which I've placed in front of you?

(Witness reviewing document.)

A. I know I've looked at this before because I recognized the -- or something. I should say, I know I looked at either this or something very similar. I recognize the crossing outs and the various notations at the side

I don't even know how I would take into account this given that there are so many numbers that are crossed out. And I don't know what this was prepared to do. I don't know which numbers are supposed to be governing, so I see, for instance, in total TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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corporate debt, I see a 5.4, but then I see a 5.0. When I see "mortgages", I see a 6.5, and then I see a 5.8 written beside it.

So there is no way for me as an expert in financial economics to look at something that's all marked up like this and interpret it in any way.

Q. Did you ask around at Barclays, the former Lehman employees, if any of them could help you understand what this was?

- A. Did I personally?
- Q. Yes.
- A. No.

Q. Do you know if your staff did?

A. I wouldn't even know who would be asked. What you have given me has no name on it, so I wouldn't know. You handed me this. There is not a name on it that would indicate who you would even ask.

Q. If you saw a document marked exhibit something, would you be at all curious to go and look to see if it was ever testified about in any deposition that was provided to you? Did you do that?

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A. That is quite possibly the way that I encountered it was in a deposition. I, sitting here today, do not remember which deposition it was or what the testimony was.

- Q. Do you recall going and asking a deponent who may have testified about this document, questions about what this document meant?
- A. I did not personally ask anyone about this particular document.

Q. Are you aware that Mr. Tonucci has testified about the possibility of a \$5 billion discount. Are you aware of that?

A. I remember that in a number of different depositions there were phrases of "\$5 billion adjustments," "\$5 billion in discount," "\$5 billion in change in the marks" and so on and so forth. So I recall that.

So what I did in response to that confusing testimony, as I explained in my report, I went to what is labeled here as the final exhibit -- I shouldn't say the final exhibit. But the final estimated acquisition balance sheet with SB, which is Stephen TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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Berkenfeld's initials on it, and is noted as final. And I took that among the very many that were obviously to in my mind -- since they didn't carry final -- not the final ones, it didn't have his initials on it.

I took that and compared it to the marks that Lehman was putting on its books for Friday before there was any discussion of any consequence with Barclays about acquiring LBI. I realize there were some preliminary discussions over the weekend about LBHI. But on Friday, the books that Lehman had did not in any way reflect any type of negotiations with Barclays, because negotiations hadn't commenced.

And I look at this and I compare it to what is on the 12th, and there is no 5 billion.

Q. Done? Is your answer complete?

A. I may have more to say about that, but I'm done for the moment.

Q. I know you may have more to say about it, but would you like to answer my question now?

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08-13555-mg Doc 8015-3 Page 298 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 MR. TAMBE: Can you read back my 3 question? 4 (Record read as follows: 5 "Question: Are you aware that 6 Mr. Tonucci has testified about the 7 possibility of a \$5 billion discount. 8 Are you aware of that?") 9 Q. Do you understand my question? .0 A. I think in my answer, I did say --11 Q. Can you answer my question, please, 12 sir? 13 A. I did say that I was aware of it. 14 And then I went on to explain that being aware 15 of a number of discussions in the record about 16 adjustments of 5 billion, I went and I did 17 this exercise to see if it was there, and I 18 found that it wasn't, at least not in terms of 19 a delta between what is on Exhibit 19 and what 20 was in the books of Lehman the 12th. 21 Q. So you see deposition testimony 22 about the possibility of a \$5 billion discount, but you don't go and speak to any of 23 the people who've testified about the 24 25 \$5 billion discount; is that your position, TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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sir?

A. They testified about it under oath. I read the depositions and the record, as I suggest, is quite confused as to what was going on. So I address something here that is not confused in the sense that there is Exhibit 19, which has been put forward as the estimated acquisition balance sheet as I understand it, and there is information that could be obtained based upon Lehman's marks on the 12th which is clearly being produced before any discussion with Barclays. I compare that and I find no delta of 5 billion.

O. And having concluded that, did you then go back to Mr. Tonucci or any of the former Lehman employees who testified about this discount who are now with Barclays and say, what were you talking about? I don't see any \$5 billion discount? What are you talking about Mr. Tonucci? You said that under oath?

A. That is certainly not my role as an expert to go back and talk to some deponent. At least I -- I did not interpret -- let me qualify that. I did not interpret my role as TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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an expert in this case to go back and either accuse individuals of having mistaken recollections or saying things that were mistaken. My role, as I understood it, was to look at the evidence that could be looked at.

And we have here an example of an estimated balance sheet which I believe is the one that everyone refers to, at least that's my reading of the testimony. Exhibit 19 is the one that is always put forward, at least in my reading and to look at the Barclays -excuse me, I misspoke, the Lehman marks as of the 12th and find a very close accord and nothing that is even remotely close to a \$5 billion difference.

Q. Did you do a valuation of what the GFS data showed as of the close of 9/15/2008? (Witness reviewing document.)

A. I was just going back and looking at my Exhibit 7 to refresh my memory that it was definitely, as I thought, September 17th, not the 15th.

And so this is, based upon a spreadsheet that was available -- that TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 - P. Pfleiderer-

purported to look at the transaction as of the 17th.

I did not do work with GS systems -- GFS system on the 15th. In particular, I thought it was useful to do it on the 12th, which I thought is a point that's before any discussion of any consequence with Barclays commence, so that there couldn't be any confusion as to what would have been determined as the result of some discussion with Barclays, and what is isolated as the balance sheet before any such discussions began.

Q. In doing any of the work that you've done with the GFS system, have you detected any gaps in the GFS system?

A. I don't know what you mean by "gaps".

Q. For example, securities that, in fact, were acquired by Barclays but don't appear anywhere on Lehman's GFS system on the 12th, the 15th?

A. Well, I've already spoken about one partial example to that, which was the Pine TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

Page 302 Page 303 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 CLO that was acquired by Barclays, but appears 2 by Barclays. The fact that there was an entry 3 in GFS just as, I understand it, a CUSIP, but 3 for it means that in some sense it was perhaps 4 doesn't have any information. 4 in the inventory but not valued for some 5 So that was something that was 5 reason. 6 acquired on GFS in the sense that there was an 6 Q. Putting Pine aside, have you 7 entry there but no information, very little detected any other instances where CUSIPs 7 8 information. Certainly no pricing acquired by Barclays appeared nowhere on the 8 GFS system for Lehman on the 12th of 9 information, which remember was the reason why 9 0 in the end it didn't appear in that 0 September, the 15th of September or during 11 11 20-million-and-above filter. that week? 12 12 A. The Pine is the only one that Q. So the answer to my question is 13 13 what? Do you want my question read back appears as I sit here. 14 again? 14 Q. Your staff has not reported to you: 15 15 We went back and tried to look at the GFS A. Well, I understood your question to 16 be is there evidence of a gap between what was 16 values for the acquired inventories and we're 17 in the GFS system and what Barclays acquired. 17 finding gaps, we are finding 5, 10 15, 20 18 And what came to mind quickly is what we were 18 percent of these CUSIPs do not appear on the 19 talking about earlier, the Pine CLO, which was 19 GFS? 20 20 acquired by Barclays but had only a CUSIP A. The answer to that is no, my staff entry, as I understand it, in GFS and no other 21 21 has not reported to me. 2.2 22 MR. TAMBE: Let's take a short information. 23 23 So whether that constitutes a gap break. 24 24 or not? It certainly did not have full MR. SHAW: Good. 25 information in the GFS system but was acquired 25 (Whereupon, a recess was taken TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 304 Page 305 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleidererfrom 6:14 p.m. to 6:29 p.m.) 2 2 Q. Are you familiar with the names 3 (Exhibit 645-A, 8/18/08 e-mail Re: 3 John Grenier or Tim Sullivan, the names that 4 Balance sheet iterations, 4 appear on the front page of this document? 5 BCI-EX-(S)-00213926-3936, marked for 5 A. I believe I've seen them before, 6 identification, as of this date.) 6 but I don't -- I don't recall. I don't recall 7 BY MR. TAMBE: 7 any specifics. 8 Q. Professor Pfleiderer, I'm handing 8 Q. If you turn to the last page of this exhibit, 645-A, you will see there is a 9 you a document marked as Exhibit 645-A. Take 9 . 0 a look at the document and let me know when 10 footer that appears on the document, not the 11 vou're done? 11 Bates stamp number, but the footer in the bottom right-hand corner, it says BS1. Do you (Witness reviewing document.) 12 12 13 Q. Did you review it? 13 see that? A. I certainly looked through it. I 14 14 A. I do. haven't looked at every item in it, but I 15 15 Q. If you flip the pages to the front 16 looked through it. 16 of the document, you will see it goes from BS1 17 Q. Do you recall having reviewed this 17 to BS2 to BS3. Do you see that? document before today? 18 18 A. I do. 19 A. I've seen various versions of the 19 Q. All the way to when you get to the 20 first page of the attachment which says "BS6, 20 balance sheet presented in various ways. I'm Thursday-9/18." Do you see that? 21 not sure that I saw this particular set in the 21 22 particular order, but I certainly seen 2 A. I do. 23 variations on the estimated balance sheet 23 Q. If you understand your previous 24 broken up in various ways. I don't know if 24 answer, you have not seen a collection of I've seen this particular set or not. 25 draft balance sheets put together in this 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580

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format before today, in this sequence?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form. Mischaracterizes his prior testimony.

A. I may have seen them. I'm not sure I saw them in this order. I'm not sure I saw these particular ones. So I don't know how to answer the question.

I've seen various versions of balance sheets, quite a few, but I don't have a specific memory of number versus number in each entry whereby I can say that I specifically looked at this, given that there were a number of iterations that I looked at.

- Q. And do you recall having any discussions with anyone at Barclays about any collection of balance sheets which showed a progression from balance sheet 1 to a balance sheet 6 as set forth in Exhibit 645-A?
 - A. I personally did not, no.
 - Q. Do you know if your staff did?
- A. They may have. But again the usual answer here, I don't know that they did, I don't know that they did not.
 - **Q.** When were you retained in this TSG Reporting Worldwide 877-702-9580

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matter, sir?

A. My recollection is that my first involvement in this was a series of phone calls that occurred some time in October. I don't have a precise notion in my mind when I was formally retained. But I certainly was involved in understanding the case and reading briefs starting in October.

Q. How did you come to be involved in the case?

A. My recollection is that I was contacted by Dr. Vellrath who's sitting to my right and my recollection is that he briefly described the case and asked if I would be interested. I'm not 100 percent sure that that's the way it developed. But I'm fairly sure that that was how it was initiated.

I had discussions early on with attorneys at Boise Schiller and I believe that was subsequent to my conversation with Dr. Vellrath, but I'm not exactly sure the exact sequence when things occurred.

Q. Prior to this assignment, had you worked with Dr. Vellrath before?

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A. No. This is the first time I've had the occasion to work with the Finance Scholars Group and with him.

Q. And when you were engaged and became involved in the working of this matter, was it your understanding that the support function or your staff function would be provided by the Finance Scholars Group? Or were you free to choose whoever you wanted to work with?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

A. I don't recall having a specific understanding. I suspect that in some since I was free to choose if -- my understanding is when an expert is -- actually, I -- I don't know. I think the best answer to that question is I don't know because it was not something that went through my mind as an issue.

Q. When you got some understanding of the scope of what you would be doing here, did you make any effort to interview people from different support services, entities, to see who could best support you in this work that

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- P. Pfleiderervou had been asked to do?

A. It was my understanding, and this may not be correct. But it was my understanding that people at the Finance Scholars Group had already received data and organized it and were set up to analyze things. So based upon that understanding, which I believe is a correct understanding, it was absolutely clear to me that they would be in a position to assist me better than anyone else.

And I know by looking at the group and who is involved that they're high quality people that do it and I can similarly say that after having the experience of working with the Finance Scholars Group, they are extremely high quality and I have absolute confidence in everything that's been done.

Q. Do you know when they were retained in this matter?

A. I do not.

Q. Was it shortly before you were retained or it's your sense they were retained long before you came along?

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Page 310 Page 311 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 1 2 2 down in that fashion. I certainly could break A. As I said, I don't know. 3 3 Q. Do you have a sense, just a rough it down by time in terms of what I did before 4 approximation, of how many hours you have 4 the filing of my report. In principle, I expended in working on this matter? 5 5 could do that. I don't recall to date how it 6 A. If I include hours to date, 6 would break along those lines, but I 7 somewhere between probably a 150 and 180, or 7 considered everything that I did before the 8 maybe approaching 200. 8 filing of my report basically preparing for 9 Q. And do you have any idea of how 9 the report. So I wouldn't be able to 0 many hours your staff at the Finance Scholars 0 distinguish one activity from another in any 11 Group has expended on this matter? 11 way that would be meaningful. 12 A. I wouldn't be able to quantify it. 12 Q. Do you record your time separately, But I would expect, given all that I specific times that you've been doing? 13 13 understand, that it was done, unless they're 14 A. I keep an hourly log and a brief 15 able to do things at 300 times the speed that 15 description of what I've done. But a lot of the entries are descriptive, they're very high 16 a normal human being would do, that it was 16 17 quite a bit -- more than what I've done 17 18 certainly. 18 Q. Well, for example, if you were 19 19 drafting the report, would you note the Q. And if did a rough break out of the 20 total number of hours you spent on this 20 drafting separately from reviewing matter, how many of those roughly 150 to 200 21 21 depositions? hours was spent preparing your report versus 22 22 A. I'd have to go back and look in 23 preparing for this deposition versus your 23 terms of how I put it. A lot of time drafting reviewing transcripts? Do you have any sense? 24 24 means reviewing documents and reviewing 25 A. I don't know that I could break it 25 documents means thinking about drafting. So I TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 312 Page 313 - P. Pfleiderer-1 1 - P. Pfleidererdon't know that I distinguish that in that 2 2 A. I'm not sure. I may have but I'm 3 way. 3 not 100 percent sure that I saw this 4 (Exhibit 646-A, PwC Review of 4 particular format. 5 Barclays capital price testing 5 Q. One of the types of securities that we talked about earlier today are auction-rate methodology, PwC-BarCapWP 00022935-948 6 6 7 securities. Do you remember that discussion? 7 with attachments, marked for 8 identification, as of this date.) 8 Q. Professor Pfleiderer, I show you a Q. And in particular I asked you a 9 9 10 10 question about Giant Stadium bonds. Do you document that's been marked as Exhibit 646-A. 11 And drawing your attention to the first 14 11 remember that? pages of this document. Take a quick look at 12 12 A. I do. 13 those 14 pages and tell me if you have seen 13 Q. Do you have an understanding one 14 14 this document before today. way or the other as to whether Giant Stadium 15 (Witness reviewing document.) 15 redeemed the Giant Stadium bonds at any point 16 A. I don't recall this particular 16 many time? 17 17 format. But I may have seen something related A. I believe that they did in -- I to this in another format, I'm just not sure. 18 18 don't remember the date. But I believe some 19 And my memory may be faulty. I may have seen 19 time in early 2009 perhaps or maybe even 20 this and I'm not remembering it in this 20 earlier than that date, they did redeem some. particular format, I just don't recall. The penalty rate had gotten to, I think it was 21 21 22 Q. Do you recall seeing a 22 23 percent, or some high rate. And I believe 23 23 PricewaterhouseCoopers memorandum which had there were some redemptions. 24 embedded in it a series of Excel spreadsheets? 24 Q. And the redemptions were at par? 25 (Witness reviewing document.) 25 A. That's my belief, yes. TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580

08-13555-mg Doc 8015-3 Filed 04/02/10 Entered 04/02/10 14:10:51 Exhibits B-E Pg 81 of 122 Page 314 Page 315 1 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 2 Q. Prior to those redemptions, had 2 because it was a range. 3 there been any defaults or missed payments by 3 Q. With respect to Giant Stadium 4 **Giant Stadium?** 4 bonds, did you or your staff do any 5 A. I'm not aware of any, no. 5 independent valuation work to determine 6 O. At the time the bonds were 6 whether or not that was a proper value for 7 transferred from Lehman to Barclays, had there 7 those bonds? 8 been any defaults? 8 A. I know that there was some focus on 9 9 A. I don't believe so, no. these bonds by people at Barclays. There were 0 Q. At what values did Barclays record 10 some files, I believe, I may be confusing them 11 those bonds? 11 with the Pine CLO files. And I believe 12 12 A. I believe in that case, we can go that -- my recollection is that the staff did 13 back to the spreadsheet to make sure. But I 13 a fair amount of due diligence on these, but I 14 believe that they recorded them Bank of New 14 don't remember the particulars. 15 15 Q. Do you have any understanding as to York marks. any of the due diligence your staff did with 16 Q. Which were what? 16 17 17 respect to the Giant Stadium bonds? A. I have to go back and look. I 18 certainly reference it. We need to go to the 18 A. Again, I would have to go back and 19 spreadsheet of my report. 19 talk to them. I don't want to attribute 20 20 Q. Go to Appendix 4 of your report something to these that was done for some where you discussed the Giant Stadium bond 21 21 other set of securities, and I'm having 2.2 marks. I believe page 112, you state a range 22 trouble at this moment keeping in mind what 23 between \$10 and \$44 for 100 of face value? 23 was done for, say, the Pine CLO and what was 24 A. That's correct. Yes, I was having done for other securities. 24 25 trouble remembering the specific number 25 So I don't want to misspeak by TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 316 Page 317 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-Q. Looking at Appendix 4 to your 2 saying that something was done for one set of 2 report, item No. 5, relates to Lehman-issued 3 securities when it was, in fact, done for 3 4 4 warrants and Lehman-issued equity late notes, something else. 5 5 as you labeled it. Do you see that? Q. Do you have a recollection as you 6 sit here about any particular direction that 6 A. Yes. O. With respect to that category of 7 you gave to your staff with respect to the 7 securities, Barclays' determination was to 8 **Giant Stadium bonds?** 8 write them off in their entirety, correct? 9 9 A. As I recall, after having looked at 10 0 the spreadsheet and saw that they were marking A. I believe that was done for all of 11 them at the same level that Bank of New York 11 them or almost all of them. I believe it was 12 12 was marking them, I focused a little bit less done for all of them, but I have to go back 13 13 and make sure that every one was marked to on that because I took the Bank of New York as 14 14 a mark that Barclays was agreeing with as zero. But I believe the bulk of them were. 15 opposed to marks that there was some 15 Q. Did you review any of the offering 16 adjustments in which the adjustment had to be 16 memoranda for any of this category of 17 17 evaluated more closely. securities to determine how they were 18 But I certainly in discussing 18 structured? 19 19

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things with staff, was concerned that any of these securities that were certainly being discussed in my report, would be given a fair amount of attention. I just can't remember the particular things that were done with respect to these as opposed to other sets of

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securities. TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

A. I may have seen something, I'm not sure it was an offering memoranda or not, related to these because I did have discussion, again, with staff. But right now, I'm not recalling anything specific as something that would definitely be an offering memoranda.

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Q. Did you have a discussion with staff or anyone else about whether these securities should more properly have been valued at the price at which Lehman unsecured debt was trading in the days and weeks after the bankruptcy filing?

A. We may have had a discussion of that sort. I don't recall sitting here now. I believe there may have been a discussion about what they had done in comparing it to some other Lehman securities but I don't -- I don't recall a specific directive to make comparisons of any particular sort. But I think there were some discussions that related to the class of Lehman securities and what -what were affected by the bankruptcy.

Again, my memory is a bit hazy at this point.

Q. Did you have any understanding as to why these securities would not be priced at the same prices that were prevailing in the market for other Lehman securities that were trading in the market post-bankruptcy?

A. I don't -- I can recall some TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 - P. Pfleiderer-

discussions along those lines, but I can't recall what understanding I came to have at the end of those discussions. So sitting here now, I don't recall the specifics.

Q. Do you have any sense of a range in which Lehman unsecured debt was trading during the week of the 15th of September or the week of the 22nd of September?

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A. I believe that there -- I may be wrong about this. But I believe that there may be some -- there are certainly some other Lehman debt instruments in the inventory that were priced. I mentioned, for instance, obviously, the commercial paper. So we can look back and sort and see some other data that comes from the actual, the actual inventory.

I do remember a conversation in which I had suggested that for some of these, that it would be useful to get debt ratings and various other indications of the value on other debt.

So I know that that was looked at. But again, I was hazy about the specifics of TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleidererthose discussions.

Q. But in terms of the opinion that you're offering here, you are not quarrelling with Barclays' decision to write them off in its entirety, correct?

A. I'm basically listing them here as a situation where the BoNY mark was inappropriate, and given the credit risk was very clearly stated on what I was quoting from the general discussion of these that was put up by Lehman, that the credit risk was tied back to the issuer, in this case, Lehman Brothers, that it made sense to significantly mark them down.

Q. Are you quarrelling with Barclays' decision to mark them down to zero?

A. No, I'm not.

Q. Do you agree with that decision?

A. I neither agree nor disagree with marking them all the way down to zero. I certainly agree that they should be very significantly marked down. Whether you mark them down to zero or two cents or five cents is not something I would offer an opinion TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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about without doing some more due diligence on

Q. Did you have any discussions with Barclays as to why they chose to mark them down to zero?

A. I did not personally have any discussions, but I know that there were a set of securities that were identified and they're included in the ones that were discussed in this particular section that my staff had discussions with Barclays about the data. I don't know in this particular case what those discussions were.

Q. Or even if there were any discussions with respect to these in particular?

A. I believe there were based upon my recollection of conversations, but I may be mistaken and confusing it with something else.

Q. As a general matter, sir, is it your opinion, are you offering an opinion in vour report that you agree with the marks, the values that Barclays has placed on all of these CUSIPs? Or are you simply saying that

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they are a better value than the one placed by BoNY?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

A. I am certainly not offering the opinion that if one goes CUSIP by CUSIP, that I agree with every particular mark. I looked at a process, I looked at the fact that extreme care was taken in the development of these, that PricewaterhouseCoopers had audited this.

And I came to a conclusion that this provided a good upper bound as to what the realizable value of this would be in an orderly but quick, fairly quick sale of this inventory.

And that's the opinion that I'm offering in my report, and I certainly stand by that based upon all that I have done and what I understand the staff has done in following up on a number of these things and investigating -- investigating various things, much of which I did discuss with staff. I just, as I'm sitting here today, don't remember all the details.

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O. Are there any particular valuations that Barclays has done that you would say you disagree with or have you not made any such determination?

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MR. SHAW: Asked and answered.

A. I haven't -- I haven't gone and said here's a CUSIP that I would disagree with because that wasn't the process. I looked at aggregates, I looked at marks that were being placed by BoNY and the adjustments that were made and found that those were reasonable estimates of what could be achieved in an orderly exit. And that's my conclusion.

MR. TAMBE: I think in the interest of time, I'm going to pass the questioning to other counsel that have questions to ask.

We certainly have areas of inquiry that we would like to pursue with Professor Pfleiderer, so we reserve our rights.

MS. TABATABAI: I have a few questions. It shouldn't take more than five minutes.

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EXAMINATION BY MS. TABATABAI:

Q. Mr. Pfleiderer, my name is Fara Tabatabai. I'm with the firm of Hughes **Hubbard and represent the SIPA Trustee in** this. I know it's been a long day, so I will try to be quick here.

Looking at your report which I think is 633-A, if you can turn to page 67 about three lines down. Are you with me?

A. I am.

Q. It reads, "...Barclays was supposed to receive financial assets worth approximately \$47.8 billion -- comprising \$45.546 billion worth of Fed Replacement Repo collateral, \$1.492 worth of clearance BOX assets, and \$769 million in other securities -- plus exchange-traded derivatives account that as of the Sale Hearing (and, for that matter, as of the Closing) were of unascertainable value." Do you see that?

A. I'm afraid I was looking at the wrong paragraph. I'm now looking at what you were reading, I believe.

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Q. Can you tell me what you meant when you wrote the "exchange-traded derivatives accounts were of unascertainable value"?

A. What I meant was that given my reading of the record and everything else that I've been able to consider, my understanding is that there is no way that a value could have been placed with any confidence on the exchange-traded derivatives given the uncertainty as to positions, the uncertainty given market movements and all the other uncertainties. So it was, I'll use the term, as I understand it, a bit of a black box with very little transparency into it, which I guess is the definition of a "black box".

Q. What do you mean by "the uncertainty as to positions"?

A. That, as I understand it, Barclays did not know exactly what the positions were, the long, the short, all of the exposures that were in those accounts and to get a notion of what the value is.

And when I say "notion," one would need a fair degree of insight into what those TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleidererpositions were as well as what the prices were and how those accounts might have been changing and what was being closed so there was a great deal of uncertainty, as I understood it, surrounding the accounts at

Q. In the ordinary course, if Barclays wanted to get that type of information, how would it go about doing that?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

A. I'm not sure what you mean by "ordinary course."

Q. Not focusing on this week or this particular transaction, but with respect to exchange-traded derivatives accounts in general. If you wanted to find out, or if the firm wanted to find out details about pricing and what the positions were, how would they do that?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

A. (No response.)

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that time.

Q. Let me see if I can narrow the auestion.

A firm like Barclays, for example,

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determine what -- what the positions in those accounts were and what the exposure was. And my knowledge is that they were not getting information that was at all reliable. I remember one bit of testimony, or maybe it was an e-mail message where -- I don't remember the exact phrasing, but it was something that maybe four days had been spent and zero progress had been made, or we're getting zero return on the efforts or something like that. I'm paraphrasing here.

So my reading of the record was that there was great uncertainty about what the exposure would be. And that certainly there was a lot of evidence based upon some information that was coming through, clearing reserve requirements and other things were changing quite dramatically.

I do remember that, I think it was Stephen King who observed that the only information that they could get was by looking at changes in margin and trying to determine from that and market movements, whether there was a net long or net short exposure.

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if it wanted to know that information, could go to the particular exchange and ask for a positions report; is that right?

A. That would be my basic understanding, but I'm not an expert in the OCC and the exact institutional details that would surround. Although I understand there is another expert in this case, Mr. Leichner, I believe his name is Leichner, who has expertise in that. It is certainly beyond what I have.

But my basic understanding is that there would be reports that could be obtained in what would be considered perhaps limited circumstances.

Q. Is it your understanding that Barclays could not get those types of reports for Lehman's exchange-traded derivatives position during the week of September 15, 2008?

A. My understanding is not complete. It's based upon reading the record. And my recollection now sitting here today of what people were saying in terms of trying to TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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But if I remember that deposition testimony, there was a lot of uncertainty expressed based upon the limited information that was available and limited amount that can be inferred from it.

Q. Just to be clear, when you say "my reading of the record," are you referring to deposition testimony or deposition testimony and something else? Just what are you referring to?

A. I certainly would be referring to deposition testimony and also exhibits that I saw, e-mail messages and things of that sort as well. So I would consider that part of the record.

Q. Do you recall seeing any e-mail messages request from Barclays either requesting or receiving position reports from any of the exchanges at which Lehman had exchange-traded derivatives accounts?

A. I don't -- I think the quick answer is no, I don't recall seeing that. I may have seen it and I just don't recall it. But it wasn't something that I was focusing on as TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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much as I was focusing on many of the other issues that relate to the value of the collateral on the repo.

But it certainly was something that I did pay close attention to as I was reading the the record because it informed my understanding of the difficulty of determining what the value of these were. And there seemed to be a great deal of uncertainty.

- Q. Can you look at page 68 of your report, the very next page? Right at the top it reads "Barclays neither knew nor could have known or even roughly estimated the net value of these accounts as of the time of the Sale Hearing." Do you see that?
 - A. I do.
- Q. Are you referring there to the exchange-traded derivatives accounts?
- A. Yes. That sentence refers back to those accounts.
- Q. What did you mean when you wrote, "Barclays neither knew nor could have known or even roughly estimated the net value of [those] accounts"?

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A. Well, that was based, certainly based on my understanding that there was considerable uncertainty about exposures and about the positions.

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- Q. In your view, could Barclays have estimated whether the net value of those accounts were more or less than one billion dollars?
- A. No. I believe that -- my understanding was that the uncertainty was quite extreme. In fact, I saw reference to a range between minus 2 billion and plus 4 billion. So that considerable uncertainty would not allow you to put a bracket on it that would in any way reliably say it was above a certain level.
- Q. Again, that understanding that you just testified to is based on your review of deposition testimony and other exhibits?
 - A. That is correct.
- O. One more thing, if you turn over the page on page 69. At the very bottom, I guess we're three lines from the bottom, "Thus, as I discuss further below, given the

TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

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- P. Pfleiderersubstantial uncertainty about the value, and even the identity of the assets and certain of the liabilities, Barclays' reported gain is reasonable, unsurprising and fair to the Sellers". Do you see that?

A. I do.

- Q. You're aware that Barclays reported gains of approximately \$4.2 billion?
- A. That is what they reported on the results report, as I understand it, the following February.
- O. If Barclays' gain on a transaction were \$7 billion, would you still consider that to be a reasonable gain on the transaction?
- A. I think that all of this comes down to a question of, first of all, whether it was foreseeable what the gain would be, and there was considerable uncertainty -- which means that ex-post the gain could have been negative, it could have been positive.

My understanding is that Barclays was anticipating a gain based upon its announcements, for instance, in the press release that's implied there, and in the

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conference call with analysts. They were certainly very upfront about the expectation of a gain. But the expectation and the actual realization are two different things, and there was considerable uncertainty here.

And more to the point, that doesn't in any way address the issue of whether the outcome could have been better in the sense of another bidder stepping in. Since another bidder did not, it doesn't in any way address the issue of whether the estate and others got the best price possible, which given that Barclays was the sole bidder and this was a distressed sale, and the alternate of liquidation was so drastic, this was the best thing for the estate and for the customers and other stakeholders in this situation which is what I talk about at the end of my report.

Q. Is that a yes, a \$7 billion gain would be reasonable in this transaction?

A. An ex-post gain at \$7 billion or an anticipated gain? I don't think it makes much difference if it is one or the other.

But if you're talking about an TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

Page 334 Page 335 1 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-1 2 ex-post gain, given the incredible uncertainty 2 that it was 70 -- excuse me, 7 billion, and 3 here, that was potentially within the realm of 3 given the considerable uncertainty, that 4 possibility as was an ex-post loss. 4 wouldn't necessarily be unreasonable given the Q. Would an ex-post gain of \$7 billion 5 5 uncertainty that surrounded the transaction. 6 be reasonable in your opinion? 6 And it also could have happened that it was A. You have to define what you mean by 7 7 negative, that even though Barclays had 8 "reasonable." 8 expected a gain, it may not have materialized 9 9 when they actually did the full accounting. Q. This is your word, "reasonable, 0 unsurprising, and fair to the Seller.' 0 Q. So in your view, given the 11 I'm just asking, if the gain had 11 considerable uncertainty, a \$7 billion gain on been \$3 billion more than the \$4 billion 12 12 this transaction could have been reasonable? reported gain, would that have been reasonable MR. SHAW: Are we talking about the 13 13 in your view? And you can take it to mean 14 day one accounting gain? 15 whatever you meant on page 69 of your report. .5 MS. TABATABAI: I'm talking about a 16 A. What I meant in page 69 is that it 6 reported gain. 17 is reasonable given the situation, the 17 Q. If the gain that Barclays had 18 distressed situation, the considerable 18 reported, instead of being \$4 billion was \$7 19 19 billion, would that have been reasonable? uncertainty that was existing at that time. 20 20 In that sense of using the word "reasonable," A. Would it have been within the span I'm not sure how to address exactly what the 21 21 of the reasonable distribution given the 22 span is before something becomes unreasonable. 22 uncertainty at this time, I didn't do a 23 But what occurred was certainly within the 23 specific calculation to calculate any 24 bounds of reasonableness. definitive way what that uncertainty was. But 24 25 And it could have been the case 25 it was considerable. And so something that TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 337 Page 336 1 1 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-2 2 would have resulted in a \$7 billion gain or a how it would account for the gain. And given \$3 billion, 2 billion loss or a zero gain, all 3 3 that, again, the support would have been 4 those were probably within what I would call 4 distributed around perhaps what Barclays was 5 the support of the distribution given the 5 expecting. It could have been zero, it could 6 6 have been negative, and it could have been considerable uncertainty at the time. 7 Q. Would a \$7 billion gain be 7 more. unsurprising to the sellers? 8 8 Q. In your view, would a \$7 billion reported gain have been fair to the sellers in 9 A. To the sellers? 9 0 10 O. Yes, to the sellers. this transaction? 11 A. I don't know. When I used the word 11 A. The answer is decidedly yes in "unsurprising here," I'm using it from my 12 terms that the alternative, as I understand 2 13 perspective. And fair to the sellers, fair to 13 it -- and it is very clear when you read the 14 14 the sellers is not necessarily unsurprising to transcript of the hearing -- is that the 15 the sellers. I don't put myself in the 15 alternative would have been liquidation which 16 16 position of the sellers. would have been a much worse outcome than what 17 17 But the sellers clearly in my the sellers received. 18 understanding knew that Barclays was 18 So the sellers were faced, as I 19 19 anticipating a gain on the transaction based understand it, in distressed sales situation 20 20 with really two alternatives, one of which was upon its press release and based upon the 21 liquidation, not go through with the 21 conference call. And so I think that based 22 22 transaction, and the other which was go upon that, it wouldn't be unsurprising to the 23 23 through with the transaction which, as I say sellers with that information. 24 in my report, in all likelihood was the better 24 Barclays was expecting a gain and 25 there was considerable uncertainty here as to 25 outcome. TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

Page 338 Page 339 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 2 The alternatives that some A. I do. 3 objectors were proposing such as wait and see 3 Q. You testified you are not the 4 if someone else comes along or see if there is 4 world's expert on what is usual and reasonable 5 a better deal is just not an alternative that 5 on a repurchase transaction, correct? 6 was available. And as I read that hearing 6 A. I don't consider myself the world's 7 transcript, it seemed, based upon what the 7 expert. But my opinion was formed by the fact that so many people on the record said that 8 Court said, that that was fully appreciated by 8 9 the Court and was completely consistent with 9 this was not the normal collateral you would .0 the testimony that was proffered by Bart 10 get in a normal transaction, so on and so 11 McDade and Barry Ridings. 11 forth. MS. TABATABAI: I have nothing 12 12 Q. Leaving this transaction for just a 13 minute -- and we will turn to the replacement 13 further. 14 MR. DAKIS: I just have a couple of 14 transaction -- generally you don't consider 15 follow-up questions. I don't expect 15 yourself the world's expert to what is 16 reasonable and usual in a replacement 16 that it will be long. 17 17 **EXAMINATION BY** transaction, correct? 18 MR. DAKIS: 18 MR. SHAW: Objection to form. 19 19 A. I think I did say that I was not Q. I just have a couple of follow-up 20 20 questions. Robert Dakis from Quinn Emanuel the world's expert. I have to go back and look at my testimony. I don't know if I said **Urguhart Oliver & Hedges for the Official** 21 21 **Committee of Unsecured Creditors.** 22 it there or I said certainly that I wasn't an 22 23 expert, world's expert in accounting because I 23 Earlier today Mr. Tambe asked you didn't have a CPA. 24 about commercial transactions. Do you recall 24 25 that testimony? 25 And I think what I said was that my TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580 Page 340 Page 341 1 1 - P. Pfleiderer-- P. Pfleiderer-2 reading of the record gave me lots of 2 comfortable, and actually very comfortable in 3 information plus my understanding of repos and 3 drawing the conclusions that I drew especially 4 how they work and the haircuts to indicate 4 when I couple it with all the other deposition testimony that I saw? The answer is yes. 5 that this was not a normal commercial 5 Q. You testified you never placed a 6 6 transaction and the collateral was not the 7 commercial repurchase transaction, correct? normal collateral that you would get in a 7 A. In the sense of being involved in 8 commercial repo. 8 9 9 the actual sale replacement, no, I have not. Q. Okay. Again, the question is, do 10 you consider yourself an expert on what's 10 Q. Have you ever represented a client 11 reasonable and usual in commercial repurchase 11 in the actual sale of a commercial repurchase transactions? The question you're answering 12 2 transaction? 13 is whether or not this transaction was 13 A. No, I have not. 14 14 reasonable and usual, and that's not my Q. Ever represented a seller or a 15 15 buyer in a commercial repurchase transaction? question. 16 16 A. That's what I assumed you meant by MR. SHAW: Well, I'm going to 17 17 object to form again. "client." No. A. The expertise that I can draw upon 18 18 Q. You're not a lawyer, correct? 19 here is my understanding of the risk and 19 A. No. liquidity issues that surround a repo, and the 20 20 Q. So you wouldn't have any legal type of collaterals that would be in a repo basis for reading and understanding from a 21 21 22 that would be consistent with that risk or 22 legal perspective the terms of a commercial 23 would not. So I have that expertise. 23 repurchase transaction, correct? 24 24 A. I wouldn't have the perspective of Now, does that make me the world's 25 25 a lawyer. I can read English, and so I would expert? Probably not. Does it make me TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 877-702-9580

Page 342 Page 343 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 2 2 hope that that would give a fair amount of to step into the shoes of the Federal Reserve 3 3 as the purchaser under a commercial repurchase insight into -- into what was required. But I 4 don't have the legal training that would allow 4 transaction with Lehman, correct? 5 5 me to parse every sentence correctly. A. Well. I'm not sure -- I'm not sure 6 6 Q. That assumes a commercial it is appropriate to characterize it as a 7 commercial repo transaction. 7 repurchase transaction is in English, but we 8 will leave that for another day. 8 They were asked to step in to the 9 shoes of the fed in the sense that they 9 **Turning to the replacement** 0 repurchase transaction. 10 entered into a repo with Lehman, the proceeds 11 11 You testified, I believe, that in of which I understood were largely used to 12 take out the feds' position in the repo. So 12 connection with the replacement repurchase, Lehman was required to substitute certain 13 that's the way that I would characterize it. 13 14 14 collateral into the repurchase replacement But I wouldn't insert the word L 5 transaction. Do you recall that testimony? 15 "commercial" necessarily if that's to be 16 MR. SHAW: Objection to form. 16 construed in some other way. A. I ask the question to be read 17 17 Q. Fair enough. 18 again, please? 18 In connection with this replacement 19 transaction, it is okay if we call it the 19 O. Let me try it again. 20 20 Do you recall your testimony replacement transaction? regarding the fed replacement repurchase 21 A. If it relates to what I said in 21 22 terms of --22 transaction? 23 23 MR. SHAW: Objection to form. Q. Yes. 24 A. -- entering into a repo, the 24 O. Let's step back. 25 25 You recall that Barclays was asked proceeds of which were largely used to take TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 Page 344 Page 345 1 - P. Pfleiderer-1 - P. Pfleiderer-2 2 out the feds' position. received certain, let's call it replacement 3 Q. It does. In connection with this 3 collateral in order to make up for any 4 replacement transaction, you testified that 4 shortfalls in what was supposed to be 5 **Barclays received certain substitute** 5 transferred when it entered into the 6 collateral. Do you recall that testimony? 6 repurchase transaction with Lehman, correct? 7 7 A. I'm not sure that it would be MR. SHAW: Objection to form. 8 characterized as "substitute collateral" 8 A. My understanding is that a lot of 9 9 things happened in these hectic times, and I'm necessarily. What I do understand is that 0 10 referring again to that week, that not enough collateral that was behind the fed repo was 11 not transferred one-to-one to Barclays for a 11 collateral was delivered as a consequence of 12 variety of reasons, many of which I have some 12 various problems that developed, and that 13 understanding of and some of which I do not. 13 Lehman had put in \$7 billion in cash, if my 14 14 And as a consequence, the set of memory is correct that was to be delivered to 15 securities that ended up being delivered to 15 Barclays. I think the anticipation at that 16 Barclays is not the same as what was back in 16 point was that other securities would be put 17 the fed. And in particular, we know that, for 17 in and the cash would be replaced. And then 18 example, some of what ended up constituting 18 that 7 billion in cash did not get delivered. 19 19 the repo collateral ended up being the So a lot of things were happening. 20 20 And I want to be careful in trying to settlement with J.P. Morgan in December that involved the delivery of some securities and 21 characterize it in a shorthand way that may 21 22 22 also, as I recall, 1.25 billion in cash. not capture all that was occurring. 23 So that clearly was not in the 23 O. Fair enough. 24 Do you recall your testimony 24 original fed repo.

25

Q. But you understand that Barclays

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earlier today that you believed it was

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reasonable and usual in cases such as this replacement transaction that there is also a requirement that the party that's receiving collateral have some discretion as to what was acceptable collateral? Do you recall that testimony?

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MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

A. I'm not sure I said it in precisely those terms. But if someone in a repo transaction attempts to deliver collateral that is not of the type of value or risk characteristic that was contemplated, then given the nature of the risk that's taken on by the other side of the repo transaction, it is my view as a financial economist, reasonable that some discretion be had to guard against substitution of collateral that would increase the risk in ways that would be adverse to that side of the repo.

Q. Do you know whether or not the documents regarding this replacement transaction we're talking about permitted such substitution of collateral?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form. TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580

- P. Pfleiderer-

Which substitution of collateral are you referring to?

MR. DAKIS: The substitution of collateral that Mr. Pfleiderer was just talking about, Professor Pfleiderer. I apologize.

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

A. As I testified, it's hard for me to specifically talk about substitution of collateral as we're using the phrase when so many different things happened. There was the 7 billion. There was the J.P. Morgan settlement. There were a lot of things going on here. So I'm not sure specifically what you're addressing when you say "substitution of collateral" given, again, so many different things are going on.

And that's why I said that a shorthand phrase like "substitution of collateral" doesn't capture the more complicated story of what actually evolved.

Q. I believe your testimony earlier to one of my questions was that as a financial economist, you believe that when a party to a

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- P. Pfleiderer-

repurchase transaction didn't receive collateral that had the same risk profile and certain other factors that they had bargained for, that that party receiving the collateral, it would have been reasonable for that party to have discretion as to what was acceptable substitute collateral? Do you recall that testimony?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

Q. Would you like me to have it read back for you?

A. Given that I don't recall specifically how I phrased it, it might be useful to have it read back.

MR. DAKIS: Can you read back his answer to, I guess it was two questions

(Record read as follows: "Answer: I'm not sure I said it in precisely those terms. But if someone in a repo transaction attempts to deliver collateral that is not of the type of value or risk characteristic that was contemplated, then given the nature of TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580 - P. Pfleiderer-

the risk that's taken on by the other side of the repo transaction, it is my view, as a financial economist, reasonable that some discretion be had to guard against substitution of collateral that would increase the risk in ways that would be adverse to that side of the repo.")

Q. So, do you know whether or not the documents governing the replacement transaction we've been talking about permitted for Barclays to exercise any discretion to guard against the substitution of collateral that would increase the risk in ways that would be adverse to that side of the repo --

MR. SHAW: Objection to form.

Q. -- to Barclays side of the repo?

MR. SHAW: Objection to form. Calls for a legal conclusion.

A. Which was going to be my answer. I am not trained as a lawyer so I would not be able to read the legal document and make the legal determination as to what was permitted and what was not.

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88 (Pages 346 to 349)

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		<u> </u>	LLL
	Page 350		Page 351
1	- P. Pfleiderer-	1	- P. Pfleiderer-
2	I would simply say that as a	2	transaction, correct?
3	financial economist, given the nature of that	3	A. That's what I indicated in answer
4	transaction, the party that was on one side of	4	to one of your questions. I'm not a lawyer.
5	the repo would be adversely affected if	5	MR. DAKIS: No further questions.
6	collateral of inferior value, or of much	6	MR. TAMBE: No further questions
7	greater risk than what was contemplated in the	7	here, but we have reserved our rights.
8	haircut, received collateral that was	8	MR. DAKIS: The Committee reserves
9	substandard in that way that increased	9	its right to the extent the deposition
10	increased the risk and jeopardized.	10	is restarted or continued, to ask
11	I said that, I believe, better in	11	further questions as well.
11 12 13	the original testimony, but that's a statement	12	MS. TABATABAI: The Trustee does
13	I do want to make.	13	the same.
14	Q. Why did you want to make that	14	(Time noted: 7:34 p.m.)
15	statement?	15	(Time noted: 7.54 p.m.)
16	A. Because it is true. Given the	16	
		17	
17	nature of repo transactions and the risks that		
18	are borne by that side, if that side is	18	PROF. PAUL PFLEIDERER
19	unprotected and collateral of a different	19	
20	nature with higher risk characteristic is	20	
21	substituted, that would be adverse to that	21	Subscribed and sworn to before me,
22	side's interest. That's a true statement.	22	this day of 2010.
23	Q. But you're not a lawyer so you	23	
24	can't testify as to what protections Barclays	24	
25	did or didn't have in the context of this repo	25	Notary Public
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		-	
	Page 352		Page 353
1	I N D E X	1	EXHIBITS
2	WITNESS EXAMINATION BY PAGE	2	EXHIBIT FOR I.D.
3	PROF. PFLEIDERER MR. TAMBE 5	3	Exhibit 637-A 7
4	MS. TABATABAI 324	4	2/10/10 e-mail to K. Carrero
5	MR. DAKIS 338	5	2/10/10 C-man to K. Carrero
6	WIK. DAKIS 550	6	Exhibit 638-A 60
	EVHIDITE		
7	EXHIBITS	7	Appendix Two, list of documents
8	EXHIBIT FOR I.D.	8	and other materials reviewed and
9	Exhibit 633-A 6	9	considered
10	Expert report of Professor Paul	10	T 1 11 1 200 1
11	Pfleiderer - Volume I	11	Exhibit 639-A 65
12		12	BCI Exhibit 346, declaration of
13	Exhibit 634-A 7	13	Paul Pfleiderer
14	Expert report of Professor Paul	14	
15	Pfleiderer - Vol II	15	Exhibit 640-A 73
16		16	2/6/2010 letter to Jones Day from
17	Exhibit 635-A 7	17	Boise Schiller
18	2/22/10 letter to Jones Day from	18	
19	Boies Schiller with attachment	19	Exhibit 641-A 200
20		20	E-mail re: Acquisition balance
21	Exhibit 636-A 7	21	sheet, BCI-EX-(s)-00213990 with
22	2/22/10 e-mail to K. Carrero from	22	attachments
23	Davenport with attachments	23	***************************************
24	Duronport with accomments	24	
25		25	
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	1 9 0 1		
	Page 354		Page 355
1	EXHIBITS	1	EXHIBITS
2	EXHIBIT FOR I.D.	2	EXHIBIT FOR I.D.
3	Exhibit 642-A 245	3	Exhibit 646-A 312
4	Agency mortgages, unsupported or	4	PwC Review of Barclays capital
5	excluded file type with attached	5	price testing methodology,
6	spreadsheets, BCI-EX-00297317	6	PwC-BarCapWP_00022935-948 with
7		7	attachments
8	Exhibit 643-A 247	8	
9	2/2/09 memo from PwC to Richard	9	
10	Landreman, PwC-BarCapWP_00023327	10	EXHIBITS
11		11	[previously marked]
12	Exhibit 644-A 287	12	EXHIBIT FOR I.D.
13	E-mail from Michael McGarvey Re:	13	Exhibit 533-A 235
14	Here's the summary from the 12th,	14	Exhibit 19 286
15	BCI-EX-(S)-00213948-51 with	15	Exhibit 200 294
16	attachments	16	2,1111011 200
17		Ī7	
18	Exhibit 645-A 304	18	
19	8/18/08 e-mail Re: Balance sheet	19	
20	iterations,	20	
21	BCI-EX-(S)-00213926-3936	21	
22	BC1-EA-(3)-00213920-3930	22	
23		23	
24			
		24	
25	TGG D	25	TGG D W. 11 .11 .0TT TGG 0.700
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	Page 356		Page 357
1	CERTIFICATE	1	ERRATA SHEET FOR THE TRANSCRIPT OF:
2	STATE OF NEW YORK)	2	Case Name: Re: Lehman Brothers Holdings
3	,	-	Dep. Date: February 23, 2010
4) ss.: COUNTY OF KINGS)	3	Deponent: Prof. Paul Pfleiderer
	,	4	Pg. Ln. Now Reads Should Read Reason
5	I, MAYLEEN CINTRON, a Registered		
6	Merit Reporter, Certified Realtime	5	
7	Reporter and Notary Public within and	6	
8	for the State of New York, do hereby	8	
9	certify:	9	
10	That PROF. PAUL PFLEIDERER, the	10	
11	witness whose deposition is	11	
12	hereinbefore set forth, was duly sworn	12	
13	by me and that such deposition is a	13	
14	true record of the testimony given by	14 15	
15	such witness.	16	
16	I further certify that I am not	17	
17	related to any of the parties to this	18	
18	action by blood or marriage; and that I	19	
19	am in no way interested in the outcome	20	
20	of this matter.	21	PROF. PAUL PFLEIDERER
21	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set	22	CHDCCDIDED AND CWODN DEFORE ME
22	my hand this 23rd day of February 2010.	23	SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, This day of, 2010.
23		24	11110 day 01, 2010.
24		-	Notary Public
25	MAYLEEN CINTRON, RMR, CRR	25	My Commission Expires:
1	TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580		TSG Reporting - Worldwide 877-702-9580
1	• •		

EXHIBIT C

APPENDIX TWO

LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIALS REVIEWED AND CONSIDERED

Bates Number Documents

BCI-EX 00185186

HHR 00000194

HHR 00000195

HHR_00000196

HHR 00000491

HHR 00000492

HHR 00000493

HHR 00000685

HHR 00000686

HHR 00000687

HHR_00001774-HHR_00001775

HHR 00001776

HHR_00001777

HHR_00006310-HHR 00006312

HHR_00006313-HHR 00006480

LAZ-C-00050306

LBHI 004083

LBHI 004083

LBHI SEC07940 92774-927779

MTHM0000139

MTHM0000140

BCI000002-BCI015744

BCI-EX-00185186

JPM-BARCAP0000001 – JPM- BARCAP0003898.TXT (with gaps)

JPM-60(b)00003982 - JPM-60(b)00005917.XLS (with gaps)

JPM-BARCAP0000001 – JPM- BARCAP0003898.TIF (with gaps)

JPM-BARCAP0000001 – JPM- BARCAP0003844.XLS (with gaps)

EXHIBIT

638A

2-23-10

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Deposition Transcripts

Deposition of Alastair Blackwell, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2009).

Deposition of Alex Kirk, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2009).

Deposition of Archibald Cox, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 11, 2009).

Deposition of Bart McDade, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 2, 2009).

Deposition of Bryan Marsal, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2009).

Deposition of Daniel Joseph Fleming, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009).

Deposition of David Petrie, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2009).

Deposition of Eric Jonathan Felder, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jul. 31, 2009).

Deposition of Gary Romain, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 10, 2009).

Deposition of Gerard LaRocca, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2009).

Deposition of Hugh McGee, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009).

Deposition of Ian Lowitt, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2009).

Deposition of James B Kobak Jr., *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2009).

Deposition of James Hraska, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009).

Deposition of James Seery, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 3, 2009).

Deposition of Jasen Yang, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 4, 2009).

Deposition of Jerry del Missier, In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 1, 2009).

Deposition of John Coghlan, In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2009).

Deposition of John Rodefeld, In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2009).

Deposition of John Varley, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 3, 2009).

Deposition of John Varley, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 11, 2009).

Deposition of Mark J. Shapiro, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2009).

Deposition of Martin Kelly, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2009).

Deposition of Martin Kelly, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2009).

Deposition of Michael Klein, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 12, 2009).

Deposition of Mike Keegan, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009).

Deposition of Nancy Denig, In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009).

Deposition of Paolo Tonucci, In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009).

Deposition of Patrick Clackson, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 4, 2009).

Deposition of Paul Exall, In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2009).

Deposition of Philip E. Kruse, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2009).

Deposition of Rich Ricci, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 8, 2009).

Deposition of Robert Azerad, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009).

Deposition of Robert Edward Diamond Jr., *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., *Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 11, 2009).

Deposition of Saul Burian, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2009).

Deposition of Stephen King, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 10, 2009).

Deposition of Steven Berkenfeld, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2009).

Deposition Exhibits

Exhibit 1	Exhibit 26	Exhibit 51	Exhibit 73B
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Exhibit 118	Exhibit 142B	Exhibit 159A	Exhibit 190
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Exhibit 120	Exhibit 143B	Exhibit 161A	Exhibit 192
Exhibit 121	Exhibit 144A	Exhibit 162A	Exhibit 193
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Exhibit 125	Exhibit 146A	Exhibit 166A	Exhibit 197
Exhibit 126	Exhibit 146B	Exhibit 167A	Exhibit 198
Exhibit 127	Exhibit 147A	Exhibit 168A	Exhibit 199
Exhibit 128	Exhibit 147B	Exhibit 169A	Exhibit 200
Exhibit 129	Exhibit 148A	Exhibit 170A	Exhibit 201

Exhibit 202	Exhibit 233	Exhibit 264	Exhibit 287A
Exhibit 203	Exhibit 234	Exhibit 265	Exhibit 287B
Exhibit 204	Exhibit 235	Exhibit 266	Exhibit 288B
Exhibit 205	Exhibit 236	Exhibit 267	Exhibit 289B
Exhibit 206	Exhibit 237	Exhibit 268	Exhibit 290B
Exhibit 207	Exhibit 238	Exhibit 269	Exhibit 291B
Exhibit 208	Exhibit 239	Exhibit 270	Exhibit 292B
Exhibit 209	Exhibit 240	Exhibit 271	Exhibit 293B
Exhibit 210	Exhibit 241	Exhibit 272	Exhibit 294A
Exhibit 211	Exhibit 242	Exhibit 273	Exhibit 294B
Exhibit 212	Exhibit 243	Exhibit 274	Exhibit 295A
Exhibit 213	Exhibit 244	Exhibit 275	Exhibit 295B
Exhibit 214	Exhibit 245	Exhibit 276	Exhibit 296A
Exhibit 215	Exhibit 246	Exhibit 277	Exhibit 296B
Exhibit 216	Exhibit 247	Exhibit 278	Exhibit 297A
Exhibit 217	Exhibit 248	Exhibit 279A	Exhibit 297B
Exhibit 218	Exhibit 249	Exhibit 279B	Exhibit 298A
Exhibit 219	Exhibit 250	Exhibit 280A	Exhibit 298B
Exhibit 220	Exhibit 251	Exhibit 280B	Exhibit 299A
Exhibit 221	Exhibit 252	Exhibit 281A	Exhibit 299B
Exhibit 222	Exhibit 253	Exhibit 281B	Exhibit 300A
Exhibit 223	Exhibit 254	Exhibit 282A	Exhibit 300B
Exhibit 224	Exhibit 255	Exhibit 282B	Exhibit 301A
Exhibit 225	Exhibit 256	Exhibit 283A	Exhibit 301B
Exhibit 226	Exhibit 257	Exhibit 283B	Exhibit 302A
Exhibit 227	Exhibit 258	Exhibit 284A	Exhibit 302B
Exhibit 228	Exhibit 259	Exhibit 284B	Exhibit 303A
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Exhibit 230	Exhibit 261	Exhibit 285B	Exhibit 304A
Exhibit 231	Exhibit 262	Exhibit 286A	Exhibit 304B
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Exhibit 305B	Exhibit 333	Exhibit 358A	Exhibit 388B
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Exhibit 306B	Exhibit 335	Exhibit 360A	Exhibit 389B
Exhibit 307A	Exhibit 336	Exhibit 361A	Exhibit 390A
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Exhibit 314B	Exhibit 342A	Exhibit 370A	Exhibit 394B
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Exhibit 316	Exhibit 344A	Exhibit 372A	Exhibit 395B
Exhibit 317	Exhibit 345A	Exhibit 373A	Exhibit 396A
Exhibit 318	Exhibit 346A	Exhibit 374A	Exhibit 396B
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Exhibit 320	Exhibit 348A	Exhibit 376A	Exhibit 397B
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Exhibit 322	Exhibit 350B	Exhibit 378	Exhibit 399A
Exhibit 323	Exhibit 351A	Exhibit 379	Exhibit 400A
Exhibit 324	Exhibit 351B	Exhibit 380	Exhibit 401A
Exhibit 325	Exhibit 352A	Exhibit 381	Exhibit 402A
Exhibit 326	Exhibit 352B	Exhibit 382	Exhibit 403A
Exhibit 327	Exhibit 353A	Exhibit 383	Exhibit 404A
Exhibit 328	Exhibit 353B	Exhibit 384	Exhibit 405A
Exhibit 329	Exhibit 354A	Exhibit 385	Exhibit 406A
Exhibit 330	Exhibit 355A	Exhibit 386	Exhibit 407A
Exhibit 331	Exhibit 356A	Exhibit 387	Exhibit 408A
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Exhibit 410A	Exhibit 439	Exhibit 463B	Exhibit 484
Exhibit 411A	Exhibit 440	Exhibit 464A	Exhibit 485
Exhibit 412A	Exhibit 441	Exhibit 464B	Exhibit 486
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Exhibit 431	Exhibit 459B	Exhibit 476B	
Exhibit 432	Exhibit 460A	Exhibit 477B	
Exhibit 433	Exhibit 460B	Exhibit 478B	
Exhibit 434	Exhibit 461A	Exhibit 479B	
Exhibit 435	Exhibit 461B	Exhibit 480B	
Exhibit 436	Exhibit 462A	Exhibit 481B	
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Legal Filings

Affidavit of Daniel McIsaac, In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) SIPA (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2009).

Affidavit of Ian T. Lowitt Pursuant to Rule 1007-2 of the Local Bankruptcy Rules for the Southern District of New York in Support of First-Day Motions and Applications, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 14, 2008).

Affidavit of Service, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2009).

Appendix to Debtor's Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, Modifying the September 20, 2008 Sale Order and Granting Other Relief: Volume I, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

Appendix to Debtor's Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, Modifying the September 20, 2008 Sale Order and Granting Other Relief: Volume II, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

Appendix to Debtor's Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, Modifying the September 20, 2008 Sale Order and Granting Other Relief: Volume III, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

Appendix to Debtor's Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, Modifying the September 20, 2008 Sale Order and Granting Other Relief: Volume IV, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

Appendix to Debtor's Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, Modifying the September 20, 2008 Sale Order and Granting Other Relief: Volume V, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

Appendix Volume I to Motion of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, for Relief from Order Under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), 363, and 365 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002, 6004, and 6006 Authorizing and Approving (A) Sale of Purchased Assets Free and Clear of Liens and Other Interests and (B) Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, Dated September 20, 2008 (and Related SIPA Sale Order) and Joinder in Debtors' and SIPA Trustees Motions for an Order Under Rule 60(b) to Modify Sale Order, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) and Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

Appendix Volume II to Motion of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, for Relief from Order Under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), 363, and 365 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002, 6004, and 6006 Authorizing and Approving (A) Sale of Purchased Assets Free and Clear of Liens and Other Interests and (B) Assumption and

Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, Dated September 20, 2008 (and Related SIPA Sale Order) and Joinder in Debtors' and SIPA Trustees Motions for an Order Under Rule 60(b) to Modify Sale Order, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) and Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

Appendix Volume III to Motion of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, for Relief from Order Under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), 363, and 365 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002, 6004, and 6006 Authorizing and Approving (A) Sale of Purchased Assets Free and Clear of Liens and Other Interests and (B) Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, Dated September 20, 2008 (and Related SIPA Sale Order) and Joinder in Debtors' and SIPA Trustees Motions for an Order Under Rule 60(b) to Modify Sale Order, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) and Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

Assumption and Assignment of Contracts Relating to the Purchased Assets, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 2008).

Debtor's Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, Modifying the September 20, 2008 Sale Order and Granting Other Relief, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2009).

Debtor's Reply in Further Support of its Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P.2004, Authorizing Discovery from Barclays Capital, Inc., *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., *Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2009).

Debtors' First Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition Notice to Barclays on Issues Pertaining to Exchange-Traded Derivatives and Exchange Deposits Under the Asset Purchase Agreement, *In re: Lehman Brothers* Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 04, 2009).

Debtors' Motion to (A) Schedule A Sale Hearing; (B) Establish Sales Procedures; (C) Approve a Break-Up Fee; and (D) Approve the Sale of the Purchased Assets and the Assumption and Assignment of Contracts Relating to the Purchased Assets, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 17, 2008).

Debtors' Second Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition Notice to Barclays on Issues Relating to the Transfer of Assets, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug 4, 2009).

Debtors' Second Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition Notice to Barclays on Issues Relating to the Transfer of Assets, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug 4, 2009).

Debtors' Third Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition Notice to Barclays on Issues Pertaining to Exchange-Traded Derivatives and Exchange Deposits, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., *Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2009).

Declaration of James B. Kobak Jr. in Support of The Trustee's Motion for Relief Pursuant to the Sale Orders or, Alternatively for Certain Limited Relief Under Rule 60(b), *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) SIPA (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2009).

Declaration of Saul E. Burian in Support of Limited Objection of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al. to SIPA Trustee's Motion Under 11 U.S.C. § \$105 and 363 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a) for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement Agreement, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2008).

Declaration of Shari D. Leventhal in Support of Trustee's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving a Settlement Agreement, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

Declaration of William R. Maguire in Support of The Trustee's Motion for Relief Pursuant to the Sale Orders or, Alternatively for Certain Limited Relief Under Rule 60(b), *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) SIPA (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2009).

Exhibits to Order, Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004, Authorizing Discovery from Barclays Capital, Inc., *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2009).

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Hearing Transcript, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) and Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jun. 24, 2009).

JP Morgan Chase Subpoena in a Case Under the Bankruptcy Code, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) and Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2009).

Letter to Honorable James M. Peck, United States Bankruptcy Judge, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) and Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2009).

Motion of Debtor and Debtor in Possession for an Order Pursuant to Fed R. Bankr.P.2004, Authorizing Discovery From Barclays Capital, Inc., *In re. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., *Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2009).

Motion of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), Fed. R. 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 363, and 365 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002, 6004, and 6006 Authorizing and Approving (A) Sale of Purchased Assets Free and Clear of Liens and Other Interests and (B) Assumptions and Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, Dated September 20, 2008 (and Related SIPA Sale Order) and Joinder in Debtors' and SIPA Trustee's Motions for an Order Under Rule 60(b) to

Modify Sale Order, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) and Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2009).

Motion Under 11 U.S.C. § § 105 and 363 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a) for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement Agreement, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) SIPA (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2008).

Notice of Hearing on the Trustee's Motion for Relief Pursuant to the Sale Order or Alternatively, for Certain Limited Relief Under Rule 60(b), *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) SIPA (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2009).

Objection of Barclays Capital Inc. to Debtors' Motion for an Order Under Rule 2004 Authorizing Discovery of Barclays Capital Inc., *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2009).

Objection to Motion of the Debtors, Pursuant to Section 502(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3), for Establishment of the Deadline for Filing Proofs of Claim, Approval of the Form and Manner of Notice Thereof and Approval of the Proof of Claim Form, In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2009).

Order Under 11 U.S.C. § § 105(a), 363, and 365 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002, 6004 and 6006 Authorizing and Approving (A) the Sale of Purchase)) Assets Free An)) Clear of Liens and Other Interests An)) (B) Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 2009).

Order Under 11 U.S.C. § § 105(a), 363, and 365 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002, 6004 and 6006 Authorizing and Approving (A) the Sale of Purchased Assets Free and Clear of Liens and Other Interests and (B) Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 17, 2008).

Scheduling Order Concerning Certain Motions Filed by LBHI, SIPA Trustee and Creditors Committee, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) and Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2009).

The Trustee's Joinder in Debtors' Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, Modifying the September 20, 2008 Sale Order and Granting Other Relief, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2009).

The Trustee's Motion for Relief Pursuant to the Sale Orders or, Alternatively, for Certain Limited Relief Under Rule 60(b), *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) SIPA (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2009).

The Trustee's Motion for Relief Pursuant to the Sale Orders or, Alternatively for Certain Limited Relief Under Rule 60(b), *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors.*, Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) SIPA (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2009).

The Trustee's, Debtors' and Creditors' Committee's Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents and Things, *In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.*, et al., Debtors., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) and Case No. 08-01420 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009).

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Document titled "Lehman OBS IPV Valuation Methodology_3.doc," *attached to* E-mail from Sean Teague to Tal Litvin et al., re: "Acquisition balance sheet" (Feb. 12, 2009).

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Spreadsheet titled "GR Long Island - Acquisition Balance Sheet 28.01.2009.xls," *attached to* Email from Andrew Daly to Gary Romain, re: "GR Long Island - Acquisition Balance Sheet 28.01.2009.xls" (Feb. 5, 2009).

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Spreadsheet titled "Lehman Asset P_3 12-22-2008_(JPM) Final 2.xls," *attached to* E-mail from Sean Teague to Tal Litvin et al., re: "Acquisition balance sheet" (Feb. 12, 2009).

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Email from Daniel Long to Jasen Yang et al., re: "Proj LI 9/19 collateral file" (Sep. 19, 2008) attaching "Master List unique 6 44pm.xls."

Email from Daniel Long to Marty Malloy et al., re: "Master list of the DTC and Fed Wire from Lehman on 9-18" (Sep. 19, 2008) attaching "Master List.xls."

Email from David Petrie to Daniel Long et al., re: "Master List_unique_mod.xls" (Sep. 19, 2008) attaching "Master List_unique_mod.xls."

Email from Duane McLaughlin to David Murgio et al., re: "Schedules A and B for Filing" (Sep. 29, 2008) with attached "Schedule A" and "Schedule B" spreadsheets.

Email from Edwin Lee to Doug Warren et al., re: "LBI Files" (Sep. 19, 2008) attaching "LBI Short and Long Inventory Detail (Corp Debt) excl Eq division Corp Debt.xls," "lbi-unknown-red-flag.xls," "lbi-converts.xls," "lbi-em.xls," "lbi-europe.xls," and "lbi-unknown."

Email from Gary Romain to James Walker et al., re: "Balance sheet" (Sep. 21, 2008) attaching "Long Island – Acquisition Summary.xls."

Email from Gary Romain to James Walker et al., re: "Draft acquisition balance sheet" (Sep. 25, 2008) attaching "Long Island – Acquisition Balance Sheet.xls."

Email from Gary Romain to Kim Cunningham et al., re: "Balance Sheet" (Nov. 10, 2008) attaching "Long Island – Acquisition Balance Sheet.xls."

Contains Highly Confidential Information

Email from Gary Romain to Patrick Clackson et al., re: "OBS" (Jan. 27, 2009) attaching "Long Island – Acquisition Balance Sheet.xls."

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Email from Gerard LaRocca to Mike Keegan, re: "Totals for the Fed Facility Collateral" (Sep. 19, 2008).

Email from James Hraska to John Rodefeld et al., re: "Repo Trade" (Sep. 20, 2008) attaching "BarCap collateral-09.18.08.jh.xls."

Email from James Hraska to Nancy Denig et al., re: "Purchased & Excluded Mortgage Asset Files" (Sep. 18, 2008) *attaching* "Excluded Mortgage Assets 09-17-2008.xls."

Email from James Hraska to Robert Azerad et al., re: "Financing Facility Schedule" (Sep. 22, 2008) *attaching* "Tri09192008 (3).xls," "BarCap collateral-09.18.08.jh.xls," "barcap pldg 09 22 08 dtc-only.xls."

Email from Jasen Yang to Daniel Long and Hogan Chen, re: "Complete position of Lehman collateral" (Sep. 20, 2008) attaching "Lehm pos 9-19.xls."

Email from Jasen Yang to Eric Yoss et al., re: "Lb" (Sep. 21, 2008) attaching "Lehm Position 2008-09-19 (Thurs Close)(Sun 1030AM).xls."

Email from Jasen Yang to James Walker., re: "Lb" (Sep. 21, 2008) attaching "Lehm Position 2008-09-19 (Thurs Close) (Sun 1030AM).xls."

Email from Jasen Yang to John Haley et al., re: "Complete position of Lehman collateral" (Sep. 20, 2008) *attaching* "Copy of lehman9-18pos.xls," "Lehman Pledged Collateral.xls," "Residual N24 Box 13.5 Million.csv," "PDCF bzw689 11909+ Bill.csv." "Remaining MOP – 210 Mill.csv" and "BZW948-38854095571-85.csv."

Email from Jasen Yang to Nathaniel Hartley et al., re: "Master List_unique (2).xls" (Sep. 19, 2008) attaching "Master List_unique 2pm.xls."

Email from Jasen Yang to Robert Azerad et al., re: "Financing Facility Schedule" (Sep. 22, 2008) attaching "Barclays Financing Collateral.xls."

Email from Jasen Yang to Eric Yoss et al., re: "Lb" (Sep. 21, 2008) attaching "Lehm Position 2008-09-19 (Thurs Close) (Sun 1030 AM).xls."

Email from Jasen Yang to James Walker et al., FW: "Lb" (Sep. 21, 2008) attaching "Lehm Position 2008-09-19 (Thurs Close) (Sun 1030 AM).xls."

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Email from John Grenier to Chris O'Meara, re: "Final Balance Sheet" (Sep. 18, 2008) attaching "bs5.xls."

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Contains Highly Confidential Information

Email from John Haley to Daniel Long, re: "Bony_Price 9-19 clean.xls" (Sep. 22, 2008) attaching "Bony Price 9-19 clean.xls."

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Email from Keith Kochie to John Haley et al., re: "Lehman Deal Collateral 9-19 EOD" (Sep. 20, 2008) attaching "LEHMAN PDCF BZW689 – 9-19.csv," "N24 LEHMAN Residual 9-19.csv," "MOP – LEHMAN Residual 9-19.csv," "Tri-Email:[OTBGZ 20080919.Z].

Email from Marie Stewart to Laura Faviano, re: "systems/process write ups for MTS, ITS, ADP and DBS" (Dec. 09, 2008) *attaching* "MTS Financing Narrative.doc," and "MTS Inventory Close Narractive.doc."

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Email from Paolo Tonucci to David Petrie et al., re: "Box Positions" (Sep. 22, 2008) attaching untitled spreadsheet.

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Email from Ryan Babcock to Jasen Yang, re: "PMTG Haircut Summary (09-21-2008).xls" (Sep. 21, 2008) attaching "PMTG Haircut Summary (09-21-2008).xls."

Email from Sean Teague to Andrew Pickett et al., re: "Pine CCS – memo and supporting pricing documentation-" (Jan. 14, 2009) attaching "PINE CCS LTD[1].-October 2008.pdf," "bfm239C.jpg," "Pine CCS BBF.gif," "Pine CCS BBG Rating History.gif," "PineII.xls," and "Pine CCS Valuation Memo (PCG)."

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Email from Sean Teague to Jeannie Chang et al., re: "Updated: Lehman at close audit – Price testing for rates" (Feb. 24, 2009).

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Email from Usmanpatel Biradar to John Haley and Steven Rosenthal re: "Bony extract" (Sep. 22, 2008) attaching "market val.zip."

Contains Highly Confidential Information

Excel Version of files attached to email from Mary Korycki to James Fogarty et al., (Sep. 29, 2008) *titled* "Exhibit A-1, A-2 – Barclays Financing Collateral List.xls", "Exhibit B-1, B-2, B-3 – DTC 074 and 636 AVAILABLE COLL," "Exhibit B-4 – Friday transfers BONY records agreed," "Exhibit B-5 – 636 Collateral," and "Exhibit B-6 – Schedule B Final."

Email from Duane Mclaughlin to David Murgio et al., re: "Schedules A and B for Filing" (Sep. 29, 2008) with attached "Schedule A" and "Schedule B" spreadsheets.

Workbook of Unpurchaseable securities titled "Book1.xls."

Workbook titled "(September 19th \$1.035).xls."

Workbook titled "(September 29th - 636).xls."

Workbook titled "(September 30th 074).xls."

Workbook titled "(September 30th 074-equity).xls."

Workbook titled "6. 12-16-2008 JPM Settlement.xls."

Workbook titled "Copy of Lehman Schedule July 2009 2.xls."

Workbook titled "DocReq122809.xls."

Workbook titled "DTC Collateral Lehman Marks.xls."

Workbook titled "Fed and DTC 9-18 (3).xls."

Workbook titled "Fed cusips cob 9.16.xls."

Workbook titled "fed-091608.xls."

Workbook titled "Final Lehman Position File v1.xls."

Workbook titled "LBI Short and Long Inventory Detail (Corp Debt) excl Eq division Corp Debt.xls."

Workbook titled "lbi-converts.xls."

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Workbook titled "lbi-europe.xls."

Workbook titled "lbi-unknown.xls."

Workbook titled "lbi-unknown-red-flag.xls."

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Workbook titled "LEH Haircut File 9-22.xls."

Workbook titled "Lehman Intangible asset and amortization Final.xls."

Workbook titled "Market Value PDCF.xls."

Workbook titled "Sched B LehOBS 5,xls."

08-13555-mg Doc 8015-3 Filed 04/02/10 Entered 04/02/10 14:10:51 Exhibits B-E Pg 112 of 122

EXHIBIT D

From: Christopher Green [Cgreen@BSFLLP.com]

Sent: 02/18/2010 01:11 PM EST

To: Kelly Carrero

Cc: "ericataggart@quinnemanuel.com" <ericataggart@quinnemanuel.com>; "erickay@quinnemanuel.com" <erickay@quinnemanuel.com>; Hamish Hume

<a href="mailto:hhume@BSFLLP.com; "jamestecce@quinnemanuel.com"

<jamestecce@quinnemanuel.com>; Jonathan Schiller <JSchiller@BSFLLP.com>; Jonathan

Shaw <jshaw@BSFLLP.com>; "Jack G. Stern" <jstern@bsfllp.com>; Jayant Tambe;

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"oxford@HughesHubbard.COM" <oxford@HughesHubbard.COM>; Robert Gaffey;

"susheelkirpalani@quinnemanuel.com" <susheelkirpalani@quinnemanuel.com>; Tracy Schaffer,

"tylerwhitmer@quinnemanuel.com" <tylerwhitmer@quinnemanuel.com>; William Hine;


Jennifer Del Medico

Subject: RE: In re Lehman Brothers Inc. - The Debtors', Trustee's, and Committee's Fourth Set of Requests for Production of Documents and Things

Kelly:

As we indicated on this morning's call, we have checked with Barclays and it appears that much of the information sought in your Fourth Set of Requests has already been produced. The two Excel files identified below contain most of the information sought by sub-part B of the Fourth Set of Requests that was used by Barclays in valuing the securities represented by the CUSIPs listed on Attachment A, and can be gathered and produced by Barclays without undue burden:

- (1) Spreadsheet titled "Acquisition Detail (PWC Day1) 09-22 Final Nu5.xls," attached to E-mail from Sean Teague to Tal Litvin et al., re: "Acquisition balance sheet" (Feb. 12, 2009) [Bates-labeled BCI-EX-(S)-00213990 (E-mail) and BCI-EX-(S)-00213995 (Attachment)]; and
- (2) Spreadsheet titled "Lehman Asset P_3 12-22-2008_(JPM) Final 2.xls," attached to E-mail



from Sean Teague to Tal Litvin et al., re: "Acquisition balance sheet" (Feb. 12, 2009) [Bates-labeled BCI-EX-(S)-00213990 (E-mail) and BCI-EX-(S)-00213996 (Attachment)].

The two excel files referenced above were produced on January 18, 2010 and previously identified in the "Revised Production Index for All Documents listed under 'Other Miscellaneous Documents' in revised Appendix Two of the Expert Report of Professor Paul Pfleiderer," which was attached to my letter to Jayant Tambe dated January 23, 2010.

Later today, as we also indicated on this morning's call, we will be producing Intex spreadsheets for securitized products that were transferred to Barclays in the JP Morgan settlement. These Intex spreadsheets provide further backup for the securitized products listings in spreadsheet titled "Lehman Asset P_3 12-22-2008_(JPM) Final 2.xls" (No. 2 above).

We are endeavoring to gather similar backup for the spreadsheet titled "Acquisition Detail (PWC Dayl) 09-22 Final Nu5.xls" and if we are successful in that effort, which I presently have no reason not to expect, we will produce that backup promptly.

Thanks.

Chris

From: Kelly A Carrero [mailto:kacarrero@JonesDay.com]

Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 2010 9:27 AM

To: Christopher Green

Cc: ericataggart@quinnemanuel.com; erickay@quinnemanuel.com; Hamish Hume; jamestecce@quinnemanuel.com; Jonathan Schiller; Jonathan Shaw; Jack G. Stern; jtambe@jonesday.com; maguire@hugheshubbard.com; oxford@HughesHubbard.COM; rwgaffey@jonesday.com; susheelkirpalani@quinnemanuel.com; tschaffer@jonesday.com; tylerwhitmer@quinnemanuel.com; wjhine@jonesday.com; Jennifer Del Medico
Subject: RE: In re Lehman Brothers Inc. - The Debtors', Trustee's, and Committee's Fourth Set of Requests for Production of Documents and Things

Chris,

It has been over a week since the parties' February 8 meet and confer on outstanding discovery issues, which included our Fourth Set of Requests attached below. A week ago, at your request, we provided you with an electronic version of Attachment A to those requests. Since then, we have heard nothing further from you about the Fourth Set of Requests.

In Hamish Hume's February 9 letter to Bill Maguire, he indicated you were "inquiring further into what if any information may be possible to gather" and anticipated having an answer for us by the end of last week. We have not been informed of the outcome of that inquiry. Also, in follow-up to our meet & confer and Hamish's February 9 letter, Bill sent Hamish a letter dated Friday, February 12, in which, among other things, he requested a status update on Barclays' prospective production in response to the Fourth Set of Requests. As I understand it, Bill has not received a response.

As you are aware, our fact discovery deadline is fast approaching. Again, please let us know promptly when and what you will be producing in response to our Fourth Set of Requests.

Regards, Kelly

Kelly A. Carrero JONES DAY 222 E. 41st Street New York, NY 10017 Direct Dial: 212.326.8391 Facsimile: 212.755.7306 kacarrero@jonesday.com

Christopher Green <Cgreen@BSFLLP.∞

02/10/2010 03:13 PM

ToKelly A Carrero <kacarrero@JonesDay.com>

cc"ericataggart@quinnemanuel.com" <ericataggart@quinnemanuel.com>, "erickay@quinnemanuel.com" <erickay@quinnemanuel.com>, Hamish Hume

<hhume@BSFLLP.com>, "jamestecce@quinnemanuel.com" <jamestecce@quinnemanuel.com>, Jonathan Schiller Jannesiecce@quimemander.com
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Jonathan Schiller Jannesiecce@quimemander.com
Jonathan Schiller <a href="mailto:Jonathan Shaw Jannesiecce@quimemander.com
Jonathan Schiller Jannesiecce@quimemander.com
Jonathan Jonathan Schiller Jannesiecce@quimemander.com
Jonathan Jonathan Jonathan Jonathan Schiller Jannesiecce@quimemander.com

<rwgaffey@jonesday.com>, "susheelkirpalani@quinnemanuel.com"

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<wjhine@jonesday.com>

SubjectRE: In re Lehman Brothers Inc. - The Debtors', Trustee's, and Committee's Fourth Set of Requests for Production of Documents and Things

Thanks Kelly.

From: Kelly A Carrero [mailto:kacarrero@JonesDay.com]

Sent: Wednesday, February 10, 2010 3:04 PM

To: Christopher Green

Cc: ericataggart@quinnemanuel.com; erickay@quinnemanuel.com; Hamish Hume; jamestecce@quinnemanuel.com; Jonathan Schiller; Jonathan Shaw; Jack G. Stern; itambe@jonesday.com; maquire@hugheshubbard.com; oxford@HughesHubbard.COM; rwqaffey@jonesday.com; susheelkirpalani@quinnemanuel.com; tschaffer@jonesday.com; tylerwhitmer@quinnemanuel.com; wjhine@jonesday.com

Subject: RE: In re Lehman Brothers Inc. - The Debtors', Trustee's, and Committee's Fourth Set of

Requests for Production of Documents and Things

Chris,

Per your request below, please find attached an electronic version of Attachment A in Excel format.

Regards,

Kelly A. Carrero JONES DAY 222 E. 41st Street New York, NY 10017 Direct Dial: 212.326.8391 Facsimile: 212.755.7306 kacarrero@jonesday.com

Christopher Green <Cgreen@BSFLLP.co

02/10/2010 12:22 PM

ToKelly A Carrero kacarrero@JonesDay.com, Hamish Hume https://hume@BSFLLP.com, "Jack G. Stern" jstern@bsflip.com, "Jack G. Stern" jstern@bsflip.com,

Jonathan Shaw <jshaw@BSFLLP.com>

cc"maguire@hugheshubbard.com" <maguire@hugheshubbard.com>,
 "oxford@HughesHubbard.COM" <oxford@HughesHubbard.COM>,
 "jamestecce@quinnemanuel.com" <jamestecce@quinnemanuel.com>,
 "jamestecce@quinnemanuel.com" <jamestecce@quinnemanuel.com>,
 "susheelkirpalani@quinnemanuel.com" <susheelkirpalani@quinnemanuel.com>,
 "susheelkirpalani@quinnemanuel.com" <susheelkirpalani@quinnemanuel.com>,
 "ericataggart@quinnemanuel.com" <ericataggart@quinnemanuel.com>,
 "ericataggart@quinnemanuel.com" <ericataggart@quinnemanuel.com>,
 "tylerwhitmer@quinnemanuel.com" <tylerwhitmer@quinnemanuel.com>,
 "erickay@quinnemanuel.com" <erickay@quinnemanuel.com>, "rwgaffey@jonesday.com" <rwgaffey@jonesday.com"
 "wjhine@jonesday.com" <wjhine@jonesday.com>, "tschaffer@jonesday.com"

<tschaffer@jonesday.com>
SubjectRE: In re Lehman Brothers Inc. - The Debtors', Trustee's, and Committee's Fourth Set of
Requests for Production of Documents and Things

Kelly:

08-13555-mg Doc 8015-3 Filed 04/02/10 Entered 04/02/10 14:10:51 Exhibits B-E Pg 118 of 122

Please provide us with a version of Attachment A to the Fourth Set of Requests in either MS Word or Excel format.

Thanks.

Chris Green

From: Kelly A Carrero [mailto:kacarrero@JonesDay.com]

Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2010 9:37 PM

To: Hamish Hume; Jonathan Schiller; Jack G. Stern; Jonathan Shaw; Christopher Green
Cc: maguire@hugheshubbard.com; oxford@HughesHubbard.COM; jamestecce@quinnemanuel.com; jamestecce@quinnemanuel.com; susheelkirpalani@quinnemanuel.com; susheelkirpalani@quinnemanuel.com; ericataggart@quinnemanuel.com; ericataggart@quinnemanuel.com; ericataggart@quinnemanuel.com; tylerwhitmer@quinnemanuel.com; erickay@quinnemanuel.com; rwgaffey@jonesday.com; jtambe@jonesday.com; wjhine@jonesday.com; tschaffer@jonesday.com
Subject: In re Lehman Brothers Inc. - The Debtors', Trustee's, and Committee's Fourth Set of Requests for Production of Documents and Things

Counsel:

Please see attached.

Regards,

Kelly A. Carrero JONES DAY 222 E. 41st Street New York, NY 10017 Direct Dial: 212.326.8391 Facsimile: 212.755.7306 kacarrero@jonesday.com

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EXHIBIT E

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	·y
In re:	: Chapter 11
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC., et al.,	: Case No. 08-13555 (JMP)
Debtors.	: (Jointly Administered) : :
In re:	: SIPA Proceeding .
LEHMAN BROTHERS INC.,	: Case No. 08-01420 (JMP)
Debtor.	· : :

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

ORDER ON MOTION IN LIMINE FOR AN ORDER EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF PROFESSOR PAUL PFLEIDERER

This matter coming before the Court on the Motion *In Limine* for an Order Excluding the Testimony of Professor Paul Pfleiderer (the "Motion"), filed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. ("LBHI"), James W. Giddens (the "Trustee"), as trustee for the SIPA liquidation of Lehman Brothers Inc., and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its affiliated debtors and debtors-in-possession (the "Committee," collectively, the "Movants"); the Court having reviewed the Motion and having considered the statements of counsel before the Court (the "Hearing"); and the Court having found that: (a) the Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; (b) this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b); and (c) notice of the Motion and the Hearing was

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sufficient under the circumstances; and the Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion and at the Hearing establish just cause for the relief granted herein;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

- 1. The Motion is GRANTED.
- 2. The expert testimony of Professor Paul Pfleiderer, including the Report dated January 8, 2010, as amended, is hereby deemed inadmissible and is excluded from the record, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702.
- 3. The Court shall retain jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters arising from or related to the implementation of this Order.

Dated: New York, New York	
, 2010	
	HON. JAMES M. PECK,
	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE